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Article

Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern
of the First Amendment"
J. Peter Byrne-

No [one] ought to meddle with the universities, who does not know them well
and love them well ....
Thomas Arnold*

t Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to the following colleagues for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Walter Metzger, Vicki Jackson, L. Michael Seidman,
Thomas Krattenmaker, Steven Goldberg, Daniel Ernst, and Warren Schwartz. Valerie Hastings,
Tracy Rickett, Anne McBride and Timothy Maguire provided valuable research assistance. Charles
Horsky deserves special thanks for many stimulating and pleasant weekends discussing academic freedom. Finally, I dedicate the article to my mother, Dorothy Byrne, whose proud and loving celebration
upon the acceptance of this article for publication was one of her last gifts to me.
* Letter to George Pryme (Mar. 8, 1837), reprinted in 2 A. STANLEY, THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THOMAS ARNOLD, D.D. 67, 69 (12th ed. 1881). Arnold goes on to affirm his love of
his university and concludes: "And therefore I wish it improved and reformed-though this is a therefore which men are exceedingly slow to understand." Id.
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INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple proposition stands explicit or implicit in numerous judicial opinions, often proclaimed in fervid rhetoric. Attempts to understand the scope and foundation of a constitutional guarantee of academic freedom, however, generally
result in paradox or confusion. The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are incon-
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clusive, the promise of their rhetoric reproached by the ambiguous realities of academic life.
The problems are fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of
what academic freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it.
Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law,
picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently addressed the question of whether the dismissal of a nontenured professor by his dean for refusing to change a student's grade
violates the professor's First Amendment right of academic freedom.' The
District Court had rejected the claim, agreeing that the First Amendment
protects the professor's choice of "teaching method" (itself a view rejected
by a majority of courts), 2 but insisting that grading does not fall within
"teaching method."' The Sixth Circuit held that the professor's grading
was a "communicative act"" protected by the First Amendment but that
the administrator himself could change the grade on his own authority.'
This bizarre decision gives the professor a symbolic legal right against his
institution but severely restricts his professional authority.6 Twisted into
incoherence by the effort to abide by contradictory statements in prior decisions, the opinion lacks sensitivity to the relationship between teaching
and constitutional values.
In a second, more serious example, the Supreme Court currently is
wrestling with the question of whether a university's academic freedom
requires some privilege against or other restraint on discovery of confidential tenure review records by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (or by a private claimant) in cases of alleged racial or gender
discrimination in the denial of tenure.' Lower courts have provided an
impressive variety of answers to this delicate question-some denying any
1. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989).
2. See Carley v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 153 Ariz. 461, 463-65, 737 P.2d 1099, 1101-03 (Ct.
App. 1987) (collecting cases). Carley is itself an outstanding example of confusion over the legal
significance of academic freedom. The Arizona Civil Liberties Union filed an amicus brief on behalf
of Carley, whose preposterous claim was that the university violated his constitutional rights by taking
into account highly negative student evaluations of his teaching in deciding not to renew his contract.
See Proper Use of Student Evaluationsat Issue in Professor's Legal Appeal to Regain Job, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 17, 1986, at 14. The court rejected Carley's claim and ordered him to pay
the university's legal fees.
3. Parate v. Isibor, No. 3-86-0311 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 1987).
4. 868 F.2d at 827.
5. Id. at 830.
6. The specific issue of control over grading was addressed quite adequately in Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986), which held that a professor has no constitutional
right to depart from a university's grading policy. The court stressed the right of a university to set
fundamental educational policy free from judicial interference. Id. at 425-26. Lovelace involved a
professor who graded part-time students severely in a curriculum intended to draw older students and
workers into college. The Supreme Court has suggested that a university's grading decisions should
not be subject to challenge in court unless they can be shown to be failures to exercise professional
academic judgment. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
7. EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 554 (1988),
amended, 109 S. Ct. 1660 (1989).
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protection for peer review, others crafting various qualified privileges, and
still others rejecting a privilege but mandating extensive protective orders.8
The justices will search in vain among prior decisions for any real guidance on this question, finding fulsome praise of free teaching and scholarship and frequent admonitions against official interference with core academic decision-making. But nowhere will the Court find instruction on
why the private evaluations of one scholar by another implicate the values
protected by the First Amendment.
The problem goes beyond a few hard cases or weird decisions. American law operates on an impoverished understanding of the unique and
complex functions performed by our universities. All too often, courts fail
to recognize that universities are fundamentally different from business
corporations, government agencies, or churches. Concepts and categories
developed in the law to regulate these institutions are applied to university
problems with varying degrees of awareness that square pegs are being
pressed into round holes. Our universities require legal provisions tailored
to their own goals and problems.
This article attempts comprehensively to describe and criticize the roles
of the Constitution and the courts in supporting a meaningful system of
academic freedom. The analysis begins by suggesting that the meaning of
academic freedom must vary among different communities of speech. Accordingly, I examine carefully the transmission of the term, academic freedom, from internal academic arguments about the role of the faculty
within our universities to the realm of constitutional law, where its interpretation by judges determines the status of universities within our political system. I conclude that the term appropriately has different, if related,
meanings in the mouths of academics and in the mouths of judges and that
both the academy and the courts have suffered from the confusion. Finally, I offer a theory of constitutional academic freedom based on the
traditional legal status of academic institutions and on the appropriate
role of the judiciary in academic affairs.
An article that aims to resolve confusion about a term that has several
meanings needs to take special care with its own usage. I claim that "academic freedom" means something different from "constitutional academic
freedom"; accordingly, I am confronted by a problem of terminology, since
the sources I discuss often fail to recognize the difference. 9 Although the
8. See, e.g., EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1163 (1986) (qualified academic privilege not recognized); EEOC v. University of Notre
Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983) (qualified academic privilege recognized); Gray v. Board
of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's interest outweighs qualified academic privilege); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981) (academic privilege rejected), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982); Dixon v. Rutgers, 110 N.J. 432, 541 A.2d 1046 (1988) (privilege rejected but
protective orders required). For a lucid argument against such a privilege, see DeLano, Discovery in
University Employment DiscriminationSuits: Should Peer Review Materials Be Privileged?, 14 J.
COLL. & UNiv. L. 121 (1987).
9. Many commentators have recognized that the courts have given constitutional protection only to
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confusion wrought by others is part of my thesis, I shall be as precise as
possible. Therefore, I use "academic freedom" as a non-legal term referring to the liberties claimed by professors through professional channels
against administrative or political interference with research, teaching,
and governance. When writing of legal doctrine, I will use the term "constitutional academic freedom." As will be seen, the essence of constitutional academic freedom is the insulation of scholarship and liberal education from extramural political interference.
There is a further confusion that should be pointed out at the beginning
of this article. Academic freedom, when understood as a legal principle,
sometimes is meant to encompass only the rights of individual faculty
members, either against their universities or against the state. At other
times, it refers to the corporate right of the university against the state. I
try to be clear in distinguishing between these meanings, but the reader
should be aware of the difficulty. As will be evident, the force of the nonlegal tradition of academic freedom has been directed at protecting the
professional autonomy of the individual professor when engaging in academic work within the university, but I believe that constitutional academic freedom should primarily insulate the university in core academic
affairs from interference by the state.
The article proceeds as follows: First, I attempt to present the cultural
and intellectual values that support a constitutional right of academic freedom, explaining the differences between academic freedom and other important applications of the First Amendment to speech by members of the
university community. Second, I describe the development within the
academy of the norm of freedom for a professor to research, publish and
teach, and I analyze its relation both to the power structure of the university and to prevailing models of successful scholarly endeavor. I then examine and critique the Supreme Court's usage of the phrase "academic
freedom" and argue for a very limited judicial role in protecting faculty
against their schools. Finally, I describe the constitutional protection afforded sensitive university decisions from lay interference, presenting a
view of the pre-constitutional legal roots of this protection. These common
law and state constitutional roots suggest the appropriate normative basis
for and scope of constitutional academic freedom.
some aspects of academic freedom, but they have seen this partial protection as a measure of prudence
in the face of conflicting interests rather than as the development of a different model of legal protection for university work. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 610-16
(1970); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1050-51 (1968).
Scholars recently have begun to insist on a sharper distinction between traditional academic freedom and its constitutional counterpart. See Metzger, Professionand Constitution:Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1265 (1988); Yudof, Three Faces of Academic
Freedom, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 831 (1987). They have not, I think, adequately described the
distinction.
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS

My concern is only with substantive protection of academic freedom by
the First Amendment. Isolating this legal right has proven difficult, in
part because courts have employed several legal doctrines that are not
themselves based on academic freedom to protect the liberties of professors
and students. At the same time, courts have declined to recognize a constitutional shield for many forms of classroom speech that seem at first blush
to implicate general principles of free expression. This confusion has led
some commentators to put a large array of legal principles under the umbrella of academic freedom, but it has led others to doubt that the law
recognizes an independent right of academic freedom at all. A detailed
examination of the legal claims of academic freedom must therefore begin
with some general differentiation of academic speech from other forms of
speech protected by the First Amendment.
This blending of academic with constitutional values is not surprising.
There were no American legal precedents for academic freedom prior to
its acceptance by the Supreme Court into the pantheon of First Amendment rights in 1957.10 Neither the common law nor any federal or state
statute granted the university professor any more security than that
granted in her contract of employment. 1 Prior to 1957, academic freedom
was a matter of professional ideology and custom. Many institutions had
committed themselves to the American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 2 and they adopted internal procedures consistent with its principles. Abuses were investigated and reported by Committee A of the
AAUP, but the only sanction was censure.13 The Supreme Court's challenge has been to give legal substance-with all that entails both of general applicability and technical, pragmatic detail-to an idea originally
conceived as a solution to long term problems of a distinct community and
best articulated in the speeches and writings of philosophers and social
10. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). For a trenchant description of the
legal rights of professors early in this century, see Note, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 YALE
LJ. 670 (1937); see also E. ELLIOTT & M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS 68-91
(1936).
11. The legal position of the faculty member often was worse than that. Courts generally permitted institutions to dismiss faculty before the expiration of their employment contracts when an authorizing statute or a school by-law conferred on governing boards the discretion to dismiss faculty whenever they felt the action appropriate. See Ward v. Board of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1905); R.
HOFSTADTER & W.

METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED

STATES 465 (1955); Note, supra note 10, at 672 & n.16 (collecting cases). Faculty at state universities
were sometimes considered to be state officers rather than contract employees; sometimes this status
gave the professor more rights, sometimes less. See E. ELLIOTT & M. CHAMBERS, supra note 10, at
71-73.
12. AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principleson Academic Freedom and Tenure, 64 A.A.U.P. BULL.
108 (1978) [hereinafter 1940 Statement], reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3
(1984) [hereinafter POLICY DOCUMENTS].
13. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. MErZGER, supra note 11, at 490-95 (describing Committee A
and its procedures).
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scientists."' It is no wonder that lawyers have had trouble getting the hang
of it.
The Court has been far more generous in its praise of academic freedom than in providing a precise analysis of its meaning. The Court has
proclaimed that "[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation,"' 5
that "[ojur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us,"" 6 and even that "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' "17 What consequence any
of this has in determining which officials can do what to which professors
has remained largely unexplained. A gross imbalance between encomium
and rule suggests an extreme reluctance by or difficulty for a court to find
any particular practice to be a violation of academic freedom.
Moreover, the Court has been unclear about whether constitutional academic freedom is an individual or community right. Academics traditionally have conceived of academic freedom in the United States as a right of
individual teachers. Beginning no later than 1978, however, the Court has
developed a concept of constitutional academic freedom as a qualified
right of the institution to be free from government interference in its core
administrative activities, such as deciding who may teach and who may
learn."8 Why the First Amendment protects administrative activities at
some remove from teaching and scholarship has yet to be adequately justified. While this doctrine involves several anomalies, courts and commentators were immediately startled by a central paradox: The institutional
right seems to give a university the authority to hire and fire without
government interference those very individuals apparently granted a personal right to write and teach without institutional hindrance. 9 How can
the same right protect both traditional antagonists-the professor and the
university? Even the Court has suggested that these rights may be somewhat inconsistent.2 Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neither
collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits from the tension
between the independence of a scholar's judgment and the university's
14. See, e.g., Dewey, Academic Freedom, 23 EDuc. REV. 1 (1902); Lovejoy, Academic Freedom,
in I ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL ScIENCEs 384 (E. Seligman ed. 1930).
15. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
16. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
17. Id.
18. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
19. See Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEx. L. REV. 817, 839-40 (1983).
20. "Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making
by the academy itself." Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985)
(citations omitted). Cf. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th
Cir.) (Posner, J.) (discussing how "these two freedoms are in conflict ....
), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
528 (1985).
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evaluation of her professional competence. This issue lies at the heart of
this article and will be discussed in detail.
I shall argue that the First Amendment protects the central intellectual
efforts of the modern university. These efforts include teaching, scholarship, and experimentation, all of which contribute unique cultural and
intellectual values to a free society. My primary concern is with the appropriate manner of constitutional protection for this system, given its historical origins, its intellectual assumptions, the structural compromises
and political equilibria that sustain it, and the attitude of the judiciary
toward it.
It might be helpful if at the outset we consider the First Amendment
values that justify a distinct protection for academic work. This analysis
will allow us to distinguish other manifestations of the First Amendment
on campus-such as protection for the extra-scholastic utterances of
faculty and students-and to explain why they should not be thought of as
rights of academic freedom.
A. Academic Speech
Academic speech-a term I use to encompass both scholarship and
teaching-has unique value because of the disciplinary and ethical constraints under which it is produced. Scholars work within a discipline,
primarily addressing other scholars and students. Their audience understands and evaluates their speech within a tradition of knowledge, shared
assumptions and arguments about methodology and criteria, and common
objectives of exploration or discovery. This learned and critical audience
provides comfort and challenge to the academic speaker; he knows that his
auditors will listen with care, consider with knowledge, and challenge
with intelligence. The speaker cannot persuade her colleagues by her social standing, physical strength or the raw vehemence of her argument;
she must persuade on the basis of reason and evidence (concepts vouchsafed, if only contingently, by her discipline). The ordinary criterion of
success is whether, through mastery of the discipline's discourse, the
scholar improves the account of some worthy subject that the discipline
has previously accepted.
Academic speech is rigidly formalistic. Every lecture or article must
presuppose the history and current canon of the discipline; every departure from common understandings must be explained and justified. Many
lovely and personally satisfying styles of expression are outlawed: The
physicist may not sing, the historian may not whine, the economist may
not offer the primordial scream. More seriously, the persons who may
engage in this speech are rigorously controlled. To enter the discourse, the
scholar must proceed through the university course of study-at great expense and personal sacrifice-in order to be certified by her peers as com-
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petent to engage in scholarly exchange. Students, even though adults in
civil society, are admitted as neophytes and treated as intellectual dependents, so long as they lack mastery or certification. Students and junior
professors suffer real punishment for speech deemed inadequate by the
masters. In general civil society, the First Amendment opposes both prior
and subsequent restraint on the speaker by a class of officials determining
which speech is valuable and which is not. 2
Yet within these constraints, the academic speaker in control of his
methodology is free to reach conclusions that contradict previous dogma,
whether within the academy or throughout the larger society. Indeed, such
contradiction is prized as new knowledge, the mark of contribution, the
sine qua non of the doctoral dissertation. Moreover, the community of
scholars will close ranks behind even the most mediocre scholar whenever
civil authority threatens to punish unorthodox scholarship. Those instances where it has failed to defend its fellows are incidents of permanent
shame and regret.2 2
This essential freedom has been at the core of professorial insistence on
faculty autonomy within the university power structure. It obviously resonates with traditional First Amendment liberty. But the simple fact that
such speech strives to be free in its application of methodology to reach
controversial conclusions does not set it apart within First Amendment
values. The unique point is that academic speech can be more free than
the speaker; that the speaker may be driven to conclusions by her respect
for methodology and evidence that contradict her own preconceptions and
cherished assumptions. The scholar cannot argue merely for her political
party, religion, class, race, or gender; she must acknowledge the hard resistance of the subject matter, the inadequacies of friends' arguments, and
the force of those of her enemies. That is what scholars mean by disinterested argument-not indifference to the outcome, but insistence that commitment not weaken the rigor and honesty by which the argument is
pursued.
The First Amendment value of academic speech rests on its commit21. See T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 503-12.
22. For example, much has been written recently about the administration of the preeminent
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, as Rektor of Freiburg University in 1933-34. Disturbing disclosures
have been published in H. Orr, MARTIN HEIDEGGER: UNTERWEGS ZU SEINER BIOGRAPHIE (1989),
and V. FARIAS, HEIDEGGER ET LE NAZISME (1988); commentary in English includes Stern, Heil
Heidegger, LONDON REV. BooIs, Apr. 20, 1989, at 7-10; Zimmerman, Philosophy Among the
Ruins, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, May 5-11, 1989, at 481; Over a Philosophic Temple,
Shadow of a Swastika, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1988, at A4, col. 3. Apparently, Heidegger sought the
position with the help of Nazi officials, proclaimed himself Fiihrer of the University, made Hitler's
pronouncements the official ideology, blackballed "un-German" professors, attacked Catholics, and
urged Hitler to exercise total control over all German universities. Despite the creditable claim that
Heidegger is the foremost philosopher of the twentieth century, influencing thinkers ranging from
Paul Tillich to Jacques Derrida, the publication of evidence of his enthusiastic suppression of academic freedom and complicity in the Nazi regime will inevitably cast doubt, not on the genius, but on
the moral consequences of his writings.
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ment to truth (however partially understood by the discipline), its honesty
and carefulness, its richness of meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its invitation to criticism. These are not often identified as the justifications for
the First Amendment protection of speech. 3 In society at large, freedom
of speech insulates from penalty expression that is vulgar, pernicious, incomprehensible, and mad.2 Even advertising, which is wholly selfinterested and manipulative, is protected.25 Only genitalia and false statements of fact may usually be regulated,2 and verbal provocations to
crime, violence and riot may be prohibited.2" The justifications for this
regime are various but persuasive. First Amendment doctrine recognizes
the danger to a democratic political process if officials proscribe some subjects or modes of expression.2 8 This sensitivity is heightened by the enormous cultural diversity of the American polity. Advocates of free expression also properly cast doubt both on the wisdom of officials, even when
acting in good faith, to decide which ideas are out of bounds and on the
efficacy of combatting apparently dangerous ideas by suppressing them.29
Finally, many recognize the value to the individual citizen of being the
sole legal arbiter of what she shall say, read or think; such freedom and
responsibility dignify the citizen in a democracy."
Yet can it be said that these familiar themes exhaust the value to democratic society of free expression? The First Amendment ought also to be
aspirational. Society ought to strive toward speech that is truthful, gracious, well-considered, and generous to opponents. It ought not settle for,
though it must often permit, speech that is ignorant, self-interested, manipulative, hateful or vapid. Without some such ideal, actively pursued,
speech loses its value as communication, and thought loses its power to
persuade through appeal to reason. When discourse becomes debased,
23. However, Professor Meiklejohn, long a defender of academic freedom, has made similar statements on occasion:
I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems,
"because they will be called upon to vote." The primary social fact which blocks and hinders
the success of our experiment in self-government is that our citizens are not educated for selfgovernment. We are terrified by ideas, rather than challenged and stimulated by them.
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 263.
24. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (flag burning); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing jacket bearing words "Fuck the Draft" in courthouse); Brandenberg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan rally). But cf.FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (on
nuisance theory, FCC has right to regulate broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue).
25. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65
VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
26. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318, 326 (1957) (advocacy of forcible overthrow of government as abstract principle may not be punished, but advocacy promoting forcible
overthrow may be).
28. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 94 (1948);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
29. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 6.
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conflict of interests within democratic society cannot be resolved or lessened through debate or deliberation (because no one will take them seriously) but only through the parlay of money, numbers and force. Speech
should be protected because it is beneficial.
Preeminent among the systems of discourse within our diverse society,
academic speech holds expression to high standards. For all the notorious
faults of jargon and circumlocution associated with scholarship, academic
speech provides our most important model of expression that is meaningful as well as free, coherent yet diverse, critical and inspirational. The
nature of this importance will be explored more fully below, but I wish to
emphasize here that much of its value is social-it contributes profoundly
to society at large. We employ the expositors of academic speech to train
nearly everyone who exercises leadership within our society. Beyond
whatever specialized learning our graduates assimilate, they ought to be
persuaded that careful, honest expression demands an answer in kind.
The experience of academic freedom helps secure broader, positive liberties of expression.
The judges who pioneered the modern doctrine of free speech followed
Mill in arguing that even hateful speech must be tolerated, because such
speech may be true. Suppression is unnecessary, moreover, because truth
will emerge in any open competition with falsehood. The problems with
this argument are familiar and many. 31 For example, proponents of falsehoods may employ powerful means of persuasion, such as television commercials that endow their views with glamour or associate them with attractive symbols. The mass audience may lack the interest, information or
intelligence necessary to sift through specious propositions. But, as Professor Schauer has pointed out, this "argument from truth" holds sound for
smaller social groups committed to rational thinking and to pursuit of
truth as a primary value. 2 The structures of academic discourse can be
justified because they facilitate the rational pursuit of truth. Academic
freedom resembles other free expression values insofar as it protects the
individual scholar's point of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects those
structures that permit the individual scholar to engage with others in collective scholarship. I shall argue below that constitutional academic freedom should protect these structures from extramural political distortion.
B.

Student Speech and ExtracurricularPoliticalActivity

Academic freedom was constitutionalized during a period in which the
Court announced other First Amendment rights of teachers and students.
31. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-39 (1982). Holmes' views of
the First Amendment are discussed infra note 176 and accompanying text.
32. F. SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 25-26. Professor Schauer argues: "In systems of scientific and
academic discourse, the argument from truth has substantial validity." Id. at 26. Because these social
groups are committed to rational thinking, "maximum freedom of discussion is a desirable goal." Id.
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Understandably, but erroneously, academic freedom has been thought to
encompass all First Amendment rights exercisable on a campus or by
members of the academic community."3 The term "academic freedom"
should be reserved for those rights necessary for the preservation of the
unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of disinterested
scholarship and teaching.3 4 The First Amendment rights I here wish to
put aside are those general civil rights of free speech incidentally exercised
by members of the academic community and enforced against public universities only because they are viewed as instrumentalities of the state.
These "civil" rights fall essentially into two categories.
First, no recognized student rights of free speech are properly part of
constitutional academic freedom, because none of them has anything to do
with scholarship or systematic learning. Cases allowing public school students to wear armbands, 5 demonstrate in good order, 6 distribute newspapers, 7 and form political organizations3 8 grant students rights against
public education officials plainly analogous to those enjoyed generally by
citizens against government. 9 Moreover, such activities have little to do
33. This hodgepodge is typified by N. DORSEN, P. BENDER., & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHrS IN THE UNITED STATES 805-90 (4th ed. 1976), where diverse substantive and proce-

dural rights of teachers and students in primary and higher education are grouped under the heading
of "academic freedom."
34. "Not ideas of any sort, but ideas promulgated according to disciplined and publicly accepted
procedures, have rights in the university." Birnbaum, Students, Professors, and Philosopher Kings,
in CONTENT AND CoNTEXT 401, 403 (C. Kaysen ed. 1973).
35. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. See Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees, 620 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. See Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
38. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
39. A self-conscious tradition of academic freedom for students has never developed in the United
States. In nineteenth century Germany, students were "free to roam from place to place, sampling
academic wares; ... they were free to determine the choice and sequence of courses, and were responsible to no one for regular attendance; ... they were exempted from all tests save the final examination; . . . they lived in private quarters and controlled their private lives." R. HOFSTADTER & W.
METZGER, supra note 11, at 386. Some of these principles were acknowledged in the development of
the modern American university in, for example, the elective system. See Eliot, Academic Freedom,
SCIENCE, July 5, 1907, at 5, 7-10. Moreover, American college students long have had an indigenous
tradition of extracurricular activities and organizations. See F. RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY 136-55 (1962). This relative freedom has been in tension with the British collegiate
view of undergraduate education, where the school assumes some quasi-parental role to guide the
intellectual and moral development of the student. Moreover, until World War II, higher education in
America was an elite attainment of a small minority. The in loco parentistradition was strengthened
by the notorious immaturity and weak intellectual preparation of American undergraduates. Recent
cases securing student civil rights compel universities to treat students largely as adult citizens in their
exercise of civil rights, but say nothing about the colleges' responsibility for their students' educational
or moral welfare.
Professor Van Alstyne once urged an enforceable legal regime of student academic freedom. Van
Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 1 (1965). Upon examination, he argues for
giving the student civil rights against the public university, so as to protect adequately the student's
interest in pursuing higher education. (In this argument he proved prophetic.) Nothing in his discussion really touches on the conditions or methods of education. See id. at 34. It is confusing to label as
"academic freedom" these general civil rights.
In the 1960's, the AAUP, in concert with several other higher education organizations, developed
statements of student academic freedom. Statement on the Academic Freedom of Students, 51
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with the formal academic training of the students; even if the activities so
protected have learning value, the learning seems more the product of experience than that of intellectual training. Indeed, sometimes these political activities threaten academic work and values, and courts have drawn
the limit on the exercise of student civil rights at the point where they
interfere with the primary educational work of the school.40 Courts also
have refused to review academic evaluations of students by universities.4 1
In short, while student civil rights enforce social norms against schools,
constitutional academic freedom enforces academic norms against society.
Thus, while the Constitution affords students at public institutions extensive civil rights, it affords them no rights of academic freedom at all.
Second, and more complicated, the right of a professor to participate in
political activity off campus and on her own time without institutional
reprisal should not be viewed as a matter of constitutional academic freedom. This assertion may seem perverse. The notorious investigations of
professors by state and federal officials for "disloyalty" during the 1950's
have often been portrayed as the quintessential violation of academic freedom, even though the conduct investigated nearly always involved nonacademic political organizing rather than scholarship or teaching.4 2 Also,
A.A.U.P. BULL. 447 (1965); Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 54 A.A.U.P.
BULL 258 (1968). The statements went somewhat beyond civil rights, urging a manner of teaching
that promoted student discussion, inquiry, and expression, and that prohibited professors from downgrading a student because her opinions differed from the professor's. While these statements are helpful admonitions that probably mirror the convictions of most faculty, they have not given rise to
enforceable rules.
A more recent case that might begin to elaborate a student right of academic freedom, although it
never uses that phrase, is Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), which limited the discretion of
a school board to remove controversial books from a junior high school library in order to protect the
students' right to receive information. Development of Pico's confused rationale seems unlikely. See
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (school officials may impose restrictions
on school-sponsored student newspaper).
40. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students may
wear armbands, because that does not disrupt classroom). The possible tension between student civil
rights and traditional notions of academic freedom were touched on in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972). The president of a state college had denied recognition to a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, because he believed that the student group advocated the employment of force and
violence on campus, views that "'openly repudiate[d]' the College's dedication to academic freedom."
Id. at 176 (apparently quoting college president). The Supreme Court ruled that the college could not
exclude the student group because of their advocacy of unpalatable positions, but it could require their
compliance with rules of conduct designed to safeguard "the traditional academic atmosphere." Id. at
194 n.24. Thus, the Court sought to accommodate the students' civil rights to the educational imperatives of the school. See also Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (students at
private university have no constitutional right to demonstrate during class to protest professor's wellknown views on eugenics).
41. Courts read the Due Process Clause as requiring that a student receive a formal hearing
before she is dismissed for disciplinary reasons, but not before she is dismissed for academic reasons.
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1978); Henson v. Honor Comm., 719 F.2d 69,
72-75 (4th Cir. 1983). The same distinction can be found between civil and educational rights: Courts
enforce the former but not the latter. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
222-28 (1985).
42. See E. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER 44 (1986).
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the AAUP has always included some protection of outside political speech
within its principles of academic freedom.4
Yet, Professor Van Alstyne surely was right when he argued that
professors at state universities have no greater (or lesser) right to participate in political affairs than do other government employees."" Since the
1960's, the First Amendment has protected state employees from employment penalties for exercising general civil rights of free speech, but it does
not distinguish among professors, prosecutors, or janitors. 5 Like student
free speech, the professor's right to speak publicly on matters of public
concern reflects the permeation of the campus by general civil rights
rather than an elaboration of a right unique to the university. Advocates
extended academic freedom to extramural speech because, prior to 1950,
civil liberty had not yet developed to the point where those who exercised
rights were protected against losing public employment. 4 6 Moreover, at a
time when the state civil service was small, professors, by training and
inclination, were the most conspicuous state employees participating in
public affairs; given their visibility in politics, it is understandable that
their right to participate should have been seen as part of their academic
freedom rather than as a general right of all state employees.
In arguing that neither student nor faculty political speech falls within
the ambit of academic freedom, I have relied on the general proposition
that academic freedom should be understood to include only rights unique
or necessary to the functions of higher education. This is properly the
domain of academic freedom. This proposition, although admittedly somewhat axiomatic, requires elaboration and justification. Academic freedom
is the only First Amendment right enjoyed solely by members of a particular profession.47 As such, it resembles a medieval corporate liberty or
AAUP, General Declaration of Principles,reprinted in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION:
860, 874-75 (R. Hofstadter & W. Smith eds. 1961) thereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; 1940 Statement, supra note 12, at 109, reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS,
supra note 12, at 3-4.
44. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972). See also Lovejoy, supra
note 14, at 386 (noting that penalizing teachers for speech outside university, while "contrary in spirit
to academic freedom," is primarily abuse of "ordinary civil liberties").
45. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). Although Pickering involved a
schoolteacher, neither in this nor in any subsequent case has the Court based First Amendment protection on values pertaining to education; rather, it has stressed general concerns about speech by
public employees on matters of public concern. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-49 (1983)
(First Amendment rights of assistant district attorneys).
46. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952) (not unconstitutional to
dismiss public employees for exercising First Amendment rights); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892) (Holmes, J.) ("The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.").
47. Journalists obviously perform professional functions protected by the First Amendment, yet
the freedom of the press protects any citizen who wishes to publish information or opinion. Indeed,
the argument that the press should have a special right of access to government-controlled information
has been resisted, in part, on the ground that First Amendment rights should not be reserved for
members of a particular profession. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1974) (First
Amendment guarantees press no right of special access not also available to general public); Van
43.

A
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jurisdiction, such as those enjoyed by faculties of medieval universities and
other occupational guilds, 8 rather than the universal civil liberties born in
the Enlightenment and enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Understanding
why some citizens, who benefit from elite training and employment,
should enjoy constitutional rights beyond those available to other citizens
in their employment requires careful attention to the requirements of academic work and its value to society at large. Academic freedom cannot
endure as a privilege of status or badge of esteem but only as a necessary
incident of the university's commitment to the pursuit of truth and the
controvertibility of dogma."9 Restricting academic freedom to those liberties necessary for valuable scholarship and teaching preserves its coherence
and vigor, protects other citizens against professional arrogance, and invites a useful inquiry into the role of constitutional law in preserving the
truth-seeking value of higher education.
C.

Tenure

A professor's tenure is often confused with his academic freedom. Security of academic tenure means that, after successful completion of a probationary period, a professor can be dismissed only for good cause-such
as incompetence or neglect of duty-adequately proved at a fair hearing.5"
Tenure, of course, is created by contract and implemented by institutional
regulations. The procedures requisite for dismissal are elaborate (and constitutionally-mandated when the tenured professor works at a state institution).51 These procedures usually involve written notice, an adversarial
hearing before neutral decision-makers, and several levels of appeal.52 AlAlstyne, The First Amendment and the FreePress: A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old
Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1980).
48. See R. NISBr, THE DEGRADATION OF ACADEMIC DOGMA 61 (1971); R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 9 (1955). For a description of the rights enjoyed by medieval faculty,
see Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 93,
94-111 (1973) [hereinafter FACULTY TENURE]; see also infra note 274.
49. See R. NIsBET, supra note 48, at 61-64; R. KIRK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM 26-27 (1955).
50. AAUP, Statement on ProceduralStandards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings,44 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 270 (1958) [hereinafter ProceduralStandards], reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra
note 12, at 10. For general discussions of the tenure system, see FACULTY TENURE, supra note 48;
Machlup, In Defense of Academic Tenure, 50 A.A.U.P. BULL_ 112 (1964); C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN,
TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES, AND THE LAW (1959).
51. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
52. The AAUP guidelines call for a statement of the grounds for dismissal, detailed notice of
procedural rights, a hearing before a faculty committee, and an appeal. ProceduralStandards,supra
note 50, at 272-74, reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 11-13. Courts have been
reluctant to specify the procedures constitutionally required before termination of a tenured faculty
member, although notice and a hearing before an impartial body prior to termination are generally
considered essential requirements. See W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1980 174
(1980). Courts also have resisted the drive to impose the niceties of adversarial hearings, such as crossexamination of witnesses by lawyers, in order to preserve the informal and collegial manner more
familiar to non-lawyerly academics. See, e.g., Frumpkin v. Board of Trustees, 626 F.2d 19, 21-22
(6th Cir. 1980); see also Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d 88, 99-100 (1987) (approving informal procedures
for revocation of graduate degree). This judicial refusal to impose civil norms on academic ways is
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though it entails some negative consequences for higher education, procedural protection of tenure does promote academic freedom by requiring
some public airing of explicit and ideologically neutral reasons for dismissal. This exposure makes firing a professor for advocating unpopular or
embarrassing views much more difficult.5 3 It also induces an atmosphere
of institutional inertia on personnel issues by making any move against a
tenured faculty member very costly; this permits thought and inquiry to
be truly disinterested among those tenured faculty who think or inquire at
54
all.
Just as clearly, protection of tenure does not protect the academic freedom of the untenured. Indeed, the effort to obtain tenure usually will
direct their scholarship into those established channels more readily understood and likely applauded by the tenured. Similarly, protection of tenure does not guarantee that initial hiring decisions are free from ideological bias. Substantive protections of academic freedom may play an
important role at this initial stage because, although an untenured professor may be fired or a candidate passed over for no reason at all, they may
not be fired or passed over for a reason that violates the First
55

Amendment.

No more in the law of academic freedom than in other branches of law
can substance and procedure be fully separated. The procedural protections surrounding tenure have led to the acceptance of a crucial tenet that
invigorates the notion of academic freedom whether the professor is tenured or not: Judgments of scholarly and teaching competence must ordinarily be made by peers. Judgments of hiring and firing are made in the
first instance by other faculty deemed capable of evaluating on appropriate academic grounds the potential and accomplishment of the candidate.
Administrators and trustees can act only in the face of departmental recclosely analogous to the judicial preservation of academic values from political interference that I view
as the primary meaning of constitutional academic freedom. Nonetheless, judicial insistence on notice
and some kind of fair hearing prior to termination of tenured faculty has done much to regularize the
security of tenure necessary for free inquiry and teaching at the public universities that had not
voluntarily adopted adequate procedures.
53. The United Kingdom recently abolished tenure in its universities while codifying substantive
protection for the right of the scholar "to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new
ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions." Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, § 202(2)(a); see
Walker, British ParliamentVotes to End Tenure for New Faculty Members at Universities,CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 3, 1988, at 1.
54. As Robert MacIver wrote, tenure protects not only "the thinker, the intellectual pioneer, the
social critic but also the inert, the barely competent, the perfunctory reciter of ancient lessons, and the
one-time scholar who now devotes his best energies to more lucrative pursuits." R. MACIVER, supra
note 48, at 240.
55. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972). This basic principle has been narrowed
somewhat through procedural refinement. A teacher who contends that she has been dismissed for
exercising a constitutional right to free speech must show that retaliation for protected activity played
a decisive role in her termination. More precisely, after a teacher shows that her behavior is constitutionally protected, the burden shifts to the school to prove that it would have reached the same decision "even in the absence of the protected conduct." Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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ommendations, and governors, legislators, donors, and police officers may
have no say at all.
The structural mechanisms within the university that give precedence
to peer judgment and the function that this judgment performs in preserving the coherence and promoting the accomplishments of a given discipline
determine the content of academic freedom. This thesis will be better explained and defended in a later section. For the present, it must suffice to
assert that insistence on procedural patterns that exclude non-academics
from primary review of a candidate's or professor's performance are intended to (and do) suppress reliance on exogenous factors in evaluation.
This article will examine the substantive significance of this procedural
pattern while not assessing the legal propriety of specific procedures.
So far, I have argued more about what academic freedom is not than
about what it is. We have proceeded no further than the proposition that
a First Amendment right of academic freedom should support primarily
formal teaching and scholarship. The historical origins of the tradition of
academic freedom, which emerged in our universities to address specific
academic problems, bear out this proposition. Consideration of the development of academic freedom in the universities is necessary both to give
substance to the invocation of academic values and to suggest the necessary distinction between scholarly aspiration and constitutional protection.
III.

THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

A. Early History and Structure
The American tradition of academic freedom has emphasized the protection of individual faculty members. It can best be understood in historical context."6 America developed a unique sense of academic freedom because its colleges began with a unique corporate structure. The English
university familiar to the first academic pioneers was a medieval corporation of its faculty, who had full authority over the assets and affairs of the
institution. The Crown and Church largely respected the autonomy of the
universities, in part because both needed the universities and in part because the universities were able to enlist each source of power to check
incursions by the other.5" The Reformation brought with it some damaging control by the Crown, although it effectively ended any risk of domination by the Church.58 The autonomy of the ancient academic institu56. Anyone who writes about the history of academic freedom is deeply indebted to R. HoFV. METZGER, supra note 11; L. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY (1965); and F. RUDOLPH, supra note 39.
57. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 6-8; infra note 274.
58. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchs did impose some controls to ensure support from the universities. Perhaps the best known account is Macaulay's retelling of James II's
attempt to capture Oxford for Roman Catholicism. 2 T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 86-109
(Everyman's ed. 1906). Until the nineteenth century, at the ancient English universities, all faculty
STADTER &
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tions remained substantial, however; no outside agencies meddled with
teaching, although faculty were subject to internal discipline.59
Although early American colleges consciously modeled themselves on
English institutions in many ways, they were governed from the beginning
by outside boards of non-academics. 6" Such boards were needed to mobilize the support necessary for establishing new colleges on the frontier
without wealthy patrons. These non-academic trustees-predominantly
clergymen and public officials occupied by other employments-could not
administer the colleges continuously, the affairs of which were entrusted
to a president chosen by the board. The college president, although often
the most eminent member of the faculty, held his position on the confidence of the trustees and exercised important administrative powers as
their agent.6"
The faculty were employees of the corporation rather than its constituents; they could be dismissed at any time for any ground not precluded by
their contracts and had no more than an advisory role in setting the goals
or policies of the college.62 These teachers received extremely low pay and
social status; they divided long hours of work between classroom drill in
Latin and Greek grammar and disciplinary supervision of often wildly
immature and poorly prepared students.6 3 Not surprisingly, few pursued
academic careers; most faculty were young divines preparing for orders or
waiting for a call to a church.
The structural elements that would give shape to academic freedom
were established early: legal control by non-academic trustees; effective
had to be ordained clergy, and students had to take religious oaths to receive degrees.
59. See Shils, Great Britain and the United States: Legislators,Bureaucrats and the Universities, in UNIVERSITIES, POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS: EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 437,
443 (H. Daalder & E. Shils eds. 1982). The autonomy of British universities persisted into contemporary times and long after universal reliance on government funding. The recent British statute that
eliminated tenure also subjected the universities to much greater control by a University Funding
Council, itself subject to the authority of the Secretary of State for Education and Science. Education
Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, § 131.
60. Harvard, the first American college (1636), began with a corporation of resident faculty and a
board of overseers who represented lay founders and exercised effective control. Yale, the third college
(1701), was the first with a single absentee board of non-academics, a structure which provided the
model for later colleges. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 134-39; F. RUDOLPH,
supra note 39, at 166-67; Herbst, The First Three American Colleges: Schools of the Reformation, in
8 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8-11 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1974). The Yale charter of 1745, which spelled out the nature of the board's ultimate control, is reprinted conveniently in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 49.
61. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 125; F. RUDOLPH, supra note 39, at
164-65. The legal position of the college president has been described as "the chief executive agent of
the governing board, with the responsibility of recommending the employment and dismissal of all, or
nearly all, subordinate administrative officers and faculty members." E. ELLIOTr & M. CHAMBERS,
supra note 10, at 68.
62. "[A] professor, learned and distinguished as he may be, is an employe [sic], and subordinate of
the Board of Regents, in law." Hartigan v. Board of Regents, 49 W. Va. 14, 22, 38 S.E. 698, 702
(1901). Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary College, 7 Va. (3 Call.) 495 (1790), appears to be the
first case affirming the right of a board to fire a professor; John Marshall argued for the college.
63. F. RUDOLPH, supra note 39, at 158-64, 193-200; R. HOFSTADTER & W. METzGER, supra
note 11, at 229-30.
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governance by administrators set apart from the faculty by political allegiance and professional orientation; dependent and insecure faculty. The
American college promised an internal division of interest and ideal unknown in England.
In the old-time college, prior to the Civil War, the concept of academic
freedom was literally inconceivable. 4 The goal of higher education was to
train young men in religious piety and mental discipline as a preparation
for the clergy and other gentlemanly professions, such as law and
medicine.65 The essentially religious objectives of the early colleges demanded and received the assent of faculty to the theological essentials of
the Christian sect that founded and supported the college."" Just as important, no one conceived the function of college faculty to be that of producing scholarship, let alone that of criticizing prevailing dogma or advancing the search for truth. 7 Rather, their efforts remained largely
devoted to drilling youths in the rudiments of ancient languages and
mathematics, educational endeavors unlikely to erupt into intellectual controversy. 8 Faculty performed essentially fixed if learned operations within
a traditional curriculum under the sanction of established truth. Questions
of religious conscience may have arisen in such a context, but academic
freedom as we know it simply had no meaning.6 9
B.

The Rise of the Scientific Research Value

By the end of the Civil War, the old-time college had become subject to
criticism from numerous reformers for the narrowness of the curriculum,
particularly insofar as it excluded science, modern languages, and subjects
of practical utility, such as agriculture and engineering.70 Reformers
64. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 263 ("For the most part, the concept
of academic freedom as it is usually expressed today had not received a clear formulation in the antebellum period.").
65. The classic statement of this viewpoint is the 1828 Report of the Yale Faculty, a spirited
defense of the traditional classical curriculum and the moral ground of education. It is available in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 275.
66. In the seventeenth century, the first president of Harvard College, Henry Dunster, resigned
because of his deviant views on infant baptism. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at
86-91. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Benjamin Hale was dismissed from Dartmouth
because he converted from Congregationalism to Episcopalianism. W. SMITH, PROFESSORS AND PUBLIC ETHICS: STUDIES OF NORTHERN MORAL PHILOSOPHERS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 7 (1956). As
late as the 1880's, distinguished colleges such as Princeton, Amherst, and Brown imposed minimal
religious qualifications on faculty candidates. L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 45-49.
67. Some antebellum professors played important extramural roles as public religious moralists,
but this aspect of intellectual life entered the curriculum only through the "moral philosophy" class
that typically provided the capstone to collegiate education and spoke within the religious tradition of
the school. See D. HOWE, THE UNITARIAN CONSCIENCE (1970).
68. Scientific inquiry flourished in eighteenth-century America, but it permeated only the margins
of the colleges before 1865. On the significance of science in revolutionary America, see Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2-7; on the slow acceptance of
science into the American college curriculum, see F. RUDOLPH, supra note 39, at 222-35, 244-48.
69. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 262-63.
70. Recent historians have challenged the rigid division between the early college and the modern
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looked toward different goals. Some, inspired by a somewhat naive view of
the German universities, wished the colleges to become true universities
devoted to disinterested research and specialization. Others demanded
more practical courses of study to better prepare men and women to lead
and serve the growing industrial society."'
Both viewpoints gained rapid, if not universal, acceptance during the
1870's and '80's. The adoption of the elective system permitted a much
wider array of subjects to be studied in greater depth, while the creation
of graduate schools provided the trained specialists necessary to teach increasingly technical subjects."2 Higher education began to be seen as scientific training for practical jobs rather than moral training of gentlemen
for elite professions. 7" As such, it appealed far more to government and
business leaders, practical men of affairs, who responded with unprecedented financial generosity and provided the resources for the creation of
the enormous institutions of higher learning familiar to us today. Presidents took the lead in transforming colleges into universities or giving
character to newly founded institutions. In performing these tasks, presidents lost whatever place they had among the faculty, becoming institutional executives and educational entrepreneurs. Just as antebellum presidents resembled the clergy who dominated their boards, so the new
resembled the successful businessmen and lawyers who now most frequently served as trustees."' The creation of the modern university, alscientific and professional university, arguing either that a traditional period of serious scholarship in
the service of religion flourished there, L. STEVENSON, SCHOLARLY MEANS TO EVANGELICAL ENDS
9-10 (1986), or that there stirred an earlier interest in reform, B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF
PROFESSIONALISM 224 (1976). Whatever welcome perspectives these works provide on the nature of
the transformation, they only emphasize the magnitude and significance of the change from religious
college to secular university, "the rise of a totally new conception of the university-diversified, research-oriented, and secular, where the old one had been unified, teaching-oriented, and Christian,"
D. HOWE, supra note 67, at 299.
71. See A. NEVINS, THE STATE UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRACY 2-22 (1962). The demand for
practical and democratic education resulted in the enactment of the Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503
(1862) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-308 (1982)), which provided land grants to states to erect and
support colleges
where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies and
including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and
the mechanic arts ... in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial
classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.
Morrill Act, 12 Stat. at 504 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 304 (1982)).
72. Johns Hopkins University was founded in 1876; it was the first university to emphasize graduate over undergraduate education and to substitute institutionally a scientific for a religious model of
truth. Its influence was vast. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 39, at 269-75.
73. Professor Bledstein ascribes to the new university a central role in the creation and sustenance
of the American culture of professionalism. See B. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 70, at 288-90. Universities
certainly conferred prestige on and standards for both established and new professions by assuming
the function of professional education.
74. In one sample of college governing boards, the percentage of clergymen declined from 39.1 in
1860 to 7.2 in 1930. McGrath, The Control of Higher Education in America, 17 EDUC. REC. 259,
262-64 (1936). The effects of this change are criticized memorably in T. VEILEN, THE HIGHER
LEARNING IN AMERICA: A MEMORANDUM ON THE CONDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN

43-61 (1918).
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though full of ambiguity, was the vessel into which the best energies of
educated men and women of that age were poured; it constituted a decisive revolution of global significance in higher education and an equally
significant innovation in the social structure of intellectual thought.7 5
These structural changes reflected a fundamental change in the intellectual orientation of American universities. The change is usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movement from a paradigm of fixed values
vouchsafed by religious faith to one of relative truths continuously revised
by scientific endeavor.76 This shift did not merely elevate the relative status of the natural sciences; scholars in nearly all disciplines adopted scientific methods and goals whether they were addressing social, moral, or
aesthetic issues.7 7 Religion lost prestige as the primary basis for interpreting human goals. Universities became secular; religion was usually retained only as a polite ornament. 8
Social sciences rapidly developed. To be sure, a science of government
had been conceived in the eighteenth century, and the rational foundations
of political economy had been accepted for many years. But now the faith
that reason could grasp the essentials of human activity was enhanced by
the prestige of the scientific method as well as the financial support and
bureaucratic organization provided by the growing universities. Soon, departments of political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and economics sprang up within American higher education.7 9 Scientific profes75. See generally L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 439-44 (discussing rise of university in United
States and its assimilation into American culture).
76. See generally R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 78-113, 112 (surveying
"decline of religious scruples of the pristine Puritan age" with respect to education). This simplistic
formulation seems adequate for present purposes. Yet, it should be acknowledged that scientists of the
day who insisted on the capacity of objective reason to portray accurately an autonomous reality
tended to be dogmatic and intolerant, see L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 145-49, while those who
followed William James and John Dewey tended to celebrate the functional dimensions of scientific
truth. See generally M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA (1947) (examining contributions of
Dewey, Veblen, Holmes, Beard, and Harvey to revolt against formalism). Still, scientists were united
by the beliefs that no conclusion was immune from criticism and that scientific investigation would
render propositions more nearly true than those previously available.
77. The attempt to conform even literary scholarship to the scientific model is described historically in G. GRAFF, PROFESSING LITERATURE (1986).
78. Democratic political discourse also had lost prestige at this time, creating a vacuum that the
social sciences filled. Americans at the time of the founding of the republic may have believed that
truth could emerge from deliberation among free citizens or their representatives. See, e.g., Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559-60 (1988). In the period after the Civil
War, democratic political life came to be seen less as a vehicle for the emergence of moral truth than
as a corrupt trading of influence. See generally G. FREDERICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR 189-98
(1965) (discussing response of intellectuals to laissezfaire politics of Reconstruction era). Social science promised a more certain foundation for understanding a rapidly changing society, and the scholar
could dictate laws to society for the public good without popular interference. See B. BLEDSTEIN,
supra note 70, at 321-22, 326-27. Such extravagant faith in scientific analysis reflected both confidence from astonishing achievement and anxiety about failure.
79. The rapid development of the social sciences is marked by the dates when national scholarly
associations were founded: the American Economic Association in 1885, the American Political Science Association in 1903, and the American Sociological Association in 1905. B. CLARK, THE ACADEMIC LIFE: SMALL WORLDS, DIFFERENT WORLDS 289-97 (1987).
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sional education in law, social work, education, and business joined that in
medicine.8" These endeavors were united in the expectation that by diligence and care in the employ of the scientific method, free from the interested rhetoric of religion and politics, they could discover the rational laws
that governed relations among people. Many diverse adherents looked forward to reforms tending toward the final perfection of society.
These changes in the structure and purpose of higher education also
enlarged the status and expectations of faculty. No longer hard-pressed
drudges, faculty became highly-trained professionals. Far more able and
ambitious people became professors. The passing of the old-time college
freed faculty from the tedium of recitation drills and, in time, of in loco
parentis responsibilities. The elective system offered far more interesting
subject matter for teaching. The specialization needed to teach such
courses required more rigorous and continuous training; this, joined with
the nineteenth-century allure of the German example, gave stature to research and writing as a necessary requisite and sign of the professor's
knowledge and achievement. Moreover, the life of science was heroic: The
professor was expected to extend the frontier of knowledge and remove the
age-old afflictions of physical and social life through mastery of the scientific method.
Yet low faculty salaries and uncertain tenure remained the norm. 8 '
Professors remained employees; although no longer dependent on the will
of clergymen, they were now answerable to businessmen and to a president who often shared business values. The president and board still personally hired, fired, and renewed contracts until the twentieth century.
Academic freedom became a rallying cry at this time for professors
seeking more control over their professional lives.8 2 Much of the term's
appeal came from its German association. German professors were free to
teach and lecture on the subjects they wished. Although their universities
were agencies of the state and the professors themselves civil servants,
German law and custom left matters of appointment and curriculum
80. The reforms instituted by Dean Langdell at Harvard Law School, for example, rested on an
understanding of law as a science capable of discovering general principles that organized and explained apparently disparate judicial decisions. See Gray, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prr. L. REv.
1 (1983). Langdell himself said that "[ijf law be not a science, a university will consult its own dignity
in declining to teach it." Langdell, Speech (Nov. 5, 1886), reprinted in 3 LAw Q. REv. 123, 124
(1887), quoted in Gray, supra, at 38.
81. In some ways, professors' legal rights were diminished in the latter part of the nineteenth
century. Courts generally permitted colleges to dismiss professors at will, even during the term of a
contract, at least when state statutes or private college by-laws gave schools the power to dismiss
faculty at their discretion. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 459-67; Note,
supra note 10, at 671-73. Concerning faculty salaries, see L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 390-91.
82. Hofstadter attributes the professors' aggressiveness to rising expectations. R. HOFSTADTER,
THE AGE OF REFORM 153-55 (1955). The demand for academic freedom became coherent only in the
1890's, when the structure of the modern university had become clear. L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at
384-85. Dramatic confrontations during this decade between trustees and faculty at the University of
Wisconsin, the University of Chicago, and at Stanford stimulated attempts to clarify principles. See R.
HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 420-51.
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solely in the hands of the academics. This professional freedom and control were seen as partly responsible for the preeminence of Teutonic
scholarship during the period.83
C. Development of the Concept of Academic Freedom
In America, the problem was not the state as such, but interference by
lay trustees or regents. Both federal and state governments largely refrained from any involvement in internal university affairs.8 4 Disputes
tended to be internal to the university, and academic freedom became conceived as an adjustment of rights among participants. Professors simultaneously demanded that no ideological test be applied to their work and
that evaluation be performed by professional peers. These demands were
justified largely by appeal to the exigencies of science: The error in any
theory could be perceived only by trained specialists, and error must be
tolerated if truth is to advance. 5 The opinions of laypersons were not
scientific; lay interference with scientists would only retard the discovery
of truth.
There are two important aspects of this struggle. First, academics
wanted to wrest control over the evaluation of scholarly thought from "lay
thinking" as represented by boards of trustees. Professors were virtually
the only spokespersons for academic freedom, and their efforts were
largely responsible for its eventual acceptance. In one sense, it was a selfinterested struggle for professional autonomy and dignity directed at improved salary and employment security. 6 In a second sense, however, this
demand represented a desire for conditions necessary to perform uniquely
valuable work. A primary condition was respect for the special character
of academic speech: Scholarship bore a special relationship to the search
for truth and should not be confused with mere political or religious opinion. Scholarship was a form of elite speech that demanded protection from
87
popular prejudices.
Science provided not only the necessary rationale for excluding lay people from evaluation but also a strong rationale for freedom: Scientific endeavor presupposes a progressive conception of knowledge. Understanding
at any one moment is imperfect, and defects can be exposed by testing
hypotheses against reality, through either adducing new data or experi83.
84.

See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 385-89.
State politicians did sometimes interfere with their state universities. See R. HOFSTADTER &

W. MErZGER, supra note 11, at 429-32.

85. See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 14, at 3-4.
86. L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 386-92.
87. The insulation of scientific endeavor from popular judgment can be understood as part of the
general effort to establish the authority of the professions over the potentially anarchistic forces of
social change in nineteenth century America. See T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCIAL SCIENCES 80-85, 220-26 (1977) (stressing importance of organization, discipline, and communication for definition of professionalism).
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mentation. The process of hypothesis-experimentation-new hypotheses
improves knowledge and brings us closer to a complete, more nearly objective truth about the world. Error is not dangerous so long as the process
is continued, because acknowledged means will expose it; in fact, it is actually beneficial (and inevitable) as part of progressive discovery.,
This apparent comfort with error stands in contrast to the acute anxiety
about "error" within religious organizations, which included the antebellum colleges. Although religious truth enjoys the ultimate sanction, it is
notoriously difficult to discern, because in most religious traditions, God
remains beyond human reason. Religious organizations exist in a tension
between the inscrutability of God and the need to speak about the divine
in ways intelligible and meaningful to members of the community. 9 Religious toleration results from humility about our capacity to understand
God and from frustration with the means available to convince the heretic
of his error. Religious organizations may feel driven to adopt secondary
rules, such as the infallibility of the Pope or the literal truth of the Bible,
to provide internal certainty against disputes about fundamental premises.
Even in the liberal Protestant religions that dominated the early colleges,
differences about essentials sometimes required departure or ostracism.9
Within even the most rationalistic religions, error (or deviate opinion)
must eventually result in exclusion. 9'
88. See R. MACIVER, supra note 48, at 4-5.
89. A similar observation is made by Robert Cover in describing the fractious lives of communities
of primary meaning: "The radical instability of the paideic nomos forces intentional communities-communities whose members believe themselves to have common meanings for the normative
dimensions of their common lives-to maintain their coherence as paideic entities by expulsion and
exile of the potent flowers of normative meaning." Cover, Foreword-Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-16 (1983). For a sensitive study of the linguistic complexity of religious statements, see P. VAN BUREN, THE SECULAR MEANING OF THE GOSPEL (1963).
90. See supra note 66.
91. The crucial role in the development of academic freedom played by the replacement of a
predominantly religious paradigm by a scientific one may be contrasted to the divergent development
of Roman Catholic universities until the 1960's. Catholic educators of the latter part of the nineteenth
century rejected many of the values of the new university as excessively secular and relativistic. Philip
Gleason characterizes this opposition:
To an age whose education was secular, scientific, and technical in spirit, particularized in
vision, flexible in approach, vocational in aim, and democratic in social orientation, the Jesuits
[the religious order that dominated Catholic higher education at the time] thus opposed a
system that was religious, literary, and humanistic in spirit, synthetic in vision, rigid in approach, liberal in aim, and elitist in social orientation.

Gleason, American CatholicHigher Education:A HistoricalPerspective, in THE SHAPE OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 15, 46 (R. Hassenger ed. 1967). The Catholic opposition to the research
ethic, reflected in the paucity of graduate studies in Catholic universities of the time, was expressed
most notably in 1938 by George Bull, S.J., then Dean of the Graduate School at Fordham University,
who argued that "research cannot be the primary object of a Catholic graduate school, because it is at
war with the whole Catholic life of the mind." Instead, the goal must be "deeper penetration into the
velvety manifold of reality, as Catholics possess it." Bull, The Function of the Catholic Graduate
School, 13 THOUGHT 364, 378, 379 (1938) (emphasis in original); see also J. ANNORELLI, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 34 (1987) (describing early Catholic opposition to
research in higher education).
In an educational institution where truth is vouchsafed by faith or authority, academic freedom
cannot flourish. Catholic universities did not accept academic freedom either in principle or in practice
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Science permits the refutation of error without exclusion from the community because it enjoys an accepted method of falsification.9 2 Experimentation tests theory against fact. All scientists accept the authority of nature; if a hypothesis cannot account for all the natural phenomena it
purports to cover, the hypothesis must be rejected or modified. Disputants
may disagree over the design of an experiment or its interpretation, but in
both theory and practice the differences can be resolved, typically by
structuring a new experiment. The faith that nature, unlike God, is comprehensible within the rational categories of thought leads to this accepted
means for resolving disputes within the scientific community. Moreover, it
supports the optimistic view that scientific knowledge is progressive. The
process of theory, dispute, and experiment, rather than producing anxiety
about the continuity of the community, is celebrated as intrinsic to the
93
pursuit of truth.

The essential requirement for successful scientific endeavor is free exchange among competent scientists. This simple insight has two practical
corollaries. First, non-scientists must be excluded from the process, beuntil the 1960's. Id. at 204-05. The current general acceptance of academic freedom at Catholic
universities has been the result of a historic process of secularization at those schools, similar to the
secularization of Protestant universities in the nineteenth century. (The differences are important and
provocative but outside the scope of this article.) By way of contrast, new Protestant Fundamentalist
colleges that insist on biblical literalism and inerrancy frequently reject the notion of academic freedom. See J. CARPENTER & K. SHIPPS, MAKING HIGHER EDUCATION CHRISTIAN: THE HISTORY
AND MISSION OF EVANGELICAL COLLEGES IN AMERICA (1987); Southern Baptist Leaders Vow to
Fight "Takeover" as FundamentalistsSeek Control of Governing Boards, CHRONICLE HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 21, 1987, at A15.
The AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure contained a limited
provision of special treatment for religious colleges: "Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment." 1940 Statement, supra note 12, at 109, reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at
3. By 1970, the turn in Catholic higher education toward research and academic freedom led the
AAUP to state that "[miost church-related institutions no longer need or desire the departure from the
principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a
departure." AAUP, 1970 Interpretative Comments, 64 A.A.U.P. BULL. 110, 111 (1978) reprinted in
POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 5, 5. The increase in fundamentalist education and the dismissal of Charles Curran from the Theology Department at Catholic University have raised concerns
that the AAUP may have been mistaken about the desires of sectarian educators. Professor Curran,
himself, advocates that Catholic universities should adhere to principles of academic freedom but that
those principles should not prohibit a theology faculty at a Catholic university from dismissing for
incompetence a tenured professor "who does not believe in Jesus or does not accept a role for the pope
in the Church." Curran, Academic Freedom and Catholic Universities, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1441, 1454
(1988). This equation of beliefs with professional incompetence is untenable. It seems best for all to
admit the incompatibility between dogmatic truth and academic freedom and to recognize that religious groups may have internally valid reasons for requiring conformity by faculty to religious tenets
that non-members or advocates of academic freedom need not accommodate. See Laycock & Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1456-58
(1988).
92. The classic exposition of this view of the basis of knowledge is that of Karl Popper. See K.
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959). Popper would accept as scientific only statements that are testable, that is, statements which can be falsified by experiments. Id. at 47-48.
93. Social scientists have also accepted the scientific notion of falsification: Scientists must reject or
modify hypotheses that do not account for the social phenomena that they purport to cover. Although
experimentation and the choice of methodology are far more problematic for social than for natural
theories, social scientists have long accepted that theory must be tested against fact.
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cause they will impose artificial constraints on the offering of new hypotheses or the criticism of accepted ones. These constraints might be attractive
because of their political, moral, and religious bases, but they will retard
and distort scientific effort. Second, the basis for excluding participants in
scientific inquiry rests on evaluating professional qualifications instead of
substantive views. Error is tolerable; incompetence is not. Qualifications
are ideologically neutral, and only peers can evaluate them.
Social scientists expected that under conditions of professional freedom
they could achieve beneficial results comparable to those achieved by natural scientists during the previous century.9 They argued for the exclusion
of laypersons from evaluation of scientific social theories and for peer review of the professional competence of aspiring social scientists. 95 These
demands were far more controversial in the mouths of economists and
political scientists than in the mouths of biologists or chemists. Businessmen understandably felt that they could evaluate theories of labor relations better than theories of gravitational attraction. Moreover, they suspected that what they viewed as error might have pernicious political
consequences. 9" Social scientists deeply resented these doubts both because
they represented unphilosophical aspersions cast on the status of their enterprise, and because these academics in fact hoped that in a properly
progressive democracy, experts would soon displace businessmen as the

97
most powerful class.

The American concept of academic freedom emerged from this ideological and practical conflict between academic social scientists and their lay
employers. The importance of science to the formulation of academic freedom is manifest in the AAUP's 1915 General Declaration of Principles,9 8 the single most important document relating to American academic
freedom. Drafted by a talented committee dominated by liberal economists
and sociologists and adopted by the AAUP while John Dewey was chairR. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 418.
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, I A.A.U.P.
BULL. pt. 1, at 15, 17 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 Statement], reprintedin 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 43, at 860.
96. Arthur Twining Hadley sympathetically expressed the viewpoint of the trustees:
The authority which seeks to suppress freedom of teaching may be right or it may be wrong in
what it says, but at any rate it has perfectly intelligible reasons to give. If it believes that the
eternal salvation of the pupils will be jeopardized by certain views as to the creation of the
world, or if it believes that the commercial prosperity of the country is dependent upon certain
theories of political economy, its duty seems to lie plain before it; and the community tends to
support it for its steadfastness in thus doing what it believes to be its duty.
Hadley, Academic Freedom in Theory and in Practice, 91 ATLANTIC 152, 152 (1903).
97. John Dewey lamented that although social studies were progressing toward true sciences, "to
the public at large the facts and relations with which these topics deal are still almost wholly in the
region of opinion, prejudice, and accepted tradition." Dewey, supra note 14, at 5. This dualism between science and opinion recurs in many arguments of the period in favor of a special protection for
academic freedom.
98. 1915 Statement, supra note 95, at 17, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
43, at 860.
94.
95.
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man, the 1915 Declaration is both the most influential statement of the
case for academic freedom and a revealing testament to the contemporary
faith in the ability of neutral, expert social scientists to improve the
human condition.
The Committee justified academic freedom by arguing for the essentially scientific character of modern academic disciplines:
The modern university is becoming more and more the home of scientific research. There are three fields of human inquiry in which
the race is only at the beginning: natural science, social science, and
philosophy and religion, dealing with the relations of man to outer
nature, to his fellow men, and to the ultimate realities and values. In
natural science all that we have learned but serves to make us realize
more deeply how much more remains to be discovered. In social science in its largest sense, which is concerned with the relations of men
in society and with the conditions of social order and well-being, we
have learned only an adumbration of the laws which govern these
vastly complex phenomena. Finally, in the spiritual life, and in the
interpretation of the general meaning and ends of human existence
and its relation to the universe, we are still far from a comprehension of the final truths, and from a universal agreement among all
sincere and earnest men. In all of these domains of knowledge, the
first condition of progress is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such freedom is the breath in the
nostrils of all scientific activity.9"
The Committee believed that all reality was knowable, that free employment of the scientific method would lead to the discovery of truths that
exist autonomously in the world.
Accordingly, the Committee rejected any view that academic freedom
implied an absolute right of free utterance for the individual faculty
member:
The claim to freedom of teaching is made in the interest of the integrity and of the progress of scientific inquiry; it is, therefore, only
those who carry on their work in the temper of the scientific inquirer
who may justly assert this claim. The liberty of the scholar within
the university to set forth his conclusions, be they what they may, is
conditioned by their being conclusions gained by a scholar's method
and held in a scholar's spirit; that is to say, they must be the fruits of
competent and patient and sincere inquiry, and they should10 0be set
forth with dignity, courtesy, and temperateness of language.
Academic speakers can be held within the strictures of discourse estab99. Id. at 27-28, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 867.
100. Id. at 33, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 871.
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lished by their discipline; departure from the scientific model can be punished. Indeed, the Committee never argued that speech should be immune
from adverse consequences. It contended only that the consequences be
determined by competent professionals within the same discipline.
It is, it will be seen, in no sense the contention of this committee that
academic freedom implies that individual teachers should be exempt
from all restraints as to the matter or manner of their utterances,
either within or without the university ....

What this report chiefly

maintains is that [disciplinary] action can not with safety be taken by
bodies not composed of members of the academic profession.'
The trustees, whose views would be based on self-interest and informal
experience, must be prevented from forcing their opinions on academics.' 2 Indeed, from the Committee's perspective, unrestrained freedom of
speech would destroy the university; abandonment of the rigors of the scientific method would forfeit the opportunity to master the truth.
The Committee did not consider this adherence to professional standards to be ideologically coercive in principle. It saw scientific speech as
essentially non-ideological; it was disinterested and patient, seeking autonomous laws of nature or of society through methods best calculated to
avoid error and prejudice. The Committee insisted on a clear distinction
between speech that was academic and that which was merely political or
sectarian. It believed that scientific speech was much more valuable, because it was verifiable; roughly, the Committee saw scientific speech as
knowledge (at least potentially) while it considered political speech to be
only opinion (which is true only by accident).' 3
Academic freedom conceived as the insulation of the individual professor from lay interference triumphed with the rise of the bureaucratically101. Id. at 38, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 875.
102. John Dewey also attributed the conflict between the public and professors to the former's
inability to acknowledge the special claims of science. While prejudices against the theory of evolution
still persisted, Dewey noted:
[T]he more influential sections of the community upon which the universities properly depend
have adjusted themselves to the fact that biology is a science which must be the judge of its
own methods of work; that its facts and tests of fact are to be sought within its own scientific
operations, and not in any extraneous sources. There are still, however, large portions of society which have not come to recognize that biology is an established science, and which, therefore, cannot concede to it the right to determine belief in regions that conflict with received
opinions, and with the emotions that cluster about them.
Dewey, supra note 14, at 4.
103. The classic definitions of academic freedom share the structure of professionalism set out in
the 1915 Statement. For instance, Robert MacIver wrote that "[alcademic freedom is . . . a right
claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because the conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution."
R. MACIVER, supra note 48, at 6. Here, again, a sharp distinction is implied between. competence
and viewpoint, and the emphasis is on restraining the "constituted authority" from enforcing judgments not made on scientific grounds. See also Lovejoy, supra note 14, at 384-85 (implying same
distinction).
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organized research university. The AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles
codifies in summary terms the academic freedom rights of faculty in research and teaching. 0 4 It has been endorsed by every major higher education organization in the nation.' 0 5 The AAUP's vision of academic freedom, as explained in the 1915 Statement and the 1940 Statement of
Principles,has proven intensely attractive for a variety of reasons. First, it
embodies a noble vision of the academic calling-the advancement of
truth-that justifies the efforts and sacrifices of professors. Second, it
eliminates the gravest evils of lay control over universities-ignorant interference with painstaking investigation and discussion of controversial
problems-by insisting that professors be evaluated only for professional
competence and only (in the first instance) by peers. This arrangement
also compensates, in some respect, for the American faculty's lack of control over the educational policy of the university.' Third, the concept of
peer review according to professional standards ideally fits the fragmented
state of modern learning in which plausible unifying principles are unavailable, and disciplines are usually bureaucratically organized into autonomous departments. 0 7
D.

The Challenge of Other Academic Values

While the American tradition of academic freedom emerged from the
professional organization of scholars dedicated to the scientific search for
truth, the research value has never been the only value for higher education in America. It has always had to compete with what may be called,
for lack of better labels, humanistic and democratic values.' 0 8 The humanistic value in higher education embraces both the view that valuable
knowledge includes ideas of order and relationship-often moral or aesthetic ideas-that are not scientifically demonstrable (or falsifiable) and
the related view that students must receive a coherent education in the
traditions of civilized thought, writing, and art. Although my label yokes
104. 1940 Statement, supra note 12, at 110, reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 12,
at 3-4.
105. Id. at 108-09, reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 7-9.
106. Metzger, supra note 9, at 1276-77.
107. Laurence Veysey cogently argues that the large and complex bureaucracies of modern universities were necessary institutional responses to growth in an environment lacking specific shared
values. L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 311. No consensus could support a hierarchy of values or
intellectual endeavors, but bureaucracy could support initiatives by individuals or subgroups in one
area without requiring that scholars in other areas either approve or understand them. Academic
freedom is consistent with this diffuse organization, because it "specializes" the evaluation of scholars
and provides a positive rationale for administrative officials not to insist on some partial vision of basic
institutional values. The relationship between triumphs of the scientific method and bureaucracy at
the turn of the century are analyzed insightfully in R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920
145-55 (1967).
108. In identifying three primary values in modem American higher education, I am adopting the
tripartite division employed by Professor Veysey of service (utility), research, and culture. See L.
VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 12-13.
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together diverse voices that quarrel loudly with one another, the humanistic value does identify a persistent tradition-one that maintains continuity with that of the old-time college and that has trenchantly criticized
modern academia for excessive specialization, intellectual fragmentation,
ethical agnosticism, and poor training of students.' 019 Proponents of humanistic values successfully reasserted their views against the research
dogmatists after 1900; 0 since then, the research and humanistic values
have coexisted without synthesis.
Humanists tend to regard the college rather than the graduate school as
the central institution of the university (although the devotion of some
faculty in professional schools to professional training, at the expense of
critical theory, may reflect a similar concern with the development of the
student for effective or moral action). Humanistic values may limit research values by insisting that faculty nurture students at the cost of time
and effort that could be directed toward research or that they teach foundational courses rather than courses in which the professor explains current research problems."' In practice, such conflicts are bureaucratically
managed, although the same tensions may surface over collateral issues
such as the relative significance of teaching and publishing in tenure and
promotion decisions.
Although humanists may cast doubt on some claims of science, they
often will close ranks with researchers to resist the demands of lay persons
for control by insisting on the pursuit of knowledge and culture, each for
its own sake."' Because humanists emphasize the significance of aesthetic
or moral judgments and seek to train students to make careful distinctions,
they tend to protect academic ideals against intrusions by the public at
large. Irving Babbit, for example, wrote that the purpose of the college is
"to check the drift toward a pure democracy" and "to insist on the idea of
quality; it should hold all the faster to its humane standards now that the
world is threatened with a universal impressionism.""' This inevitability
109. See id. at 180-251; G. GRAFF, supra note 77, at 121-243. Important educators within this
tradition include Woodrow Wilson, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Robert Hutchins. Polemical writings
range from I. BABBIT, LITERATURE AND THE AMERICAN COLLEGE (1908) to A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); see also THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARNING: MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT ON EDUCATION (T. Fuller ed. 1989) [hereinafter OAKESHOTT ON EDUCATION].

110.

See L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 180-259.

111.

Humanists often advocate a general education. For a recent and sophisticated plea for liberal

education, see E. BOYER, COLLEGE: THE UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 43-69, 68

(1987) (arguing that colleges should avoid narrow skill training and that they have "an obligation to
give students a sense of passage toward a more coherent view of knowledge and a more integrated
life").
112. See, e.g., R. KIRK, supra note 49, at 27 (academic freedom is necessary for pursuit of truth);
A. MEIKLEJOHN, THE LIBERAL COLLEGE 84-96 (1967) (academic freedom provides opportunity for

"the highest development of private reason and imagination").
113. I. BABBIT, supra note 109, at 80, 81. Michael Oakeshott has expressed similar sentiments
with greater subtlety:
A university, like everything else, has a place in the society to which it belongs, but that place
is not the function of contributing to some other kind of activity in the society but of being

1989]

Academic Freedom

contains an element of elitism, a view that there is a higher sphere of
thought and action than that normally occupied by business or working
people. Nonetheless, humanists often also wish to improve the lives of
people broadly or at least to train their elite students to meet their responsibilities to others.
The democratic value in higher education reflects the demands placed
on our colleges and universities by the society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social mobility and general prosperity.1 14 This value
dates at least from the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862,5 which instituted the land-grant college, but has become more prominent and influential since the massive increase in demand for higher education since 1945.
Advocates for democratic values have always insisted on the provision of
an education suited to the abilities and concerns of a larger percentage of
6
American youth, as well as to available employment opportunities.1
Similarly, there has been a desire for scholarship that is useful, either for
industrial development or for social justice. In general, advocates of democratic values view education as instrumental, conferring benefits on the
general public, rather than as a good in itself or in its diffuse, long-term
consequences. Such familiar aspects of university life as student loans, college athletics, agricultural research, and affirmative action reflect democratic values. 1 17 Indeed, the judicial enforcement against state universities
of the constitutional rights of students to free speech and fair disciplinary
procedures-rights sometimes mistaken for academic freedom ititself and not another thing. Its first business is with the pursuit of learning-there is no
substitute which, in a university, will make up for the absence of this-and, secondly, its
concern is with the sort of education that has been found to spring up in the course of this
activity. A university will have ceased to exist when its learning has degenerated into what is
now called research, when its teaching has become mere instruction and occupies the whole of
an undergraduate's time, and when those who came to be taught come, not in search of their
intellectual fortune but with a vitality so unroused or so exhausted that they wish only to be
provided with a serviceable moral and intellectual outfit; when they come with no understanding of the manners of conversation but desire only a qualification for earning a living or a
certificate to let them in on the exploitation of the world.
OAKESHOrr ON EDUCATION, supra note 109, at 103-04.
114. See generally A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987) (educational goods should
both satisfy democratically-informed distributional goals and maintain imperatives of democratic political systems); C. KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY (1963) (universities are central to economic
and social growth); A. NEVINS, supra note 71 (access to higher education promotes social mobility
and intellectually-capable citizenry necessary to democracy).
115. 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-308 (1982)).
116.

See I HIGHER EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISreprinted in part in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note

SION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (1947),

43, at 970, 979 ("We shall be denying educational opportunity to many young people as long as we
maintain the present orientation of higher education toward verbal skills and intellectual interests.").
117. Student loans and affirmative action are democratic in an obvious sense: They extend the
availability of higher education to segments of the population that have been deterred by economic or
social barriers. Agricultural research can enhance the profitability of farms and benefit consumers.
College athletics are democratic in several senses: They imply a criterion of collegiate admission and
success that is wholly unintellectual; they provide popular entertainment; and they enhance the image
of an institution to those indifferent to scholarship but important to the college's financial success,
such as alumni and state legislators.
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self-represents a high-water mark in the imposition of democratic values
on universities."" Largely accepted by many members of the academic
community, democratic values have been naturalized as academic values.
Democratic values exist in tension with academic freedom because they
insist that the university, and the scholarship of individuals, be measured
by standards other than professional competence in the pursuit of truth.'
Such tension can erupt into conflict, if rarely, such as when administrators
demand that scholarship remain "loyal" or be useful to industry. Far
more subtle and widespread are the effects wrought by shifts in values
and emphasis, such as in the maintenance of large intercollegiate athletic
programs, contract-research for industry or government, and lucrative opportunities for consulting. Both institutions and individual scholars may
come to feel excessive dependence on those who pay for these useful or
popular programs.'2
That academic freedom may need to give way to humanistic or democratic values in an intra-university decision is not necessarily a defeat for
higher education. Universities perform vital functions in preserving the
intellectual heritage, providing training for useful employment, and promoting economic development; performance of these functions justifies for
the public the expenditure of enormous resources to benefit universities.
For example, the extent to which notions of traditional professional competence ought to be altered in order to promote racial or ethnic heterogeneity on faculties is a question of primary importance on which persons of
equal thoughtfulness and good faith can differ. An advocate of academic
freedom might criticize some affirmative action plans as derogations from
accepted notions of professional competence for political reasons. But one
side ought not win a final victory merely because it can plausibly wave the
banner of academic freedom. Faculty and administrators might honorably
reject this argument to advance other values in appropriate circumstances.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
119. The most bitter opponents of incorporating democratic values into higher education tend to
be those humanists who see such values as imperiling the survival of their view of culture and excellence. See, e.g., A. BLOOM, supra note 109, at 351 (describing how "sea of democratic relativism...
has lowered university standards and obscured the university's purpose"); Hook, Conflict and Change
in the Academic Community, in IN DEFENSE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 106, 117 (S. Hook ed. 1971)
(decrying "politicalization" of the university as threat to "the values of the liberal arts tradition").
120. See D. BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER 24-26 (1982) (arguing that financial and professional opportunities outside of academe have significantly decreased academic independence). Professor Rebecca Eisenberg recently has offered a perceptive critique of the weakness of traditional academic freedom for protecting academic values against the dangers posed by sponsored research.
Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1363
(1988). She points out that
research sponsors threaten academic values when they seek to control the dissemination of
research results, the conduct of research, or the choice of research topics by faculty members,
even when faculty members themselves acquiesce in the sponsor's restrictions .... A conception
of academic freedom that precludes universities from setting limits on sponsor-imposed restrictions can only weaken the position of universities and faculty members in defending academic
values against competing outside interests.
Id. at 1384.
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Indeed, the tension is legitimate and ought to be permanent. These different academic values have existed together successfully for many years in
our universities, during which time acceptance of academic freedom has
become nearly universal.
Although the tradition of academic freedom reflects primarily research
values, constitutional academic freedom, as I will argue below, reflects
and protects both scientific research and humanistic values. Both these
values are manifest in traditions of scholarship and pedagogy called liberal
education, a concept indigenous to the university. Constitutional academic
freedom primarily protects these special values from interference by nonacademics who wish to use the university for political ends. Democratic
values reflect the imposition on and the adoption by universities of the
goals of society at large. Democratic values may nourish liberal education
indirectly by inducing support or correcting baseless prejudices, but they
also threaten it by encouraging the abandonment of the ideal of the true
for that of the useful. Accommodating these values requires careful and
delicate balancing by faculties and administrators committed to the preservation of liberal learning. Politicians steeped in popular preferences are
likely to sacrifice humanistic and research values for immediate social
benefits. Constitutional academic freedom requires courts to scrutinize external requirements that threaten indigenous values.
E. Professional Competence as a Regulatory Standard
Graver than the threat to academic freedom from other academic values
is the danger from its own internal contradictions. Chief among these is its
reliance on the ideological neutrality of the notion of professional competence. As noted above, academic freedom does not insulate speakers from
being penalized for the content of their speech. Academic freedom only
requires that speakers be evaluated by their peers for relative professional
competence and within the procedural restraints of the tenure system.
Few thinkers today are as confident as the drafters of the AAUP's 1915
Statement'2 ' that questions of professional competence are divorced from
questions of values. Science accepts the view that paradigms of analysis
shape the results investigators obtain; the scientific method is not a transparent perspective on autonomous facts. 2 2 Much less often are the inquiries of social scientists seen as ideologically neutral or free from cultural
presupposition. 2 3 This, of course, does not make physics or anthropology
1915 Statement, supra note 95.
The key contribution here has been, of course, T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
123. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 34, at 441 ("[t]he delineation between objective knowledge
and social and political judgments in the social sciences is impossible to maintain."). Social scientists
today argue from many perspectives over the meaning and value of any social inquiry that aspires to
be scientific. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE (1979); METATHEORY IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE (D. Fiske & R. Shweder eds. 1986). A renewed defense of the philosophical basis for
121.
122.
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merely subjective; the vigor of criticism and the acceptance of demonstrating falsity by experiment or evidence curbs the prejudices of the investigator. The integrity of academic freedom depends on the good faith of the
professorate and on its collective ability to distinguish between scholars
who disagree with accepted findings and those who do not understand
them. One probably can safely assume that most scholars attempt to put
aside mere disagreement or repugnance most of the time.
Trouble develops, hewever, when scholars depart from or challenge basic suppositions of a discipline that help to define competence. Norman
Birnbaum has advised us to pay "explicit attention to the mechanisms of
academic succession, with their customary confusion of criteria of competence and of adherence to conventional categories of thought."1'24 Unusual
scholarship often generates visceral negative reactions whereby professional disagreement and political opposition may become expressed by
claims that the challenger is incompetent. The sociologist who maintains
that the entrails of an owl can render more useful information than can a
statistical survey is likely to be met with derision as well as disagreement. 12 5 The competence of a modern historian who insisted on a Whig
interpretation of events while focusing largely on the affairs of "great
men" would likewise be suspect.
Those who challenge disciplinary axioms are likely to be held to higher
standards of competence than those who ably travel established pathways,
yet those who are able to establish successfully new perspectives in a discipline are likely to become its leaders. Such disputes may be bitter because
the professional status of all participants may hang on whether views they
have advocated are ascendant or on the wane. Although some individuals
may suffer in this process because they are denied positions obtained by
more conventional scholars of equal competence, holding radically unconventional scholars to higher standards helps to maintain the coherence of a
discipline. In this context, claims that the insurgent's academic freedom
has been violated cannot be disentangled from the substance of the dispute, because both issues turn on the intellectual value of the challenger's
position.
Academic freedom concerns are likely to become even more pervasive
when a discipline is divided over the acceptability of fundamental paradigms. Without agreement about basic paradigms, competence loses much
of the neutrality that might ordinarily be assumed, as there may be no
shared criterion for evaluation.12 6 Participants may view themselves as
academic freedom within the university must await a new synthesis of theories of knowledge.
124. Birnbaum, supra note 34, at 456.
125. This is not to say that one could not construct, for example, an academically-respectable
argument that reading entrails performed a more useful or meaningful role within Roman culture
than surveys do in ours.
126. Thomas Kuhn writes that the incommensurability of scientific paradigms makes it very difficult for proponents of competing paradigms to communicate with each other. T. KUHN, supra note
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competing for the future of the discipline. Arguably, this roughly describes
the situation in legal scholarship highlighted by the recent controversial
employment decisions at Harvard Law School.12 In such settings there
may be no neutral principle by which to resolve the dispute, because questions of competence and substantive acceptance cannot be separated. Thus,
concluding that one side has violated academic freedom will be viewed as
implying necessarily that the opposing view has substantial merit as a
paradigm for the discipline. Academic freedom was never intended to provide a rule for settling this kind of problem. Toleration, understanding
and analytical syntheses are the only means by which the dignity of individuals can be protected during such fertile but disturbing times. Interestingly, the AAUP argues that faculty appointments should be made without regard to the "fit" of the candidate's views with any "contemporary
orthodoxy," but it also holds that a faculty's good faith attempt to separate
evaluation of competence from ideological disagreement both exhausts the
candidate's rights and is itself protected by academic freedom from further
128
questioning.
Even were one dissatisfied with reliance upon peer review, no alternative seems as promising. 129 The AAUP's efforts understandably are dedicated to increasing the centrality of peer review, through grievance procedures that act as a faculty check upon administrators' responses to
departmental recommendations. (The principle of academic freedom reflects the structure of the university; the drive for professorial autonomy
can be furthered by increasing the power of the faculty within the univer122, at 149-50.
127. See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL. EDUC.
1 (1985) (exchanges of letters among legal academics concerning Paul Carrington's criticism of Critical Legal Studies movement); Frug, McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 665 (1987); Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law, NEw YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at
53-83. Professor Frug argues that the repeated criticism that Critical Legal Studies is "incompetent"
derives from a desire to maintain perceived academic standards against challenges to traditional institutional practicies. Frug, supra, at 696. He also observes that confusion about the nature of "competence" may only be exacerbated by appeals to academic freedom. Id. at 688-89. Contemporary social
science as a whole is characterized by competing, seemingly irreconcilable methodologies. See C.
LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 123, at 47-49.
128. AAUP, Some Observations on Ideology, Competence, and Faculty Selection, ACADEME,
Jan.-Feb. 1986, at la [hereinafter AAUP, Observations on Ideology]. While defending the relevance
of academic freedom to these problems, Professor Rabban nonetheless concedes that the AAUP has
somewhat begged the question: "To a significant extent, the very definition of a discipline and its
standards for determining professional competence are themselves based on conventional wisdom."
Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1405, 1426 (1988).
129. Professor Frug, in his thoughtful essay comparing McCarthyism with recent hiring controversies regarding scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, offers an ethical basis
for academic freedom that goes somewhat beyond faculty self-governance and adherence to professional standards for evaluation: "To be successful, my own notion of academic freedom-of continuous dialogue between opposed positions-must overcome the blindness of different sides to other
points of view; indeed, the very definition of the various sides must become an object of discussion."
Frug, supra note 127, at 701. Whether or not it is useful to stretch the term "academic freedom" to
encompass this humane engagement about academic norms, it is important to insist that angry controversy over criteria for good scholarship raises intellectual and social, rather than legal, problems.
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sity, but at some cost to other values). It is incoherent to suggest that
academic freedom could be furthered by reducing peer review and substituting the enforcement of rules by lay persons such as judges. This ignores
both the historical basis of, and the actual structures that protect, faculty
rights.
Some may argue that peer review provides only specious protection for
the professor's liberty, particularly when the candidate seeks to challenge
orthodoxy. Professor Bertell Olman, himself the protagonist in a wellknown dispute about academic freedom analyzed below, has argued that
peer review is a mechanism of repression, that the faculty itself is entrusted by higher-ups with the task of limiting the numbers of radical
faculty on campus, and that the higher-ups-administrators and governors-intervene only when the faculty fail.' 3 0 Olman is one of the few
commentators to stress the central role of policing of the academic standards by faculty in the exercise of academic freedom. His analysis appears
mistaken, however, in its assumption that the ideal of academic freedom is
the "professor's right to pursue truth in his own way.'1 3 ' American academics have always insisted that speakers conform broadly to the evolving
standards of the discipline. What Olman viewed as prejudice or conspiracy against radical thinking and Marxist critique probably reflected good
faith substantive judgments about what kinds of political science are the
most valuable. Such judgments may be wrong or may be widely viewed as
such in the future, but the effort to make judgments is essential for progress, or at least for coherence, within disciplines.' 3 2
Some may find the concern for progress and coherence naive. Few to130. Ollman, Academic Freedom in America Today: A Marxist View, MONTHLY REVIEW, Mar.
1984, at 24, reprinted in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS 45 (C. Kaplan & E. Schrecker eds.
1983).
131.

Id. at 25, reprinted in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS, supra note 130, at 46.

132. Thomas Kuhn offers the following perspective on the resistance of proponents of an older
paradigm to those of a new one:
Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have committed them to
an older tradition of normal science, is not a violation of scientific standards but an index to
the nature of scientific research itself. The source of resistance is the assurance that the older
paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature can be shoved into the box the
paradigm provides. Inevitably, at times of revolution, that assurance seems stubborn and pigheaded as indeed it sometimes becomes. But it is also something more. That same assurance is
what makes normal or puzzle-solving science possible.
T. KUHN, supra note 122, at 151-52.
Frank Kermode, the eminent literary critic, makes a similar point about the persistent attachment
of literary scholars to canons of revered and studied literary work:
[Wihether one thinks of canons as objectionable because formed at random or to serve some
interests at the expense of others, or whether one supposes that the contents of canons are
providentially chosen, there can be no doubt that we have not found ways of ordering our
thoughts about the history of literature and art without recourse to them. That is why the
minorities who want to be rid of what they regard as a reactionary canon can think of no way
of doing so without putting a radical one in its place.
'. . The canon, in predetermining value, shapes the past and makes it humanly available,
accessibly modern.
F. KERMODE, HISTORY AND VALUE 116-17 (1988).
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day share the faith of the early prophets of academic freedom that the
scientific method imminently will reveal objective truths about social and
ethical dilemmas that can transform the basis of social life.1"' Some within
the academy also dispute the existence of any truth independent of the
seeker and may insist that all paradigms of systematic thought are only
expressions of the social placement of the speakers. 3 To the extent such
critics find the protection of academic freedom comfortable, they will seek
to uncouple the justification for academic freedom from the view that one
account of phenomena may be, in some objective sense, more true than
another. Such thinkers, quite unafraid of rendering discourse incoherent
(because they believe it to be so already), would likely favor a general free
speech approach, where virtually all voices are protected: Academic speech
should be treated like political speech because there is no material difference between the two. Yet if formulations and critiques of any subject are
merely restatements of subjective political preferences, it is difficult to see
why society at large should not demand that only certain political preferences be reflected. If speech is believed to have no autonomy from political
power, political power will not long brook contradictory speech. Academic
freedom in such a setting would be only the result of inertia and
35

traditionalism.1

Academic freedom has taken firm root in American society because of
the widespread view that academic speech matters.3 8 Disciplined attempts
133. For all the new-found awareness of the influences of research paradigms, the natural sciences remain largely immune from incursions on academic freedom. "One of the strongest, if still
unwritten, rules of scientific life is the prohibition of appeals to heads of state or to the populace at
large in matters scientific." T. KUHN, supra note 122, at 168. No doubt the broad consensus on the
underlying principles of methodology and the relatively objective results of scientific research permit
functional distinctions between competence and viewpoint to an extent impossible in the social sciences
and humanities. Thus, the natural sciences remain what Allen Bloom called them in a slightly different context: "the Switzerland of learning." A. BLOOM, supra note 109, at 349.
134. See, e.g., Singer, The.Player and the Cards.- Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
57-59 (1984) (legal theory).
135. An honest attempt to escape this dilemma is found in S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 170-78 (1988). Professor Levinson shares the radical skepticism about truth referred to in the
text, identifying himself with the view that "what is professed to be known [is) itself constituted by the
subject that claims to know." Id. at 175. He finds, however, a basis for academic freedom in the
behavior of faculty within a discipline, who "decide whose conversations it finds interesting, helpful,
or illuminating" and agrees that "none of us could possibly believe that everyone is a genuine contributor." Id. at 178. This view is confusing. A normative principle, such as academic freedom, cannot be
justified by descriptions of behavior. Although Professor Levinson wishes to expand the range of
voices valued by academics, he also asserts that a faculty must be able to exclude speakers whose work
it finds uninteresting. To what criteria of interest should the faculty agree? Moreover, he does not
address the problem of why society at large should permit professors the liberty to make these distinctions themselves.
136. See R. NISBET, supra note 48, at 24-27. One could also take the opposite view that academic speech does not matter at all-that academic freedom permits or encourages intellectual malcontents to direct potentially revolutionary energy toward arcane and harmless exercises that have
little effect on the real world of power and wealth. Leaving aside the poverty of the view that education and scholarship are so far inferior in value to dominance and acquisition, see generally E.M.
FORSTER, THE LONGEST JOURNEY 67-68 (Vintage ed. 1962) (contrasting the "goodness" and morality of academic imperatives with directives issued by powers of "great" force), this view misconceives
the origin and function of legal rules. If academic speech were always harmless, no legal protection
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to transcend received or popular opinions provide both weight and depth
to academic discourse and to education. Indeed, beyond their capacity to
train students for white-collar jobs, our colleges and universities are valued because their work and the time we spend in them affirm the worth
of free inquiry and the capacity of the trained mind to see things, however
partially, as they are. The modern university epitomizes a liberal faith
that a free people can, like the college itself, cast off authoritarianism
without lapsing into total relativism or incoherence. Perhaps, intimations
of this vision explain the glowing rhetoric with which the Supreme Court
has justified its constitutional protection of academic freedom.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL
SCHOLAR

When the Supreme Court came to constitutionalize academic freedom,
it encountered a tradition of values and personnel procedures protecting
the individual scholar from non-academic judgments by college administrators. In considering the Supreme Court's innovations, we will want to
enquire about the extent to which the Court has also sought to protect the
individual scholar against administrators or trustees who are state actors.
Yet the Supreme Court's cases are few and vague, and lower court decisions seem confused and contradictory. In this section, I review Supreme
Court precedent concerning constitutional academic freedom and the individual professor. I argue that courts are poorly equipped to enforce traditional academic freedom as a legal norm, and I suggest more limited, but
137
useful, protection for individual faculty members.

would be required because the speech would never be worth challenging. Both academic tradition and
the constitutional protection of academic freedom have been fashioned in crisis and conflict.
137. Throughout this article, I treat cases involving elementary and secondary school teachers as
marginal, citing or discussing them only when they bear directly on the law as it pertains to universities. This distinction is appropriate for several reasons. First, academic freedom was conceived and
implemented in the university, and any role it plays in the lower grades is derivative. Second, as
argued in the previous section, academic freedom makes sense only for teachers who are also researchers or scholars-work not generally expected of elementary and secondary school teachers. See supra
text accompanying notes 84-107. Third, when lower courts sometimes use the term academic freedom
in defending the classroom speech of schoolteachers from sanctions by principals or school boards, they
appear to mediate between the often-affirmed power of school boards to inculcate "American values"
in young pupils, see Diamond, The First Amendment and the Public Schools: The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477, 497 (1981) (one First Amendment concern in public
schools is indoctrination), and the values of individual expression and diversity, see West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Universities do not "inculcate" ideology; their
transmission of cultural values is an explicitly intellectual process that permits the student to reach
her own conclusions. The rights of schoolteachers are important, but they are articulated in such a
different educational context that they should be kept distinct.
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Sweezy and the Origins of ConstitutionalAcademic Freedom

In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,1 38 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Marxist economist 13 9 Paul Sweezy for refusing to answer several questions put to him by the State attorney general, who was investigating "subversive persons." A few of the questions inquired into the
content of a guest lecture Sweezy had given in a humanities class at the
University of New Hampshire. A plurality of the Justices joined an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, holding that the Attorney General's questioning violated due process because the state legislature had made a
"broad and ill-defined" delegation to him of its investigative power. 4"
This odd holding, which imposes federal separation of powers limitations
on the states, has had no subsequent legal career. The opinion nevertheless contains passages that generally approve constitutional limitations on
government power to interfere with academic freedom. The plurality
states provisionally: "We do not now conceive of any circumstance
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these
fields."'' The decision to base the holding on an improbable procedural
limitation on state legislatures rather than on a clear, positive right of
academic freedom may have reflected either the Court's primary anxiety
about abuses arising from broad legislative investigations-the essential
tool of McCarthyism

42

-or the Court's aversion at that time to the artic-

ulation of precise, conclusive First Amendment rights. 43
A concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan,
138. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
139. Paul Sweezy, described in the Court's opinion only as a journalist, was (and remains) a
significant Marxist economist and the founder of the leftist periodical Monthly Review. Sweezy earned
his doctorate from Harvard and was an assistant professor there until 1945. He resigned in the belief
that his department would not grant tenure to a Marxist. He had already written a pathbreaking
book in American Marxism, The Theory of CapitalistDevelopment. After leaving Harvard, Sweezy
was free not to seek another academic position because he enjoyed (ironically) a small independent
fortune inherited from his father, a successful Wall Street banker. See Interview with Paul M. Sweezy,
MONTHLY REVIEW, Apr. 1987, at 1; see also Brief for Appellant at 5, Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957) (No. 175). Because Sweezy did not occupy a regular academic position at a
university, he did not come within the protection offered by AAUP and the traditions of academic
freedom.
140. 354 U.S. at 245, 254-55.
141. Id. at 251.
142. In a companion case, the Court reversed the conviction for criminal contempt of a witness
who had refused to answer questions from the House Un-American Activities Committee on the
ground that the House's delegation of investigational power was so vague that the witness was unable
to decide which questions the Committee had authority to compel him to answer. Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). The decision appears intended to prompt congressional reexamination of
the scope and propriety of the Committee's investigation. See id. at 198-99.
143. In another decision announced the same day, the Court reversed the convictions of members
of the Communist party for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act, on the ground that the Act, as upheld
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), only outlawed any advocacy of violent revolution,
not "teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
318 (1957). Professor Gunther has emphasized the importance of Yates as a step toward stricter
requirements that speech incite unlawful action before it can be prevented. Gunther, Learned Hand
and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 753 (1975).
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went further, arguing that in the academic realm, "thought and action are
presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority."1"4 Frankfurter thus would have held that university freedom for teaching and
scholarship without interference from government is a positive right and
that the state here had failed to provide a compelling justification for
questioning an academic about the content of a lecture. Frankfurter argued at length for "the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university."1 45 He gave some content to the legal right
of academic freedom by quoting a statement by South African academics
concerning "' "the four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' ",146
There are at least three significant oddities about the plurality and concurring opinions in Sweezy. First, never before had the Court suggested
that academic freedom was protected by the First Amendment.1 47 Al144. 354 U.S. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 262.
146. Id. at 263 (quoting statement of conference of senior scholars from Universities of Cape
Town and Witwatersrand).
147. The only prior use of the term "academic freedom" in a Supreme Court opinion was by
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952). In Adler, the Court
upheld the Feinberg Law against a First Amendment challenge by schoolteachers. This state statute
was designed to preclude the employment of anyone who belonged to an organization advocating the
violent overthrow of the government. The Adler Court upheld the law on the now-discredited doctrine
that government can condition public employment on compliance with any pertinent conditions. Justice Douglas argued in broad, non-technical language, that this rule was pernicious; he graphically
described "this system of spying and surveillance" that might result from the Feinberg Law. Id. at
510-11. This situation, he maintained, was inconsistent with academic freedom. Justice Douglas
never argued that academic freedom itself was constitutionally protected; rather, he argued that the
Court should have found that the statute violated the teacher's right of free expression because, in
part, the law would inhibit academic freedom, understood as the actual process of free inquiry in the
classroom. In other words, academic freedom denoted an attractive mode of teaching and scholarship
rather than a legal right.
Similarly, in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the Supreme Court struck down an
Oklahoma law barring from public employment persons who had been members of "subversive organizations" within the past five years, regardless of their knowledge of the organization. Although the
appellants were faculty at a state college, the Court properly made clear that the requirement was
unconstitutional as applied to any public employees. Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter emphasized in
his concurring opinion the deleterious effects on education from attempting to enforce ideological orthodoxy on faculty. Id. at 196-98. Although he never used the words "academic freedom," he wrote
vigorously about the social value of free-thinking teachers in a way that anticipated future judicial
justifications for academic freedom. He also quoted extensively from congressional testimony by Robert Hutchins, former President of the University of Chicago and an outstanding theorist of higher
education, about the role of free speech in universities.
Finally, Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), struck down a state law requiring
public colleges to dismiss any employee who exercised her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Again, although this ruling applied to all public employees-not just to teachers and
scholars-it vindicated the right of an associate professor at Brooklyn College. It addressed a practice
condemned by the AAUP but too often followed by fearful institutions of higher education.
Though none of these cases established or called for the establishment of a constitutional right of
academic freedom, they do reflect the Court's accumulating concern about the effects of the loyalty
craze on vigorous teaching and scholarship and about the developing articulation of the social utility of
free schools.
Although some commentators find ancestors of constitutional academic freedom in the line of cases
beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which did affirm a "right to teach" while
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though the decision must be viewed as the major break with the historical
status of academic activity under the Constitution, neither opinion contains any acknowledgment that the Court was making new law. The only
hint that the Justices were aware that they were conferring a novel constitutional status on academic freedom is the vehemence of the rhetoric with
which they praised the right. The formal pose that academic freedom always had been a functioning part of the system of freedom of expression
may best be explained by the vulnerability of a Court then actively reaching out to curb abusive legislative investigations. Sweezy was handed down
on the same day as six other opinions making it more difficult for Congress, administrative agencies, and state legislatures to expose and to penalize allegedly subversive persons."" When imposing novel and controversial limitations on government power, the Court often strives to appear
to be proceeding upon long-established consensual norms. In any event,
press reports of the controversial decisions handed down on "Red Monday," whether approving or condemning the Court's intervention in "loyalty" issues, failed to observe that a new constitutional right of academic
149
freedom had been born.

Because of the Justices' reticence about the effects of their decisions,
neither opinion frankly assessed the advantages or disadvantages of constitutionalizing academic freedom. The failure to place academic freedom
within a context of competing concerns and the Court's exuberant praise
of its value made the legal reach of the right of academic freedom appear
soaring and expansive; observers might understandably have predicted a
major role for the Court in identifying and rectifying violations of this
vital principle. Today we can see how misleading such a reading would
have been. At the time of the Sweezy decision, the AAUP was deeply ambivalent about the constitutionalization of academic freedom, because some
members feared the long-term consequences of having judges rather than
professors elaborate and apply the protective rules of academic life. As a
result of this reluctance, the AAUP did not file a brief in Sweezy, depriving the Court of knowledgeable counsel on the virtues andrisks of its
15 0

course.

invalidating a state ban on teaching the German language, see Finkin, supra note 19, at 836-37, these
are old-fashioned substantive due process cases that suggest no special value to learning or scholarship
but uphold liberty to teach on the same theory as liberty to employ workers at substandard wages. See
Metzger, supra note 9, at 1285 n.45.
148. In addition to Sweezy and the cases cited supra notes 142-43, on June 17, 1957, the Court
handed down Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), which invalidated the dismissal of an allegedly
disloyal State Department employee as inconsistent with the department's procedural regulations.
149. See The Court, Congress, Chaos, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1957, at 19-20; N.Y. Times, June 23,
1957, at E9, col. 3 (cartoon depicting Supreme Court as guard dog protecting Bill of Rights from
congressional investigations); Lawmakers Assail High Court for 'Invasion,' Wash. Post and Times
Herald, June 19, 1957, at B4, col. 1; 'Liberal' Court Emerges as Champion of Individual, Christian
Sci. Monitor, June 18, 1957, at 1, col. 5;JudiciarySeen as Setting Limit on Other Branches, N.Y.
Times, June 18, 1957, at 1, col. 5.
150. Soon thereafter, Professor Carr explained the AAUP's dilemma:
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A second curious feature of the decision is that Frankfurter's opinion,
subsequently the more influential, looks solely to non-legal sources to describe the content of the right of academic freedom. In an important sense,
this reliance was inevitable because the Court's decision had no legal precursors and the words "academic freedom" had no meaning apart from
their usage in academic contexts. Frankfurter never pauses, however, to
comment on the different meanings words can have in different professional and social contexts. Thus he quotes with approval an aspirational
political statement by academics about the four freedoms of a university,
leaving ambiguous whether these four freedoms henceforth constitute positive limitations on state power.' 5 1 Frankfurter does not signal whether he
is writing a judicial opinion or a professorial tract.
Frankfurter's loose and essayistic writing creates a further source of
fertile ambiguity. The structures of both Warren's and Frankfurter's
opinions follow the established First Amendment convention that the
rights claimed by Sweezy were personal to him: As a speaker, he asserted
his constitutional right as a limitation on state power. Yet, in finding a
violation of academic freedom, Frankfurter repeatedly addresses the right
of the university itself-rather than those of its faculty members as individuals-to be free from wrongful governmental interference. On the facts
of the case, the distinction is unimportant because the "villain" was the
state itself-the attorney general acting as an agent of the legislature to
enforce political norms-and both the professor and the university were
its "victims." The confusion is crucial, nonetheless, because academic freedom had traditionally been understood as a personal right of the faculty
member against university administrators and trustees.152 Would the case
have been decided differently had a dean, who would have been a state
official, asked the questions of Sweezy? 15 3 The roots of this distinction and
The Sweezy decision posed quite a problem for the American Association of University Professors. At the time the case was being argued, it was suggested by interested persons that the
Association consider the submission of an amicus brief to the Supreme Court. The Association
declined to do so, thinking it likely that the case would be decided on grounds not directly
related to the principles and activities of the Association, and also because it was not completely persuaded of the wisdom of seeking legal recognition of and protection for academic
freedom as against the legislative power of investigation. The Court's decision in the Sureezy
case made it necessary for the Association to reconsider its position .... The Association would
perhaps have preferred to let the meaning and practice of academic freedom take shape, as it
has in the past, on a private, voluntary basis through the collective efforts of teachers, institutions of higher learning, and educational associations....
...[0]ne reason for the Association's reluctance to see academic freedom defined as a legal
concept has been its fear that what the courts give, they may take away, and that having thus
given and taken away, academic freedom may be left in a weaker position than it was before it
became a concern of the law.
Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors, and the United States
Supreme Court, 45 A.A.U.P. BULL. 5, 19-20 (1959).
151. 354 U.S. at 262-63.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
153. During the 1950's, academic administrators often questioned targets of legislative inquiries
about their radical political involvements. See E. SCHRECKER, supra note 42, at 219-40. The AAUP
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its perpetuation by Frankfurter's apparently careless employment of nonlegal discussions will be discussed in detail below.""
A third significant aspect of Sweezy is that although Frankfurter draws
the content of academic freedom from available non-legal sources, both he
and Warren praise academic freedom by stressing the social utility of free
universities. Both Justices argue that continued progress in the social sciences requires freedom of inquiry and discussion, that impairment of this
progress would imperil democratic government and civilization, and,
therefore, that government must not interfere with academic freedom." 5'
The persuasiveness of this reasoning may be thought to lie at the core of
the justification for the constitutional status of academic freedom. Obviously, it is intensely problematic: Our democratic government was established and flourished for one hundred years before departments of social
sciences were established at any American universities.' As will be explored below, 157 affirmation of the social utility of academic freedom reflects the faith of an intellectual elite in the centrality of neutral reason to
the success of the liberal state. At present, it is enough to note that someone who supports freedom of inquiry and discussion within academic life
without regard to its constitutional status need argue only that it is likely
to produce "better" writing and teaching.
B.

Ambiguous Development in Barenblatt and Keyishian

Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of academic freedom with
a legacy of triumphant rhetoric but also with an ambiguous description of
the relationship between academic custom and positive legal right. The
Court's decision not to ground its ruling on a positive right of academic
freedom, moreover, presaged the Court's refusal to give this right the
practical force that its rhetorical enthusiasms promised. Indeed, the
Court's decision two years later in Barenblatt v. United States,'58 affirming the conviction of an academic for criminal contempt in refusing to
answer Congressional questions concerning Communist activities among
graduate students at the University of Michigan, immediately suggested
limits on the reach of academic freedom. Justice Harlan's opinion, while
promising that the Court would "always be on the alert against intrusion
took the position that professors have a duty of candor when answering questions put by college
administrators seeking to determine their fitness to teach. 42 A.A.U.P. BULL 60 (1956).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 238-46.
155. 354 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion); id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
156. It is not merely tendentious to note that Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln presided over robustly democratic societies wholly deprived of guidance by social scientists. Even granting the greater
complexity of current government and society, social science seems more necessary to technocratic
structures of social management than to democratic choice. See R. WEBE, supra note 107, at 145-49.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 328-35.
158. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain," ' stresses that a
university is not a "constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that
may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain . . 0
Barenblatt could be seen as a defeat for academic freedom, because it
substantially upheld the investigation of the House Un-American Activities Committee into campus Communism.
Whatever its effect on academic morale in 1959, Barenblatt's impact on
the development of the constitutional right of academic freedom has been
negligible. 61 Harlan labored to distinguish between attempts by Congress
to control teaching in the universities through investigations, which would
violate academic freedom, and efforts by Congress to discover traces of the
international conspiracy on campuses, which fell outside of academic freedom. The Court justified Congress' investigation by the special nature of
the Communist party (taken as dedicated to violent overthrow of constitutional government) and by its particular focus on political organization. 6 2
Even if the cruel and fruitless loyalty investigations did in fact inhibit the
vigor of academic writing on social issues in the 1940's and 1950's,' an
allegation that seems frequently overstated,16 4 Harlan was correct that investigations about a subversive organization that included graduate students did not violate academic freedom; significantly, none of the Barenblatt dissenters argue otherwise.' 6 5 Political organization deserves First
Amendment protection, but it has little or nothing to do with scholarly
159. Id. at 112.
160. Id.
161. The AAUP filed an amicus brief in Barenblatt.Significantly, it did not argue that Barenblatt's right of academic freedom had been violated, but rather that "[t]he threatened punishment of
petitioner is a link within a chain of acts which ends in a trespass by the Government on certain
immunities [i.e. institutional autonomy] essential to academic institutions." Brief of American Association of University Professors as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959) (No. 35).
162. 360 U.S. at 127-30.
163. One survey of social scientists during the McCarthy period found that 20% of the respondents stated that they had become less willing to express unpopular views in class and 17% stated that
they were more inclined to avoid controversial subjects in their speeches and writings. P. LAZARSFELD
& W. THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC MIND: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 194 (1958).
164. Professor Schrecker cautiously suggests that the purging of past and present Communists
from academia may have been responsible for the dearth of radical academic work during the 1950's.
E. SCHRECKER, supra note 42, at 339. Justice Douglas apoplectically expressed this same view:
"[O]ne of the main problems of faculty members is their own re-education or re-orientation.... More
often than not they represent those who withered under the pressures of McCarthyism or other forces
of conformity and represent but a timid replica of those who once brought distinction to the ideal of
academic freedom." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 196-97 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
An atmosphere of fear and suspicion certainly dampens intellectual boldness. Yet, it seems too
simple to ascribe the centrist tone of much academic social writing in the 1950's to McCarthy-like
investigations. A host of powerful factors, such as the widespread first-hand experience of war, television, prosperity, and the baby boom contributed to a strong political desire for consensus that influenced academic scholars. Indeed, European scholarship settled into a more centrist mode as well, even
without the demagoguery and paranoia of loyalty investigations.
165. Justice Black's eloquent dissent never mentions academic freedom or Sweezy. 360 U.S. at
134-62 (Black, J., dissenting).
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writing and teaching. 6 Barenblatt highlights the nature of the offense to
academic freedom that distinguished Sweezy: political review of an aca67
demic lecture.1
The Court's preference for deciding academic freedom cases on other
grounds was continued in Keyishian v. Board of Regents'68 in 1967. The
case struck down on vagueness and overbreadth grounds the application of
New York's Feinberg Law-a series of statutes and regulations intended
to bar "subversive" persons from employment-to professors at the State
University of New York.' 6 9 The Court read certain sections of the law
outlawing advocacy of forceful overthrow of the government to embrace
potentially sympathetic classroom treatment of Marxist or other revolutionary works or ideas. The provision was held to be unconstitutionally
vague because a professor's fear of the law would distort his selection and
70
treatment of subjectsY.
The Court emphasized that regulations affecting
academic freedom must be sufficiently clear so as not to discourage the
exercise of constitutional rights.
Ironically, this opinion, which voided a statute as unduly vague, is itself
extraordinarily vague about the dimensions of the right of academic freedom.' 7 ' Plainly, the Court was convinced that the imposing apparatus of
loyalty laws had chilled and would continue to chill controversial teaching, research, and writing over a broad range of politically-sensitive subjects. At the same time, the Court implied that truly subversive teaching,
intentionally indoctrinating students with treasonous sentiments or inciting them to violence, properly could be penalized.'7 2 The Court failed to
develop a principled distinction between protected and punishable academic speech, although it insisted quite justifiably that loyalty laws attempt to do precisely that. The only guidance the Court did provide was
by way of example: It presented obviously protected conduct that the
vague Feinberg Law, reductio ad absurdum, might prohibit, such as a
teacher's informing her class about the Declaration of Independence or
her carrying a copy of the Communist Manifesto.1' 3 The Court provided
such examples more to impugn the statute than to illuminate the constitutional right.
In the absence of a precise delineation of the protected right, the fervid
166. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
167. 360 U.S. at 129-30.
168. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
169. This was essentially the same package of laws upheld against a challenge by schoolteachers
in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See supra note 147.
170. 385 U.S. at 604.
171. Justice Clark aptly began his dissent: "The blunderbuss fashion in which the majority
couches 'its artillery of words,' together with the morass of cases it cites as authority and the obscurity
of their application to the question at hand, makes it difficult to grasp the true thrust of its decision."
Id. at 620-21 (Clark, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 599-600, 602.
173. Id. at 600-01.

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 99: 251

and stirring rhetoric with which the Court praised academic freedom must
be considered for the meaning of the ideas it clothes. The language used,
other than that borrowed from Sweezy, deserves to be quoted in full:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of
ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
174
authoritative selection.1

Several features of this passage are noteworthy. First, the Court here
makes an even more passionate claim for the social utility of academic
freedom than it did in Sweezy. The quasi-religious claim, that academic
freedom is of "transcendent" value to every member of society, even if a
product of imprecise word choice, seems significant. The Court does not
posit any direct benefit to the average citizen from academic freedom, such
as higher wages or longer life. Rather, the value is found in the acculturation of the future leaders of the political order in a critical attitude toward
authoritarian dogma and in tolerance of dissent. The view seems to be
that a free education of this sort will graduate political leaders tolerant
toward dissent within society as a whole. That the Court is emphasizing
free education's capacity to promote allegiance to open inquiry rather than
its ability actually to "discover truth" through academic inquiry is emphasized by its quotation from Learned Hand's opinion in Associated Press,
the next line of which reads: "To many this is, and always will be, folly;
but we have staked upon it our all."' 7 5 The rhetoric of the Keyishian
Court implies that the elements of free inquiry, discussion, dissent, and
consensus are not important primarily because they lead to
truth-although the attainability of such truth may be a formal premise of
the doctrine-but because they express an invaluable sense of what kind
of society we, as a people, desire; their value is symbolic rather than
practical.
Second, the Court remains reticent in defining the content of constitutional academic freedom. Describing the classroom as "peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas' " obscures more than it clarifies. The Court is
surely right insofar as it suggests that academic freedom requires that
174. Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) and United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (citations omitted).
175. 52 F. Supp. at 372.
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ideas achieve eminence only to the extent that competent scholars accept
them upon due and unconstrained examination. However, the application
of Holmes' familiar metaphor to the operation of a classroom falsely suggests that teaching normally involves a free exchange of ideas among
equals. 76 The academic status of the writings of a Dryden or Pascal or
the prevalence of a particular scientific hypothesis about the origin of the
Milky Way or about reproduction among swordfish does not depend upon
the applause or assent of undergraduates. Necessary functions of modern
universities include the preservation of ideas, the advancement of knowledge to which the public is indifferent, and the education of students in
7
elite standards of criticism and sophisticated means of investigation.1 1
Moreover, the careless application of the "marketplace" metaphor overlooks delicate issues concerning the professor's limited autonomy in the
selection of content for a particular course.
Third, the Court's use of rhetoric to define the content of academic
freedom increases the ambiguity already created by basing the case's holding upon vagueness. The Court insists that the First Amendment will not
"tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.' 7 8 The
central point appears to be that laws are bad when they discourage free
and unconstrained teaching, not just when they directly prohibit it. This
point is appropriate in a case based upon vagueness, and it implicitly limits the holding of Barenblatt. But this language obviously goes too far.
Many laws and regulations pertaining to universities discourage heterodoxy by supporting a self-perpetuating academic establishment with identifiable standards for teaching and scholarship.'7 For example, the estab176. Holmes employed the metaphor of a marketplace of ideas in his famous dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), where he wrote that the "best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 630. In the context of that
dissent, it is plain that Holmes was referring to basic postulates about social life, such as the attractiveness or justice of communism, that are not susceptible to being settled according to established
criteria. Moreover, for Holmes, society's acceptance of an idea exhausts what it means for that idea to
be true. His view of discourse reflects a Darwinian yet pessimistic view of the struggle of interest
groups to achieve social dominance. He favors "free trade in ideas" because it facilitates this underlying process of social competition. As he stated in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
673 (1925), "[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should
be given their chance and have their way." This meaning of truth seems antithetical to the aspirations
of scholarship, which seeks to measure the viability or importance of an idea by intellectual or experiential criteria independent of popular prejudices. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112, at 89
(arguing that colleges must "stand apart, viewing all interests of men alike with equal eye, and measuring each in terms of every other and the whole.").
177. Robert Hutchins is one of the most articulate to insist that "[i]f there are permanent studies
which every person who wishes to call himself educated should master; if those studies constitute our
intellectual inheritance, then those studies should be the center of a general education." R. HUTCHINS,
THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 70 (1936).
178. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
179. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (association's refusal to accredit
proprietary school not subject to antitrust laws). An attempt to bring disproportionate impact suits
against universities under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 probably would founder
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lished procedures for graduate training, enforced by accreditation
agencies, promote orthodoxy by preserving a professorate of similar training, which emphasizes a limited choice of investigatory methods, at least
as compared with a faculty chosen at random or by diverse political interest groups. 8 0
The anomalies in the Court's rhetorical exposition of the meaning of
constitutional academic freedom seem to stem from its incomplete understanding of what academic freedom requires. The Court's rhetoric praises
academic freedom as an institutional right to be free from orthodoxy prescribed by the government at large. The focus is on the classroom, viewed
metaphorically as the process of institutionalized scholarship and teaching,
rather than on the rights of any individual teacher or student; the benefits
to democracy flow through a system of education not seriously imperiled
by isolated injustices. The "orthodoxies" feared are not those of academics
themselves, but those imposed by non-academic officials seeking to advance their views on various policies. These are the only kind of interferences in the "free market" of teaching with which the Court is concerned.
This focus on the protection of the system from government interference
can easily be missed because the term academic freedom had always signified an individual right against any interference by laypersons. The
Court's rhetoric, however, is quite unsuitable to this traditional notion.
These two cases exhaust the Supreme Court's development of a university faculty member's right of academic freedom. Despite their analytical
shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contributed substantially to the virtual extinction of overt efforts by non-academic government officials to
prescribe political orthodoxy in university teaching and research."' Today, few politicians seek political capital by attacking academics for their
political opinions, and those who do only provide their victims with lawsuits that usually fortify their academic positions against more subtle or
justifiable assault. This does not mean that ideological passion and
prejudice now play no part in academic appointments (how could they
not?); rather the rules of the game are now those of the academy.
because of judicial reluctance to tamper with educational standards, even though such suits may be
brought against other professional groups. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777
(1989) (subjective or discretionary employment practices in bank subject to disproportionate impact
challenge).
180. Requiring generally that college professors of literature earn doctoral degrees limits both the
number who become teachers and the kind of questions they pursue. See, e.g., I. BABBIT, supra note
109, at 118-49; G. GRAFF, supra note 77, at 57-59, 65-72.
181. Other important cases protecting faculty members from interference from non-academic governmental officials are White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (First
Amendment provides basis for injunction against police attending classes in disguise to report on
seditious utterances); Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (grand jury report violated academic freedom when it criticized faculty for
being partly responsible for violent demonstrations at Kent State University because of critical tone of
teaching). Both cases treat academic freedom as a corporate right but permit faculty to sue to protect
common rights.
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ConstitutionalAcademic Freedom and the State Action Doctrine:An
Aside

Theoretical problems with establishing an individual constitutional
right of academic freedom arise from the anomalies of the state action
doctrine. Only if administrators can be characterized as exercising state
power can the First Amendment limit the internal authority of the university. Despite the general uncertainty about the state action doctrine, 82 a
rigid rule of application to universities has developed. Faculty and students at state universities enjoy extensive substantive and procedural constitutional rights against their institutions while faculty and students at
private institutions enjoy none. 83 This is so despite the substantially similar functions usually served by state and private institutions; the dean of
the University of Virginia Law School does not need to be restrained from
instituting an assault against liberty any more than does the dean of the
Harvard Law School."' More significantly, academic tradition accords
182. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1302 (1982) ("The state action problem vividly illustrates the ambivalent,
if not contradictory, relationship of citizen and state that plagues modern liberal theory."); Glennon &
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976
SUP. CT. REV. 221, 221 ("The problem of defining 'state action' continues to haunt constitutional
adjudication and legal literature.").
183. See, e.g., Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1977) (private institution
held not to be engaged in "state action" despite historic connections with Commonwealth, public aid,
tax exemption, and public certification of graduates); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J.) (when university suspended students, those enrolled in private liberal arts college could
not bring constitutional action against school but those enrolled in state-contracted ceramics college
could). See also O'Neil, Private Universities and PublicLaw, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 155 (1970)
(noting that while federal judges "are no longer reluctant to test the disciplinary procedures of state
colleges and universities," they balk "when the institution imposing the challenged penalty is not
state-supported.").
184. At the same time, the law professor at the Harvard Law School has no less need for freedom
to write and teach than does the law professor at the University of Virginia. "Although private universities are probably not subject to the Bill of Rights, no one could defend having one set of rules for
faculty members in state universities and another and more limited set for scholars employed by
private institutions." D. BOK, supra note 120, at 29.
The absence of a real distinction between public and private universities goes beyond the inability
to decide whether higher education is a public or private function. The federal government's commitment to higher education through subsidy of student loans and grants, which exceeds $15 billion
annually, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., No. 248, at 147 (1988),
is distributed without regard to the public or private character of the institution. Similarly, both types
of universities directly receive current fund revenue from the federal government that exceeds $12
billion annually in the aggregate. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDuc., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS table 226, at 261 (1988). Federal funds provide about
one-sixth of the current fund revenue of all private institutions of higher education. Id., table 225, at
260. Several leading private universities receive a much larger percentage, even a majority, of their
current revenue from federal research grants. Needless to say, extensive regulations follow these federal funds. Universities under private control, however, apparently will not be deemed state actors
regardless of the degree of government support given or regulation imposed. See Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) ("private" school for troubled children that receives more than 90% of its
budget from public funds and is extensively regulated by state held not to be "state actor").
While private universities have at least a quasi-public character, many state universities enjoy substantial autonomy from the center of state political power. See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying
text. A college president or department head simply does not reflect the coercive power of the state in
the sense that a police officer or a welfare investigator does. One way to resolve this confusion is to
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largely identical rights of academic freedom to professors regardless of
their institutions' governmental affiliations.1 8 5 Thus, the state action doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of constitutional liberties against institutional infringements for half the nation's academics and denies it to
the other half1 8 6 for reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far re87
moved from the realities of academic life.
The state action doctrine also may blur the important distinctions for
academic freedom between university administrators and nonacademic officials. Department heads, deans, and presidents may penalize a faculty
member for the content of her scholarship if they follow the correct procedures, apply academic criteria, and do not usurp the judgment of peers;
the state attorney general, the state legislature, and the governor may
never do so. The state action doctrine does not distinguish between those
who are part of the system of academic freedom and those who are not.
This may tempt a court to intervene in decisions it ought to respect. Indeed, even fellow faculty exercising peer review could be characterized as
state officials. To this extent, Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct in insisting that government as educator is different from government as
sovereign.' 88
A final anomaly in the application of the state action doctrine is that
constitutional academic freedom is the only constitutional right exercised
by state actors."8 9 Those universities whose institutional liberties have
been recognized by the Supreme Court include the state universities of
Michigan, Missouri, and California.19 " A state university is a unique state
entity in that it enjoys federal constitutional rights against the state itself.
treat most large private universities as state actors. See O'Neil, supra note 183, at 157. Consistent
with the discussion below, I would be more inclined to treat reasonably autonomous state universities
as private parties, freeing universities more broadly from strictures designed for governmental entities.
Important social interests can be better protected against academic imperialism through statutes such
as Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982) (prohibiting sex discrimination
by institutions receiving federal funds).
185. Early advocates of academic freedom feared interference more from businessmen, who dominated university boards of trustees at the end of the nineteenth century, than from government officials. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 11, at 413-60. Lay interference with scholarship violates academic freedom regardless of its source or nature.
186. More specifically, approximately 75 percent of faculty teach in public institutions while 25
percent teach in private institutions. However, one-third of all faculty teach in two-year colleges
(which are nearly all public); these rarely emphasize faculty research. B. CLARK, supra note 79, at
17, 78-79.
187. The courts' increasing reluctance to impose constitutional limitations on traditionally private
universities no doubt reflects a desire not to enmesh them in legal restrictions. As such, it may be part
of the judicial effort to enhance the autonomy of universities from political control. See infra notes
295-302 and accompanying text.
188. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 201 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
189. State universities are shielded from liability for constitutional violations to some extent by the
Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits damage suits against the states in federal court. Most federal
courts which have addressed the issue have found that state universities are integral parts of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Note, The Status of Public Universities Under the Eleventh
Amendment, 78 GEo. L.J. (1990) (forthcoming).
190. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent,

1989]

Academic Freedom

D. The Proper Scope of JudicialIntervention
The Supreme Court's establishment of a constitutional status for academic freedom led some commentators to predict that the Court would
eventually provide extensive protection for the academic judgments of individual faculty against interference by university administrators,1 9 thus
giving constitutional status to traditional notions of academic freedom. Although in a few early cases, lower federal courts protected teachers against
sanctions for teaching unpopular books, 9 2 courts soon abandoned the effort to shield teachers from administrative displeasure (with the important
exception of requiring the procedural protection of the tenure system).
Thus, courts have denied relief to teachers sanctioned for unusual teaching methods,1 93 for receiving poor student evaluations, 9 4 and for straying
from prescribed coverage.1 9 5 Even when courts agree in principle that a
teacher's behavior is constitutionally protected, they often find that antagonism to the protected behavior was not the effective motivation for a
teacher's dismissal. 96 In short, as far as the courts are concerned, admin454 U.S. 263, 277-81 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
191. See, e.g., Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 575, 587 (1973);
Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
447, 486 (1963); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1051
(1968) ("Although the legal protection currently afforded to academic freedom is thus quite limited,
the doctrines inhibiting a more expansive judicial role are being gradually eroded as the courts are
involved more frequently by aggrieved students and teachers."). Thomas Emerson argued at the time
that the Supreme Court had not yet elevated academic freedom to an independent constitutional right,
but had only used familiar First Amendment doctrine to protect academic freedom interests; he predicted that such an elevation was several decades away. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 610, 616.
192. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (protecting article by Robert J.
Lifton in Atlantic Monthly); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (protecting
Welcome to the Monkey House by Kurt Vonnegut). Both cases involved high school teachers; as noted
supra note 137, questions of classroom freedom involving primary and secondary schools are quite
different from those arising in universities.
A more recent case is Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980). In
that case a high school teacher was denied contract renewal by a school board in a small Texas town
after he addressed sensitive racial issues through student role-playing. The Court found a violation of
protected classroom discussion. The Fifth Circuit's solicitude for the teacher's liberty may be explained by that court's well-developed sensitivity to the perpetuation of racial prejudice.
193. See, e.g., Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973).
194. See Carley v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 153 Ariz. 461, 737 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1987); supra
note 2.
195. See Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[Wle do not conceive academic
freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular contents
and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922
(1970).
196. Such decisions follow Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See
W. KAPLIN, supra note 52, at 192-95. In Mount Healthy, a unanimous Court held that a school
board could fire a teacher, even if her exercise of First Amendment rights was a "substantial factor"
in the decision, so long as the Board could prove that it would have reached the same decision "even
in the absence of the protected conduct." 429 U.S. at 287. There can be little doubt that Mount
Healthy makes it difficult for individual faculty to bring constitutional academic freedom cases against
their institutions, as it requires them to defeat the university's showing that they could have been
dismissed for a "legitimate" reason.
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istrators may exercise extensive control over curricular judgments so long
as they do not penalize a professor solely for his political viewpoint. One
commentator concluded that the constitutional right to academic freedom
in the classroom, presumably proclaimed by Sweezy, is only a "myth."19
However, no one adequately has explained why this should be so or accounted for the different response from courts when those interfering are
political officials or bureaucrats rather than academic administrators.
An unusual example of apparent political interference in faculty hiring
may serve to illustrate what Sweezy and Keyishian have accomplished and
what they have not. In 1978, a search committee at the University of
Maryland recommended to the administration that Bertell Ollman-a
Marxist professor then at New York University-be appointed as the new
chairman of the Department of Government and Politics. 98 A major political controversy ensued that raised many sensitive issues, including the
prudence of appointing a radical Marxist chairman of an ideologically
divided department, the respective powers of appointment of the search
committee, the department, and the president, and the influence of outside
political pressure. The Governor and several legislators warned against
appointment of a Marxist; newspapers and professional organizations
warned against refusing to appoint someone because he was a Marxist. 99
The university depended on public support in its efforts to improve its
academic programs. After much deliberation, the president refused to appoint Professor Ollman, arguing that he was not the right person to develop the potential of the department, disclaiming any reliance on
Ollman's political beliefs, and promising to stand firm against "outside
pressures."' 00
Not surprisingly, Professor Ollman sued the president for violating his
constitutional right of academic freedom. Professor Ollman had substantial support in the lawsuit from various organs of liberal opinion and was
represented pro bono publico by one of the premier law firms in the nation.20 1 Nevertheless, the suit failed; the district court credited the presi197. Katz, The FirstAmendment's Protectionof Expressive Activity in the University Classroom:
A ConstitutionalMyth, 16 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 857, 932 (1983).
198. Olman v. Toll, 518 F. Supp. 1196, 1199-1201 (D. Md. 1981), affd, 704 F.2d 139 (4th
Cir. 1983). The search committee actually recommended that two people, Olman and another, be
appointed.
199. See, e.g., U-Md. Head Rejects Marxist Professor, Wash. Post, July 21, 1978, at B1, col. 2;
The Governor and the Marxist, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 1978, at B6, col. 1; Litmus Test at College
Park, Baltimore Sun, Apr. 27, 1978, at A18, col. 1.
200. 518 F. Supp. at 1199-1201, 1213-14. It appears from context that by "outside pressures,"
the president was referring only to those who urged him to appoint Olman rather than to those who
insisted that he not.
201. Arnold & Porter represented Professor Olman. It is a happy fact that apparent academic
victims of intolerance frequently enjoy the very best legal representation at little or no cost. Professor
Charles Curran, for example, was represented by Cravath, Swaine & Moore in his recent dispute
with Catholic University. This generous representation reflects both the cultural significance of academic freedom and the social respectability of its beneficiaries. Less noteworthy academics often are
advised by the AAUP or the ACLU.
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dent's testimony that Ollman's political beliefs were not a "substantial or
motivating"2 2 factor in denying him the appointment. Under this established evidentiary standard, the court concluded that the plaintiff's constitutional rights had not been violated. Despite the outcome of the lawsuit,
the AAUP had previously censured the university for a violation of academic freedom in its handling of the appointment, and Maryland remained the most prominent university on the AAUP censure list until it
was taken off in 1988.203
The Olman case illuminates some of the most profound issues in the
relationship between political ideology and academic freedom. Indeed,
Professor Ollman himself later contributed an extremely stimulating critique, arguing that the concept of academic freedom is a bulwark of bourgeois liberalism against truly radical thought. 20 4 Before considering the
implications of this critique, it is important to note the degree to which the
First Amendment actually protected Professor Ollman.
First, if he had proved that antipathy by public officials to his political
beliefs was "a substantial or motivating factor" in President Toll's decision not to appoint him, 20 5 he would have made out a violation of the
First Amendment and, perhaps, this would have entitled him to judicial
relief.20 8 The intolerant statements of non-academic public officials helped
his case immeasurably; had he been able to show that they played a sig202. 518 F. Supp. at 1214-18. This is a straightforward application of the Mount Healthy rule.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
203. See Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of Maryland, ACADEME, May 1979, at
213-27. The investigating committee did not conclude that the president rejected Professor Ollman
because of his political beliefs; it viewed the rationale for the decision as ambiguous. It faulted the
university for confused procedures for making appointments, for prejudicial delay, for failing clearly
to rebuff outside political pressures not to make the appointment, and for failing adequately to explain
the actual grounds for the decision. Although Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, see
supra note 13, recommended that the AAUP not censure the university, the members attending the
annual meeting voted to censure, on the stated grounds that under the circumstances, the president
should have fully explained the grounds for non-appointment.
In conducting its investigations and reaching its judgments, the AAUP looks carefully at decisionmaking procedures and the distribution of authority within the institution. This is appropriate because of the AAUP's expertise in such matters and its view that faculty governance is inseparable
from academic freedom. The AAUP's emphasis on structure and system is illustrated by the statement
of the investigating committee: "The investigating committee's primary concern is not whether Professor Ollman's constitutional rights have been abridged-that issue is the subject of independent litigation-but the condition of academic freedom at the University of Maryland as revealed by the events
and actions surrounding the decision not to appoint him." Id. at 223.
204. See Ollman, supra note 130 and accompanying text.
205. 518 F. Supp. at 1214.
206. The availability of § 1983 remedies to a professor who wishes to obtain damages from a state
university because it has violated his constitutional academic freedom has been put further into doubt
by the Supreme Court's recent decision that neither state agencies nor state officials are "persons"
within the meaning of the statute. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989).
Moreover, many courts have construed the Eleventh Amendment to bar damage actions under § 1983
against state universities. See supra note 189. The consequence of these developments may be that
professors able to prove a violation of constitutional rights may often be limited to injunctive relief.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to grant injunctive relief that displaces academic decisionmaking.
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nificant role in the chairmanship decision, he would have prevailed.2"'
This deters politicians from interfering in academic disputes.
Second, in addition to excluding non-academics from academic decisions, constitutional academic freedom requires academic decision-makers
to justify their decisions on properly academic grounds.2 0 8 University administrators, like other public officials, cannot penalize employees solely
because of their political beliefs or affiliation. In Olman, the president
carefully explained his decision solely on the academic merits of appointing Ollman to the chairmanship and disclaimed any reliance on his
political beliefs. Some academics, of course, may justify on neutral
grounds decisions actually taken in antipathy to political views. Justifications are subject to testing, however, and the very processes of discovery
and litigation deter illegitimate decisions. 0 9
These constitutional protections, although plainly limited, are important. Exclusion of public officials from academic decisions preserves the
liberty of both the individual faculty members and their universities. Policing this exclusion is an appropriate role for the federal judiciary, because it has the power to check incursions by officials whom universities
may be too weak to resist. Universities, after all, exist only through the
continuing generosity of public appropriations and private gifts. The McCarthy period demonstrated how difficult it is for all but the wealthiest
universities to resist political interference. 10 The Court began to constitutionalize academic freedom in response to these very problems. Such a role
is appropriate for the courts because exercising judicial power to check
non-academic officials needs to be done only rarely; the clarity of the principle and the degree of public support for it make the academic adventures
of politicians today instantly controversial.2 ' Courts need not continuously supervise relations between the political and academic worlds.
207. See also Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 811 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("political furor" surrounding Marxist professor persuaded court that professor was dismissed because of his political
views).
208. See infra notes 226-29.
209. This, of course, is the basic assumption behind the tenure system, which requires that tenured faculty be dismissed only for good cause and that the existence of that good cause be shown at an
impartial hearing. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. The justifications for dismissal are
few, and the hearing tests whether decisions were made on forbidden grounds. When non-tenured
faculty claim that they have been penalized for the exercise of constitutional rights, they must first
show that they engaged in some protected activity potentially related to the action taken against them.
Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). This is in the nature of a
prima facie case and shifts the burden of persuasion to the school authorities to show that they would
have reached the same decision regardless of the protected activity. The valid academic grounds that
may discharge their burden are, of course, much broader than those that suffice for the dismissal of
tenured faculty.
210. Professor Schrecker's study reveals that large, private institutions with strong academic traditions, such as Harvard and Chicago, were better able to resist political demands for loyalty tests than
were state universities dependent on legislative appropriations, which often jumped to cooperate with
red-hunting officials. E. SCHRECKER, supra note 42, at 112-13, 197-205, 267.
211. An unusual academic freedom case has percolated for some years in New York, where the
irresponsible involvement of Governor Cuomo has exacerbated the problem. A state university profes-
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It would be perilous for courts to proceed further to determine if academic personnel decisions were based on reasonable assessment of the
merits or wholly without taint of ideological bias. Courts are ill-equipped
to find their way among the labyrinths of academic decision-making.
Courts and commentators too often refer to "academic grounds" for decisions as if the term referred to something fixed and pure.
In reality, as the Ollman case itself illustrates, the terrain is shrouded
and disputed. The selection of Ollman by the search committee appeared
to be an effort by one faction of the Department of Politics to gain control
at the expense of the "old guard."2'12 These insurgents may have been
influenced by both their own commitment to the left and their impatience
with the department's traditional leadership. Both the department and
central administration believed that the location of the University of Maryland, adjacent to Washington, D.C., provided the possibility that a great
department might be created from a mediocre one, but the parties were
quite divided in their views as to what constituted a great department.
The discipline itself was, and still is, divided into numerous methodological, philosophical, and political groups.2" 3 These various passions insured
that this academic personnel decision could not be based on pure determinations of the "quality" of the candidate's publications, teaching, and administrative ability. Moreover, as I argued above,21 " even evaluations of
the writing, teaching, and administrative ability of a candidate for a
faculty position, without these admixtures of departmental and entrepreneurial passions, are not antiseptic questions of scientific evaluation
but contain ineradicable elements of ideological partisanship.
The extent to which any of these forces properly may influence particular appointment decisions is subject to dispute. Any one academic's view
will be influenced by her own view of the ends of her own work and of
higher education generally. The same faculty candidate can be seen as a
careful scholar, a tiresome grunt, an effective teacher, a shameless showman, a thoughtful conservative and a homophobic reactionary. In universor of African studies taught in a class that Zionism was a form of racism. Some Jewish leaders
attacked the professor as anti-Semitic, charging that equating Zionism with racism is one of the
"things you just can't say in a classroom." Governor Cuomo issued a press release criticizing the
professor and also the Stony Brook faculty for not speaking out against such "pernicious" ideas. See
Academic Freedom Tenet is Tested, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1983, at Cl, col. 1. Stony Brook investigated the professor's teaching and concluded that his opinion was protected by academic freedom. In
1985, however, the professor was denied tenure after various faculty committees recommended that
tenure be granted. See CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., June 3, 1987, at 11. The professor sued and his
case is pending. Ironically, the professor's suit has benefited greatly from the Governor's intervention.
212. 518 F. Supp. at 1208-10.
213. It is generally understood that some academic departments will hire no Marxists, while a
few will hire Marxists only. Similarly, some universities may not hire any disciples of Leo Strauss; no
doubt at other schools Strausserians have a leg up. A self-identified Marxist or Strausserian is simultaneously part of both a scholarly and a political tradition. Those who prefer not to hire either scholar
may be unable to distinguish among the various grounds for approval or opposition.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 121-36.
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sities, the system of academic freedom tends more to keep competing notions in ongoing tension rather than to declare final victors; the new comes
quickly, the old remains indefinitely.2 1
Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to resolve these disputes. Asked to
protect the academic freedom of a candidate denied tenure by faculty vote,
a court would need to determine what, in fact, are the requirements for
tenure, whether the candidate met the requirements, and whether the
faculty rejected the candidate for some non-academic reason. Such an inquiry, backed by the coercive power of the state, would put the department or school into intellectual receivership, with the court determining
the appropriate paradigms of thought.21 In practice, courts would either
protect points of view with which they were sympathetic or, more likely,
protect all arguably respectable points of view, the judicial attitude most
consistent with general First Amendment values.
This last response may seem appealing since it would require academics to be open to innovative critical ideas. In actuality, it would represent
the final dispatch of the scientific research and humanistic values by the
democratic value-the replacement of a manner of discourse native to the
university by one more appropriate to society at large. It is crucial to
academic discourse that new speech be critically met and that those who
fail to satisfy a reasonable standard be excluded. This intellectual displacement would seem to be the likely consequence of a civil authority's
requiring the acceptance of controversial paradigms.
This is not to say that courts cannot competently decide easy cases, as
when regents at a state university penalize a scholar against his department's recommendation on grounds clearly linked to the political direction
of his scholarship. Such cases are extremely rare, however, in the modern
university and would severely damage the reputation of any school. The
best justification for allowing a professor to sue her university on the
ground that it has unjustifiably deprived her of a job for non-academic
reasons is to proclaim the social importance of academic freedom so that
the threat of suit will cause aggressive administrators or regents to reflect
on the impropriety of acting on their biases.
The view to which we have come is that constitutional academic freedom cannot be violated by any personnel decision based upon professional
competence and taken by peers in good faith.2" 7 And, indeed, courts have
215. The current hiring and tenure system preserves older viewpoints because tenured scholars
cannot be ousted. The prevalence of the requirement of a doctoral degree for hiring and the necessity
of publication for advancement compel young scholars to be thoroughly "up-to-date," even modish, in
their work because of the difficulty of saying anything new. Moreover, the criteria for hiring and
advancement are so notoriously vague that different decision-makers may take the same positions on a
candidate for reasons that have no relation to one another.
216. Cf Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts
from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.").
217. Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979), is a case where, given the factual
findings of the court, one could conclude that Cooper's non-retention was not a good faith academic
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never sanctioned a university for such a decision. Although courts have
not articulated or justified a rule of constitutional academic freedom such
as this, this rule resembles that followed in the somewhat similar area of
procedural and substantive judicial review of academic evaluations of
students."' 8
Given the scope of these disputes, it would be most difficult for a court
to separate legitimate from illegitimate academic decision-making. The
court would have no guiding principles enabling it to determine which
academic grounds are consistent with the First Amendment and which are
not. This is so because, as noted below, the only intelligible purpose for
constitutional academic freedom is to protect academic values and practices from conformity to general social demands.2" 9 Imposing on academic
actors principles deduced from the First Amendment generally, such as
those of "compelling state interest" or "public forum," will impose on
academics popular standards of evaluation and acceptable discourse-a
compulsion wholly at odds with every respectable tradition of academic
freedom. 220 It is appropriate to remember that judges themselves are public officials whom academic freedom strives to exclude from interfering in
academic affairs.221 Judicial views of civil liberty may infringe academic
principles just as much as executive or legislative views of national
222
security.
decision, but rather an incompetent attempt by the administration to diffuse the public outcry in Little
Rock concerning Cooper's classroom proclamation of his devotion to revolutionary Communism.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 295-302.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 324-34.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 84-107.
221. It is a healthy caution that the first great academic freedom court case of modern times
presented the spectacle of a judge ordering, without any prior notice or hearing, the Board of Higher
Education of New York not to employ Bertrand Russell, the foremost logician of the century, to teach
mathematics at the City College because of the "immoral and salacious" doctrines advocated in his
prior books. Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 173 Misc. 943, 947, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (Sup. Ct.
1940). Justice McGeehan therein wrote the immortal lines: "Academic freedom does not mean academic license. It is the freedom to do good and not to teach evil." Id. at 829. The case was a cause
cilbre; John Harlan represented Russell in an appeal that was unsuccessful on jurisdictional
grounds. See THE BERTRAND RUSSELL CAsE (J. Dewey & H. Kallen eds. 1941); Comment, The
Bertrand Russell Case: The History of a Litigation, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1192 (1940). Empowering
judges to pass on the qualifications of academics may be hazardous. By contrast, a California court
rejected a similar challenge to the employment of Russell at UCLA, finding itself without authority to
pass on his qualifications because of the university's autonomy guaranteed by the state constitution.
Wall v. Board of Regents, 38 Cal. App. 2d 698, 102 P.2d 533 (1940). I argue below that such state
constitutional provisions are an important precursor to federal constitutional academic freedom. See
infra text accompanying notes 303-18.
222. Perhaps the most celebrated example of a court's confusing civil with educational norms is
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton v. Schmid,
455 U.S. 100 (1982). The court found that a non-student, a Lyndon Larouche activist, had a state
constitutional right to hand out leaflets on the campus of Princeton University. The court reasoned
that because Princeton was committed to free scholarship and learning, the public should have a right
to speak freely on the campus, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. This conclusion betrays indifference to the gulf existing between political harangue and the disciplined academic
speech of teaching and scholarship. This indifference is made explicit in the indignant account of the
case written by Professor Sanford Levinson, who represented Schmid, wherein the author confesses
that he had "become progressively disillusioned with rationalist models of behavior and thus more
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When presented with claims by faculty members that other academics,
usually administrators and department chairs, have violated their rights to
academic freedom, courts should only ascertain if the administrators can
establish that they in good faith rejected the candidate on academic
grounds.2 2 They should not go further to assess whether the stated academic grounds are adequate, because no standards of adequacy have been
or could be established by academic custom that are sufficiently accessible
to provide a legal standard or test. Should a court hold, for example, that
a university administrator violates academic freedom when he fires a creative and original untenured philosopher because he believes that the philosophy department needs instead to hire experts on Plato and Aristotle?
The court would have no basis in law for holding that the administrator
had exceeded his powers, even though the scholar is penalized for her
meritorious speech.
At the same time, a more aggressive evaluation of the propriety of the
grounds for decision by academic organizations, such as the AAUP, is
entirely justified. The AAUP does not review the merits of academic decisions; it relentlessly insists on procedures that place effective power over
tenure and dismissal in the hands of faculty. The AAUP rationally could
criticize the administrator discussed above for rejecting a departmental
recommendation of tenure for a candidate because it is that association's
business to enhance the sphere of freedom and control over academic administration of its members. The advocacy of this position, outside the
coercive domain of law, furthers the academic debate through which
workable norms have in the past and may in the future be established.2 2
Moreover, if the tradition of academic freedom is to endure and grow,
its animating values and operational assumptions must be reevaluated and
applied by thoughtful academics in addressing major, contemporary
accepting of the importance of displays of emotion, including the use of angry epithets that put their
hearers on notice about the intensity of the speaker's feelings." Levinson, Princeton Versus Free
Speech: A Post Mortem, in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS, supra note 130, at 189, 204. Even
though the result the court reached is harmless, its reasoning fails to allow universities the discretion
to maintain control over the appropriate atmosphere for study and reasoned discourse. In another
case, the Second Circuit's farcical decision that a student's First Amendment rights to receive commercial information (here, to hold "Tupperware" parties) might be sufficient to void a university rule
against commercial solicitation in dormitories was recently reversed by the Supreme Court. Fox v.
Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (1989).
223. The AAUP has asserted that the judgment of faculty departments that attempt in good faith
to put aside ideological "fit" in evaluating candidates should be protected by academic freedom.
AAUP, Observations on Ideology, supra note 128, at la-2a. Courts should not distinguish between
faculty groups or administrators in deferring to good faith judgments, because the Constitution cannot
impose any ideal structure of authority among the constituents of the university. Moreover, courts
need to take a more lenient view of what are legitimate criteria than should the AAUP, both because
courts lack the expertise to draw the line and because they wield coercive power.
224. See supra note 203. Similarly, professors may agitate for a broader freedom to debate the
intramural issues of their university than the Supreme Court affords public employees under the First
Amendment. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 TEx. L.
REv. 1323, 1332-45 (1988). Such a claim would be based on that aspect of the tradition of academic
freedom which has sought to transfer control from administrators or trustees to faculty.
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problems. For example, Professors Eisenberg and Rabban recently debated the usefulness of the traditional academic freedom emphasis on
faculty autonomy in preserving fundamental academic values in an era of
pervasive corporate and government sponsorship of research.2 25 Despite
their principled disagreement, both authors presumably would be unhappy to delegate resolution of this complex problem to the judiciary,
which would apply constitutional rules very difficult to change and fashioned for other settings.
There are many signs that in intra-academic cases, courts are limiting
their inquiries to assuring themselves that decisions are truly academic in
character and that they do not offend some independent legal norm such
as that against racial discrimination. That rule has been expressly established in cases where courts have been asked to review a university's academic evaluation of a student. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that due
process does not require a hearing before a student is dismissed from a
state university for "academic" reasons, 226 even though it does require
hearings before a student is dismissed for disciplinary reasons. 227 The
Court argued that academic judgments are more "subjective and evaluative '22s than disciplinary judgments. Similarly, the Court has held that
academic dismissal of a student from a state university does not violate
substantive due process if made on bona fide academic grounds. 22 9 Even
though these cases neither explore very incisively the checkered nature of
academic decisions nor admit the difficulty when constitutional values
clash with one another, they do provide the doctrinal basis for a judicial
refusal to review most internal academic freedom disputes.23 0 Further, as
I will argue below, they rest on a firm common law tradition.2 3 ' There
seems little reason for the Constitution to concern itself more with good
faith academic evaluations of faculty than with similar evaluations of
students.
Nor should courts subject academic justifications to familiar First
Amendment tests, such as demanding that such rationales be sufficiently
"compelling" to overcome the faculty member's presumptive right of free
225. See Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 1374-84; Rabban, supra note 128, at 1416-21.
226. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
227. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1973) ("Neither the property interest in educational
benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no
matter how arbitrary.").
228. 435 U.S. at 90.
229. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
230. The Court's deference to expert decisions made in good faith is epitomized by Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (treatment decisions for institutionalized mentally retarded patients
violate due process only when there occurs "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgement, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base
the decision on such a judgement.").
231. See infra text accompanying notes 294-97.
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expression.123 Such an approach mechanically imports norms from political society into the academic context. This model of analysis, which captures the presumption that government should never (or rarely) penalize
citizens for the content of their speech, 233 misses a crucial attribute of academic life: Scholars routinely are criticized for the content of their speech
by other scholars, and some are eventually penalized by their institutions.
Assistant professors are denied tenure; more prestigious schools decline to
hire tenured faculty at other schools; some tenured faculty receive smaller
raises than others. These administrative actions by academic officers are
often based on negative evaluations of a professor's speech. Employing a
legal test that presumes the faculty member's speech is immune from these
judgments and penalties wholly misconceives the scholarly enterprise. It is
of the essence that worthy ideas be distinguished from dull, and an unobjectionable corollary is that some speakers will be valued more highly and
given more prominent positions.
Generally in First Amendment matters, the law prohibits government
agents from distinguishing among speakers because we deny the capacity
of government to establish a hierarchy of thought. The First Amendment
formally insists upon a complete relativity of value among ideas and expressions in order to preserve liberty. Imposing such a model on the university would be false and perverse. The government agents here-faculty
and deans-presumptively are competent to judge by academic criteria the
value of the speaker's ideas; 2 4 if we deny their collective authority we
deny the structural principle of collective scholarship upon which the university is built. To "liberate" the fomenter of innovative scholarship from
adverse consequences would introduce a thoroughgoing relativity into
scholarly discourse that would destroy categories and disciplines, based as
they are on accepted and identifiable-as well as disputed and
changing-premises.
Academics have evolved a system of academic freedom that preserves
substantial professional liberty for individual scholars without producing
intellectual anarchy. Potentially destructive personal consequences from
adverse substantive criticism are ameliorated by a series of bureaucratic
procedures that comprise the tenure system. In brief, these procedures insure that personnel decisions are based largely on scholarship and teach232. This is essentially the approach taken in cases concerning the exercise of general First
Amendment rights within the school environment. Thus, students can wear armbands in class so long
as it does not substantially interfere with the educational mission of the school. Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). By contrast, speech, criticism, and sanction
within accustomed patterns are all part of a functioning system of academic freedom.
233. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
234. This refers back to the point that faculty and administrators at public universities may arguably be considered state actors for purposes of the 14th Amendment. See supra text accompanying
note 188.
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ing ability by placing primary responsibility for hiring and promotion on
peers. Also, they limit the occasions when major personnel decisions will
be made, particularly freeing the mature scholar after a probationary period from the primary concern about losing her job. Academic freedom
encompasses the tensions inherent in individuality and conformity, imagination and coherence, change and hierarchy. These principles are widely
accepted by universities; constructive enhancement of scholars' freedom
will require careful development of new structured relationships within
the academic community.2 35
In this section, I have sketched the development of the constitutional
law of academic freedom. The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role
to excluding non-academics from imposing ideological criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to impose substantive limits on academic administrators who in good faith penalize faculty for academic
speech. Even though the Court's approach appears anomalous given that
the main thrust of the non-legal tradition of academic freedom has been to
secure the autonomy of the individual teacher against improper interference by administrators, I have argued that the Court has struck the appropriate balance between its desire to protect free scholarship and its
concern about involving itself in academic disputes. To make this judgment more persuasive, it is necessary to explain the legal roots of the
Court's protection of institutional freedom and to suggest an appropriate
relationship between the academic tradition of individual freedom and the
constitutional protection of institutional freedom.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PROTECTION OF
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

In the last decade, the Supreme Court's decisions concerning academic
freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment
right of the university itself-understood in its corporate capacity-largely
to be free from government interference in the performance of core educational functions.2" 6 These functions usually are taken to include the "four
2 37
freedoms" of a university identified by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy.
Commentators steeped in the traditional notion of academic freedom-understood as the protection of the scholarly integrity of faculty from institutional interference-have expressed both surprise at this change in doc235. See D. BOK, supra note 120, at 23-26, 26 ("The conditions of modem life have placed new
pressures and inhibitions on intellectual inquiry, but ... the most that a university can do is to try to
free the scholar from artificial constraints that are subject to its control.").
236. The cultural and social predicate for the assertion of institutional autonomy is explained in
Metzger, Academic Freedom in Delocalized Academic Institutions, in DIMENSIONS OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM I (W. Metzger ed. 1969).
237. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (freedom to determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may study).
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trine and concern that a university may have a constitutional right to
violate an individual professor's academic freedom.
The Court's new elaboration of institutional academic freedom does
contain anomalies. The First Amendment rarely protects institutional decision-making so indirectly related to expression as student admissions or
faculty hiring. It may be hard to identify what speech (or even point of
view) the university expresses as an institution, distinct from those of individual faculty, students, or administrators. Moreover, while the right to
institutional academic freedom has arisen at the time in our history when
universities have been most subject to federal regulation, no federal regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in Sweezy and Keyishian,
the new turn in academic freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more
than in holdings and rules.
In this section of the article, I argue that judicial protection of institutional autonomy is the appropriate concern of constitutional academic
freedom. This builds on the prior argument that routine protection of the
rights of individual professors against academic officers is excessively
problematic. I will first describe and analyze what the Supreme Court has
written about institutional academic freedom. Then, I will argue that this
right has deep legal roots that help explain its emergence, despite its abrupt departure from the academic tradition of academic freedom. Significant changes in the social function of the university and in its legal status,
furthermore, have necessitated some constitutional protection of the university's essential institutional decision-making. Finally, I argue that this
constitutional protection is justified by the same compelling need to protect
inquiry and exchange among trained scholars that underlay the traditional
struggle within the university for academic freedom.
A.

The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic Freedom

Again, we must begin with Sweezy.2 38 The inquiry of the New Hampshire attorney general in that case was arguably a threat both to Paul
Sweezy and to the University of New Hampshire as an institution. The
Justices' opinions acknowledge the double threat. Both Warren and
Frankfurter emphasize the systemic values of academic freedom. Indeed,
Frankfurter writes as if the university were the real party to the suit, not
Sweezy, to whom he refers at one point as "the witness," rather than as
the petitioner.2 39 Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a
limitation on the grounds or procedures by which academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellec'240
tual life of a university.
238. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). See supra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
239. 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 262.
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His long quotation from the pleas for free universities in South Africa
refers primarily to institutional freedoms, as in the now famous invocation
of the " '"four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.' "241 Frankfurter's concern lies
with the threat of McCarthyism to the autonomy of universities, rather
than with a violation of any individual professor's rights.24 2 By contrast,
when addressing other legal issues raised by Sweezy unrelated to university functions, Frankfurter wrote passionately about the political autonomy of the individual citizen.2 "
McCarthyism represented a democratic assault on elite institutions as
much as a demagogic persecution of radicals. The investigations by federal
and state legislative committees constituted an unprecedented attempt by
democratic governments to hold universities to the public's notion of academic fitness. 244 Ellen Schrecker's study of McCarthyism and the universities details several occasions in which university administrators penalized
accused radicals in the hopes of preserving institutional autonomy.24 5
While the loyalty craze of the post-war period was a complex phenomenon, the political investigation of universities reflected in part the anxiety
of the public over the values of elite institutions at a time when those
institutions were growing rapidly and taking on a new importance in educating a wider spectrum of American youth. It was the first instance in
which the autonomy of universities from the federal government had been
drawn into doubt. Frankfurter's concern with threats to institutional values was not inappropriate.2 46
The potential for reading Sweezy as establishing a right of institutional
autonomy went unrealized for many years. Justice Powell first tapped it
in his separate yet controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.24 Powell held that, even though the Fourteenth Amend241. Id. at 263.
242. "These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on the testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the dependence of a free society on free universities. This means the exclusion of
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university." Id. at 262.
243. For example, Frankfurter wrote that "[flor a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so
basic a liberty as his political autonomy, the subordinating interest of the State must be compelling,"
and "the inviolabity of privacy belonging to a citizen's political loyalties has ... overwhelming...
importance .
I..."
Id. at 265.
244. See E. SCHRECKER, supra note 42. For excerpts of Robert Hutchings' testimony on behalf of
the University of Chicago before the Illinois Seditious Activities Investigation Committee, see R.
MACIVER, supra note 48, at 186.
245. See E. SCHRECKER, supra note 42, at 105 (discussing how president of University of Washington defended his decision to fire three tenured professors on grounds that "it was necessary to
anticipate outside pressures and get rid of Communist professors before reactionary politicians, who
were unable to tell a crypto-Communist from an anti-Communist, took over the task").
246. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), similarly can be understood as a defense of institutional autonomy. The statutes invalidated there were imposed on the university by the
legislature, and the Court praised the systemic benefits of free teaching and scholarship.
247. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion by Powell, J.).
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ment and Title V124 prohibited any state instrumentality from penalizing
any applicant because of his race, the First Amendment right of academic
freedom empowered a state university to take race or national origin into
account in admitting students when doing so in pursuit of the academic
goal of a diverse student body.2 49 Powell relied on the fourth of Frankfurter's "four essential freedoms"-the right of the university to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may be admitted to study.25 0 Powell
explicitly connected racial diversity with the grounds on which the Court
in Sweezy praised academic freedom: "The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body." 2 5' Justice
Powell's practical accommodation between constitutional interests in nondiscrimination generally and the university's right to create a racially diverse student body in particular led to a rejection of racial quotas in admissions but an acceptance of admissions criteria that make race one factor among many to be taken into account.
In attempting to gauge the significance of Bakke in the development of
the constitutional law of academic freedom, one should begin by noting
that racial diversity has nothing to do with the values upholding the tradition of individual academic freedom: To the drafters of the AAUP's 1915
Statement, benefitting a scholar because of his race would have been as
repulsive in principle as penalizing him. 25 2 They believed that scholars

could identify the best scholars by employing criteria as neutral and as
divorced from social prejudices or aspirations as science itself. Of course,
they had nothing to say about the rights of students, who were always
considered insignificant in the search for truth. More fundamentally, they
would have been puzzled by the suggestion that the search for truth at the
university would be enhanced by ethnic diversity. Truth would be discovered by the disinterested pursuit of the scientific method by trained professionals of high intelligence; race or ethnic origin was completely irrelevant
when these professional criteria were satisfied.
A racially diverse student body more directly serves the academic values
of humanism and democracy. Seen as a humanistic value, diversity con248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin in any federally assisted program).
249. 438 U.S. at 311-19.
250. Id. at 312.
251. Id.
252. This is not to deny the pervasive barriers to higher education for blacks in 1915 and long
thereafter. See generally Kujovick, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public
College: The Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REv. 29 (1987) (tracing history of black
public colleges). The AAUP, too, has acknowledged the persistence of prejudicial barriers to equal
opportunity in higher education, and it has supported affirmative action on a basis that seeks to
preserve its long commitment to impersonal concepts of merit. See AAUP, Affirmative Action in
Higher Education: A Report by the Council Committee on Discrimination,59 A.A.U.P. BULL. 178
(1973), reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 82.
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tributes to developing a mature cosmopolitan outlook on the part of the
student by challenging easy ethnocentricity. This serves the traditional
college value of nurturing the student to a responsible adulthood; as the
pre-Civil War college aimed to produce Christian gentlemen, the modern
college strives to develop a citizen capable of living harmoniously with
people of different backgrounds by understanding that the perspective of
each is limited but valid. At the same time, for racial minorities, affirmative action serves the powerful democratic value of social mobility. Since a
chief social goal for higher education has been the acceleration of social
and economic advances for relatively disadvantaged ethnic groups and social classes, affirmative action would fit easily among the democratic values of higher education. Interestingly, in justifying a university's right to
give weight to the fact that an applicant is not white, Justice Powell flatly
rejects the appropriateness of a university promoting social mobility for
racial minorities but warmly endorses the university's desire for a diverse
student body; he rejects the democratic value but accepts the humanistic
value.25 3 Thus, Bakke finds a constitutional right of academic freedom to
develop a policy that is essentially irrelevant to the tradition of academic
freedom and the research values from which it springs.
An early reader of Bakke could be pardoned if she doubted that the
Court was serious about a First Amendment right of institutional academic freedom. Was it not merely a chimera of a doctrine, affirmed only
for that day, to provide an acceptable ground on which Justice Powell
could preserve affirmative action while condemning racial preferences?
Indeed, one might have argued that the virtue which most recommended
institutional academic freedom in Bakke was its distance from the tangled,
acrimonious constitutional debate about racial justice; perhaps it drew a
tranquilizing cloud over an insoluble conflict in values.25 Yet the tradition of university autonomy in the pursuit of educational goals supports
both Justice Powell's approval of the avoidance by the university of the
social norm of non-discrimination in order to pursue humanistic values
and his rejection of the university's freedom to adopt democratic values
different from those specified in Title VI.
The Court's subsequent development of institutional academic freedom
253. Powell does not really disparage the goal of providing relief to a racial group so long isolated
and denied the benefits of quality higher education; rather, he insists that such a policy must be
formulated by the legislature. "[The university's] broad mission is education, not the formulation of
any legislative policy ....
[Ilsolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria." 438 U.S. at 309. Powell seems to argue that allocations among social groups of opportunities for
social mobility are more the business of the legislature than the university. While the university may
make rules that promote democratic values, it may do so only subject to the superior authority of the
state. When the university makes rules promoting research or humanistic values, it enjoys some measure of constitutional protection. In other words, the state ought not to legislate research or humanistic
values for universities.
254. See J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 303-04 (1979).
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suggests that the institutional right has more vitality than our early reader
might have suspected, but the Court has yet to provide it with either a
definite sphere of influence or an adequate constitutional justification.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v. Vincent2 55 represents
both a refreshing acknowledgment that universities must and should distinguish among speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and a
pioneering inquiry into which university administrative decisions the First
Amendment should protect. In Widmar, the Court held unconstitutional a
University of Missouri regulation prohibiting student religious groups
from holding prayer meetings on school property otherwise generally
available to student organizations; the university erroneously believed that
the Establishment Clause required such a prohibition.2 56
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion took issue with the Court's statement that the university required a compelling interest to justify contentbased discrimination against the students' religious speech. He argued that
requiring a university to justify the regulation with a compelling interest
might interfere with the university's academic freedom to distinguish between academically valuable and relatively worthless speech. Stevens went
on to explain that substantive decisions of university administrators deserve to be protected as academic freedom because they are necessary and
appropriate in creating the atmosphere of a university.2 57
Stevens' view recognizes that academic speech requires social support-that scholars' efforts to advance knowledge and train youth require
social structures supporting these goals. Through its administration, a
school makes choices about admissions, hiring, and expenditures which
shape its educational character and mission. Thus, core academic administrative decisions-determining who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study-cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without impairing the unique virtues of
academic speech. Stevens finds this administrative liberty to be limited by
the principle that the university cannot penalize a speaker because it disagrees with her viewpoint.""5 Thus, Justice Stevens translates to the administrative sphere the distinction inherent in the AAUP's 1915 Statement between permissibly evaluating a scholar's professional competence,
which corresponds to evaluating some campus speech as academically valuable, and impermissibly making political judgments-corresponding to a
university's decision to eliminate a department or a student organization
because it disagrees with its viewpoint.259 A school cannot ban the Stu255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
note 43,

454 U.S. 263 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 270-73.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 280.
1915 Statement, supra note 95, at 31-35, reprinted in 2
at 869-72.

DOCUMENTARY

HIsTORY, supra
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dents for a Democratic Society from campus because it disagrees with or
fears its social goals, but it can ban fraternities if it views them as trivial
and anti-intellectual.26 0 This distinction is valuable, because it permits a
college to make choices that promote educational values while deterring
sectarian exclusivity. Unfortunately, it is also unstable.
Justice Stevens' application of the right of institutional academic freedom in his Widmar concurrence resembles Justice Powell's invocation of
the same concept in Bakke. While neither Justice found a statute or regulation unconstitutional because it conflicted with the right, both found in
the right a persuasive ground for not interpreting a distinct constitutional
rule to require certain behavior in a sensitive area for a state university.
In 1985, a unanimous Supreme Court accepted this use of institutional
academic freedom in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing.2 61
There, the Court rejected a claim by a medical student that his dismissal
from medical school for academic failures violated substantive due process
because it represented an arbitrary departure from a past policy of leniency. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court formulated a due process rule
that incorporated the traditional common law doctrine of academic abstention and implied a strikingly broad autonomy for academic decisionmaking:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for
the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it
unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible
did not actually exercise professional judgment.2" 2
Stevens based this refusal to meddle with academic decisions both on lack
of judicial standards and on academic freedom: "Academic freedom thrives
not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among
teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself. '2 63 Once again, the Court
found that academic freedom provided the necessary justification for interpreting a constitutional provision as not inhibiting the discretion of academic decision-makers.
The strength and reach of institutional academic freedom remain in
doubt. 264 The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to clarify its signif260. Compare Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (forbidding ban on SDS) with Waugh v.
Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1914) (upholding ban on fraternities at University of Mississippi).
261. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
262. Id. at 225 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
263. Id. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted).
264. An often-cited student Note justifies institutional academic freedom, at least for faculty hiring decisions, on the grounds that faculty and students enjoy a freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment and that the university as a corporate entity exercises a right of free speech when it
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icance in EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, a case which requests it to
settle the most contentious issue of academic freedom among the courts of
appeal: 265 whether academic freedom requires that there be a privilege
against discovery of peer review evaluations of faculty candidates in race
and sex discrimination cases. As noted at the beginning of this article, the
lower courts have offered several answers to this difficult question.2 68
Plaintiffs required to establish that animus toward blacks or women
played a role in denying them employment or tenure may need access to
peer review documents to show the intent of decision-makers. In such
cases, the interests of the plaintiffs are clear and impressive: Congress expressly extended Title VII to universities in 1972.67 Plaintiffs can obtain
similar documents from non-academic employers on a simple showing of
relevance.
The University of Pennsylvania case presents two related questions:
First, does protection of the peer review process from damaging outside
interference rise to the level of a constitutional concern? Only if this question is answered in the affirmative need the Court address the second
question: Will discovery of peer review evaluations seriously damage the
process by chilling candid evaluations of candidates for hiring, promotion
or tenure? The analysis developed in this article could help resolve the
first question; the second question requires a balancing based on an empirical judgment about the effects of disclosure.
Beyond invoking Frankfurter's "four freedoms," the Supreme Court
has not provided any guidance as to which administrative activities are
hires faculty. Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 879, 885-88 (1979). As formalist legal arguments go, this appears plausible (although the expressive value of hiring is highly qualified). Moreover, grounding constitutional academic freedom on
general First Amendment principles avoids the elitist implications of special constitutional status for
universities: The same freedoms of inquiry and exchange would protect Georgetown University and
the Georgetown Odd Fellows Book Club.
Employing such a First Amendment doctrine, however, obscures the very complexities of university
values and organization that give rise to legal disputes. Universities are not simple voluntary associations but complex and permanent social institutions that perform indispensable functions. They do not
fit within legal structures created for other institutions. The student Note, for example, draws an
analogy between faculty hiring and admittance to membership in a voluntary association, id. at
885-86, and between faculty hiring and corporate speech, id. at 890-91. But this only pushes offstage
the central question of how judges ought to scrutinize the selection of faculty given the democratic
demand for racial diversity. As a consequence, the student authors' conclusion-that the public values
of racial diversity outweigh a university's right to use traditional selection criteria-emerges from a
"black box" of social preferences. This is unsatisfying, because it neither explains why the university
can be so regulated while many membership organizations constitutionally cannot be, nor why business corporations can be thoroughly regulated without raising any substantial constitutional question.
The student authors fail to make explicit their concept of the university. The Note does not appreciate
how legal regulation of universities would improve generally if tailored to their unique characteristics.
265. EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 554
(1988), amended, 109 S. Ct. 1660 (1989). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
266. See cases cited supra note 8.
267. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the prohibition.
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protected by constitutional academic freedom from political regulation.
Peer review certainly comes within the protection of institutional academic
freedom if any university activity other than teaching and scholarship
does. Peer review is the canonical procedure for determining "who will
teach." It also is the linchpin in the structural compromise over governance that insulates faculty from regular supervision or review by administrators. Peer review consigns evaluation of a faculty candidate in the ordinary course to fellow faculty whom we must presume to be both
competent to evaluate scholarly accomplishment and promise and dedicated to the tradition of academic freedom which seeks to separate the
question of competence from exogenous factors. As I argued above,2"8 imposing preventive regulations on the peer review process threatens the
mechanism by which the professor's scholarly freedom is assured in order
to address the inevitable but exceptional cases where peers have failed
sufficiently to separate competence from ideological acceptability. Academic freedom has no meaning without peer review.
Happily, peer review does not conflict in substance with the dictates of
non-discrimination in Title VII. No one contends that academic freedom
provides universities any right to exclude minorities or women from faculties; no such decision could be justified on academic grounds. Indeed, this
distinction between evaluation on academic grounds, which courts constitutionally must honor, and evaluation poisoned by discrimination, which
Congress has instructed the courts to detect and condemn, has been offered to deny the need for protection of peer review documents. 89 But this
argument misses the central point: The peer review system offers evaluators confidentiality to encourage them to speak honestly and concretely as
to the candidate's relative competence and weaknesses; the litigation process exposes the reports in the search for discriminatory animus. Many
confidences must be broken in the search for incriminating evidence. The
evaluator may feel secure that no one examining his report will conclude
that he is sexist but he may nonetheless be anxious that it not be broadcast that he stated, for example, that the candidate was poorly trained by
Professor X or is more qualified than Professor Y. Even favorable assessments of the candidate may contain embarrassing criticisms of others
within the field. Confidentiality predictably harbors valuable frank evaluations much more often than it shields evidence of discrimination.
At the same time, it is hard to gauge how much the chance that an
evaluation may be made public in subsequent litigation may discourage
frankness. Some chill surely will be felt. But discrimination suits against
universities are not abundant, and protective orders can limit the exposure
of documents not introduced into evidence. A qualified privilege, perhaps
268.
269.

See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
See DeLano, supra note 8, at 149.
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one requiring some particularized showing of need by the plaintiff, may
not provide sufficient assurance of confidentiality to induce an evaluator to
be frank. Some empirical study would be helpful in answering these
questions.
In striking a balance, the Court must achieve a practical accommodation between important and recognized interests. A cavalier disregard for
the interests of the university in the process of peer review would be disastrous; this would relegate institutional academic freedom, at least as to
activities other than teaching and scholarship, to a trivial status, a makeweight in decisions reached on undisclosed grounds.
B.

The Legal Roots of InstitutionalAcademic Freedom

One reason that institutional academic freedom remains little more than
a potential constitutional right is that it has not been explained satisfactorily by legal scholars. It is hard to take seriously a constitutional guarantee that has no obvious bases in constitutional or educational tradition and
that would protect a state institution when it penalizes individuals also
claiming a right of academic freedom. It is no wonder that courts have
described academic freedom as contradictory and anomalous. Dean Yudof
has even written that academic freedom has "three faces," which are supported by independent policies and which should be kept entirely
distinct.2" °
In my view, the constitutional right of academic freedom provides a
constitutional status for higher education. It sets the ground rules for the
relationship between civil and political authority on the one hand and universities on the other. The failure to elaborate these ground rules, and the
traditions and policies on which they stand, threatens to flood the universities with socially-popular, utilitarian functions and responsibilities that
may crowd out the search for truth and the pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake. Moreover, the constitutional law of academic freedom when
conceived primarily as a protection of institutional autonomy can stand on
a lengthy legal tradition, growing out of common law and state constitutional provisions, which are insufficiently understood.
In Part IV, I argued that in protecting academic freedom, courts have
wisely confined their efforts to excluding political control over the university and checking political interference with academic functions. The case
I have presented has been negative in character, trying to demonstrate that
270. Yudof, supra note 9. Dean Yudof views the three faces of academic freedom to be professional autonomy, limits on government indoctrination through schools, and institutional autonomy. I
agree that there is a thorough theoretical distinction between traditional academic freedom and the
rights of schoolteachers, although I believe that the latter should not be termed academic freedom, see
supra note 137. We appear to disagree most fundamentally over the significance of institutional freedom to protect the intellectual discourse of academics. Dean Yudof's failure to take seriously institutional freedom may reflect his failure to perceive its ancestry in state constitutional autonomy; indeed,
he even expresses surprise that the right should encompass state universities. Id. at 855.
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constitutional academic freedom was something different from the tradition of faculty academic freedom formulated and successfully advocated by
the AAUP. In this section, I attempt to present the affirmative case for
constitutional academic freedom, conceived as the prevention of political
interference with academic decision-making.
The most helpful and provocative study of institutional academic freedom to date is Professor Finkin's 1983 article.2"1 Finkin's study appears
motivated by his concern that "'institutional' academic freedom would
constitutionalize the concept of administrative prerogative that the American professorate struggled against at the turn of the century, and it would
do so, perversely, in the name of academic freedom."2'72 He attempts to
show that institutional autonomy is only an "excrescence of property
rights,"2 73 not protecting faculty freedom to teach and write. His effort
seems unconvincing, at least in part, because he neglects the legal tradition
on which institutional academic freedom rests and fails to appreciate the
difficulty of incorporating the AAUP tradition of academic freedom into a
legal regime.
As previously discussed, European universities of the middle ages enjoyed extensive autonomy from both church and state, and the authority to
base their corporate lives on academic values resulted in free teaching and
scholarship. 274 Practical autonomy from government control has characterized American colleges and universities, too, at least since disestablishment of the state churches at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As
described above, the more difficult process of development in America was
271. Finkin, supra note 19, at 817.
272. Id. at 854. Professor Finkin's concerns were provoked by the Princeton case. See supra note
222.
273. Finkin, supra note 19, at 839.
274. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The autonomy of the medieval university
developed out of local custom and from the grants of kings and popes seeking at times to protect
scholarship, at other times to silence dissent. For example, papal decretals of the twelfth century that
forbade the Chancellor of Notre Dame cathedral from selling teaching licenses and requiring him to
issue them to every qualified candidate contributed significantly to securing a degree of independence
from ecclesiastical authority for the professors at the nascent University of Paris. 1 H. RASHDALL,
THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 281-82 (1936).
An important aspect of this autonomy for purposes of legal analysis is that universities enjoyed
extensive jurisdiction over their own members that excluded other civil and ecclesiastical authorities.
Indeed, one of the very earliest legal charters of higher education-issued in 1158 by Emperor Frederick Barbarosa and known as the Authentic Habita-provided that, in any legal proceeding, a student in Lombardy could have the matter heard by his teacher. Id. at 143-45. The medieval University
of Oxford, through courts maintained by its Chancellor and its steward, exercised criminal jurisdiction
where a member of the university was a party; civil jurisdiction, except those relating to freeholds,
where a member was a party; and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the morals of both clerical and lay
members and over testamentary causes. I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 169-70
(1927). The protection of university autonomy through the grant of such a franchise jurisdiction,
however characteristic of medieval legal thought, is echoed by the American common law doctrine of
academic abstention, whereby courts refuse to resolve internal university disputes which otherwise
could have been adjudicated according to generally-applicable common law rules. See infra notes
277-93 and accompanying text. Examining this historical background makes somewhat less surprising
the modern constitutional law of academic freedom that protects university decision-making as well as
teaching and scholarship.
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the divorce of the college from religious sects and the forging of a distinct
educational ethic. Throughout the balance of the nineteenth century, and
until the Second World War, private universities received virtually no
state or federal support 275 and were subjected to few governmentallyimposed legal duties. As discussed below, even some state universities
were placed beyond the control of the political branches of state government by constitutional enactment and judicial interpretation. As Professor
Metzger has incisively noted, the physical isolation of the college or university, set in a rural college town and behind the traditional college gate,
reflected the more general removal of scholarly and student life from the
interest or control of society at large.2 78
What is less often noticed is that this autonomy was legally protected.
Of course, the college enjoyed the general freedom from government regulation that all voluntary, non-profit organizations enjoyed in America during the nineteenth century. Professor Finkin is right to regard this freedom as a "property" right that has no bearing on academic freedom
because it expresses no values distinctly academic.27 7 Moreover, grounding
the universities' autonomy in property concepts entails deference to "owners" who remain free to pervert academic values by, for instance, suppressing dissident voices. It is appropriate to reflect, however, that the
legal sway of property rights was once such that parties seeking autonomy
had no need to press for any more specific rights based on more finelyarticulated public values. Such it was with universities, which had little
reason to argue for their institutional autonomy when government so consistently recognized it in practice, and all were content to speak in terms
of property. 278 Beginning in the nineteenth century, however, American
law came to recognize two legal bases for university autonomy: the common law notion of academic abstention and state constitutional status for
state universities.
275. Some states did assign their federal land grants under the Morrill Act, see supra note 71, to
private institutions; for example, Connecticut, for nearly thirty years, gave land-grant revenues to
Yale. 1 R. CHITTENDEN, THE HIsrORY OF THE SHEFFIELD SCIENTIFIC SCHOOL OF YALE UNIVERsrr, 1846-1922 90-92, 269-73 (1928). This was an exception to the rather complete divorce between
states and private schools during the nineteenth century. The history of Harvard's founding provides a
good example. Harvard in the seventeenth century was both a private and public institution (it would
be more accurate to say that such a distinction had not yet been forged); it received regular appropriations from Massachusetts throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The subsidies finally
ended early in the nineteenth century. The severing of the financial ties reflected the growing religious
pluralism of Massachusetts and the powerful ideology of privatization that characterized most American institutions at that time. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 39, at 184-90.
276. See Metzger, supra note 236, at 6.
277. Finkin, supra note 19, at 839.
278. This is well-illustrated by Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819), which established the autonomy of private colleges from legislative control. The decision,
of course, turned on the Court's insistence that a state legislature's "reforms" had impaired the obligation of a contract-a liberty or property right extending far beyond higher education. Indeed, despite
the historical importance of the case in fostering a mixed economy of public and private universities,
the Court never addressed educational policies or needs.
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1. Academic Abstention
Academic abstention has long specifically preserved university freedom
from state regulation. It describes the traditional refusal of courts to extend common law rules of liability to colleges where doing so would interfere with the college administration's good faith performance of its core
functions.2 7 9 It would be inappropriate to describe academic abstention as
a doctrine, because courts have never developed a consistent or thorough
body of rationales or followed a uniform group of leading cases. Yet the
consistency of result and invocation of the need for judicial restraint
whenever internal university decisions are challenged by an unhappy student or professor has been sufficiently impressive that a competent practitioner today would advise such a student or professor that her chances of
success are low or nil.28 0 The few common law limitations on the authority given the college over its internal affairs still consist of prohibitions
against bad faith dealings and violations of overriding public policy.28 "
The practical effect and supporting rationales of such judicial abnegation are demonstrated in the early and influential case of People ex rel.
Prattv. Wheaton College,28 2 where a student, suspended for belonging to
a "secret society," sought reinstatement through the courts. After noting
the reasonableness of a rule prohibiting secret societies, the court explained the proper relationship between courts and colleges:
But whether the rule be judicious or not, it violates neither good
morals nor the law of the land and is therefore clearly within the
power of the college authorities to make and enforce. A discretionary
power has been given them to regulate the discipline of their college
in such a manner as they deem proper, and so long as their rules
violate neither divine nor human law, we have no more authority to
interfere than we have to control the domestic discipline of a father
in his family.28 3
The recognition of authority over internal affairs and the exclusion of judicial governance go hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree of
279. Academic abstention has largely been criticized by legal scholars in the twentieth century,
because it presents an apparently unreflective barrier to establishing legal rights of both faculty and
students. See, e.g., Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J. COLL. & U.L. 141 (1981-82). In pointing out the persistent
strength of academic abstention and offering it as a basis for constitutional protection, I do not mean
to suggest that I approve of all the decisions rendered in its name. Critical attention to reshaping the
common law of university relations lies outside the scope of this article.
280. Professor Nordin describes academic abstention as "the most consistent value or judgment
which the courts bring to any given factual situation concerning higher education." Id. at 146.
281. See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, affd, 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962) (court will not review exercise of school's discretion unless
it was arbitrary); Foley v. Benedict, 55 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932) (court will not interfere
absent clear showing of arbitrariness or abuse of discretion).
282. 40 Ill. 186 (1866).
283. Id. at 187-88.
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common law autonomy. Such common law autonomy could not, of course,
prevail against statutes, 8 4 but the paucity of statutes affecting universities
made this an insignificant limitation.
Most cases that involve some notion of academic abstention involve
complaints by students against college discipline or application of academic standards. Prior to the development of professional research faculties, these matters lay at the heart of the college's goals and preoccupations. Faculty members complaining about dismissal, too, even when
claiming a violation of their academic freedom, were rebuffed by the same
insistence that courts must not interfere with the broad discretion of the
college.2" 5 We have learned to read these cases with distrust because they
evoke a dark age of faculty dependence, yet they also represent a positive
freedom against state control that should be valued more highly in an age
when most universities voluntarily defend the academic freedom of their
faculties. The benefits of this institutional freedom are more fully appreciated if one acknowledges the risk of judicial tyranny demonstrated, if farcically, for example, in the Bertrand Russell case.28 6
Litigants seeking to avoid judicial abstention from internal college disputes have most often sought to demonstrate that they have a contract
with the college, for the breach of which a court can grant damages or
injunctive relief. And indeed courts often declare that the relation between
college and student, or college and teacher, is contractual in nature.28 ' Yet
examination of these cases reveals that such contracts are nearly always
construed in favor of the authority of college officials, either by affirming
their discretion to interpret vague standards or by giving effect to explicit
reservations of discretion so broad that they would void a commercial contract for lack of mutuality."8 8 Indeed, one court has recently insisted that
284. See, e.g., Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W. 623 (1906) affd, 211 U.S.
45 (1908) (state statute forbidding instruction of blacks and whites in same institution upheld as
constitutional exercise of state police power).
285. See, e.g., Ward v. Board of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1905). The court stated:
Questions concerning the efficiency of a teacher in an institution of learning, his usefulness, his
relations to the student body and to other members of the faculty, are so complicated and
delicate that they are peculiarly for the consideration of the governing authorities of the institution. It may be perfectly apparent to them that the presence of a teacher is prejudicial to the
welfare and discipline of the college, although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make
it so appear to a jury by the production of evidence in court.
Id. at 377. It follows from this analysis that civil authorities should not be able to penalize professors
whom the college wishes to retain.
286. See supra note 221 (discussing Russell case).
287. See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, affd, 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(1928); Nordin, supra note 279, at 144-45.
288. Thus, in the cases cited supra note 287, courts sustained dismissals of students either for
narrow sectarian reasons or for no stated reason at all. In Anthony, the court stated:
The university may only dismiss a student for reasons falling within two classes, one in connection with safeguarding the university's ideals of scholarship, and the other in connection
with safeguarding the university's moral atmosphere... . Of course, the university authorities
have wide discretion in determining what situation does and what does not fall within the
classes mentioned, and the courts would be slow indeed in disturbing any decision of the uni-
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contract law provides only an analogy for examining the college's authority to dismiss a student;28 9 the dilution of contract principles as a binding
ground for decision has invariably led to deference toward academic
officials.
It would be misleading to suggest that cases affirming academic abstention develop a coherent rationale for their results; very little is said beyond
insisting on the need for discretion for college officials to carry out their
duties effectively. One rationale that does emerge is that the breadth of the
responsibility that the college bears in disciplining students in loco parentis requires broad powers.29 ' This rationale does not speak directly to contemporary concerns, given that colleges today assume little legal or moral
responsibility for the moral welfare of their students."' The cases do suggest two other rationales that seem more relevant to contemporary higher
education. First, the courts see the college as a separate realm, pursuing
values different from those of society as a whole, and striving for collegial,
pedagogical, or disciplinary models of personal relations that eschew competition.2 92 This view of college life, partially mythical, has had profound
influence both on judges and academics. The courts fear that offering a
legal remedy for a complaint will break down the consensus of value or
procedure within the institution. Second, judges feel themselves incompetent to evaluate the merits of academic decisions. 93 This rationale seems
strongly connected to the first, because the lack of legal standards presupposes that colleges act upon values different than from those of society at
large.
Although this common law notion of academic abstention may seem
anachronistic in an age of statute and regulation, the judicial attitudes
versity authorities in this respect.
224 A.D. at 491, 231 N.Y.S. at 440.
Courts are more likely to enforce explicit promises by universities to follow stated disciplinary
procedures, see, e.g., Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 427 N.Y.S.2d
760 (1980).
289. Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975). The court elaborated:
It is apparent that some elements of the law of contracts are used and should be used in the
analysis of the relationship between plaintiff and the University to provide some framework
into which to put the problem of expulsion for disciplinary reasons. This does not mean that
"contract law" must be rigidly applied in all its aspects, nor is it so applied even when the
contract analogy is extensively adopted.
Id. at 626 (emphasis in original).
290. See, e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913) (upholding
rule forbidding students from eating at off-campus restaurants).
291. See cases cited infra note 292. This attitude seems to be changing; many educators are looking for meaningful ways to guide students toward a healthy maturity without presuming to adopt
parental control over the students. See Kidder, Developing "Character"Again at American Universities, Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1987, at 21, col. I (describing President Bok of Harvard as
on a crusade "to reawaken a commitment to ethical standards on American campuses.").
292. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187-88 (1866); Woods v.
Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551-52, 126 A. 882, 883 (1924), citing O'Sullivan v. New York Law School,
75 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 118, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893).
293. See, e.g., Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924); State v. Hyman,
180 Tenn. 99, 108, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942).
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embodied therein persist in surprisingly similar forms. Several recent decisions shielding colleges from tort liability have insisted that tort law
should not impose duties on colleges in dealing with their students that the
colleges have not voluntarily and unambiguously assumed." 4 These decisions evince a judicial regard for preserving the discretion of academics
hardly in evidence when the defendants are doctors or railroad companies.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned federal judges not to
meddle with the discretion of academics, either on substantive or procedural grounds, when they make bona fide academic decisions. The leading
case here is Board of Curatorsv. Horowitz,29 5 where the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause requires neither notice nor a hearing
before a university student may be dismissed for poor academic performance. The Court explained that the determination whether to dismiss a
student for academic reasons "requires an expert evaluation of cumulative
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial
or administrative decision-making." 2 6 Moreover, the "educational process
is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a continuing relationship between faculty and students .... ,,211 Horowitz thus counsels courts
that universities proceed on assumptions different from society as a whole
and that an insistence by courts on conforming to legal standards or procedures will likely destroy something uniquely valuable in higher education.
This point of view recurs; courts trim constitutional rights to preserve
academic values in other contexts. A striking example is the consistent
refusal by courts to require that lawyers be able to participate actively in
those university hearings actually required by the Due Process Clause on
the ground that professional advocacy and cross-examination will transform the proceedings from the informal and collegial to the adversarial
and technical.2 98 Although invocation of academic abstention does not defeat all constitutional claims, it is consistently used to avoid enforcing
some general societal norms within the university.
The constitutional right of institutional academic freedom appears to be
a collateral descendent of the common law notion of academic abstention.
This heritage is made explicit in Regents of the University of Michigan v.
294. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-39 (3d Cir. 1979) (college had no duty
to protect students from hazards of driving while intoxicated); University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744
P.2d 54, 60-61 (Colo. 1987) (university not liable for injuries incurred at fraternity house); Eiseman
v. State, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 189-92, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1135-37, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 615-17 (1987)
(holding university not liable for murder committed by prisoner on conditional release while attending
classes).
295. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 226 (discussing Horowitz).
296. Id. at 90.
297. Id.
298. See, e.g., Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d 88, 99 (6th Cir. 1987); Frumkin v. Board of Trustees,
626 F.2d 19, 21-22 (6th Cir. 1980); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59
(5th Cir. 1961).
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Ewing,29 ' where the Court, after invoking Horowitz and the rhetoric of
abstention, suggests that these views recommend themselves as protection
for academic freedom."' 0 And the "four freedoms" of Sweezy 01 reflect the
kinds of university decisions courts have refused to review under common
law principles.3 12 Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as academic abstention raised to constitutional status, so that judges can consider
whether statutes or regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the
special needs or prerogatives of the academic community.
2. State Constitutional Law
The second legal source for constitutional academic freedom lies in state
constitutional provisions endowing state universities with the status of being separate branches of government. These provisions are contained in
several state constitutions. 30 3 The provisions either expressly or, as construed by state courts, implicitly limit the power of the state legislature to
interfere with the internal decision-making of the university, even though
the university is supported by state appropriations. State courts in several
states, in fact, have held state statutes unconstitutional because they reflect
attempts by state legislatures to interfere with academic decision-making.
The State of Michigan enacted the first constitutional provision for the
separate government of its state university in 1850,304 and its courts have
given the provision more far-reaching and detailed development than have
courts in other states with similar provisions. 3 05 The current provision
gives the elected Board of Regents of the University of Michigan "general
supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds." 30 8 The Michigan courts have consistently construed the provision as a prohibition against all attempts by the
legislature to interfere with the academic management of the university.
299. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
300. Id. at 226 & n.12.
301. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
302. A principal difference between the Sweezy formulation and that implicit in the older abstention cases is that the former encompasses only decisions made on "academic grounds," while the latter
often concerned themselves with the moral grounds central to the educational mission of those times.
303. It is difficult to identify all the state universities that have constitutional status, because
courts have been willing to interpret often ambiguous constitutional language as imposing limitations
on the legislature. States with universities enjoying explicit constitutional status include California,
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9; Georgia, GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. X, § 6;
Idaho, IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 10; Michigan, MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; Minnesota, MINN.
CONST. art. XIII, § 3; Montana, MoNT.CONST. art. X, § 9; Nebraska, NEB. CONsT. art. VII, § 10;
and Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 8. See H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION
AND THE LAW 57-79 (1979); E. ELLIOTT & M. CHAMBERS, supra note 10, at 134-164; L. GLENNY
& T. DALGLISH, PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES, STATE AGENCIES, AND THE LAW 5-49 (1973); Recent Decisons, 55 MICH. L. REV. 711, 728 (1957) (summarizing state constitutions).
304. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, §§ 6-8.
305. See cases cited infra notes 307-14 and accompanying text.
306. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5. The 1850 provision granted constitutional status to the University of Michigan; the current provision (adopted in 1963) grants it to Michigan State and Wayne
State as well.
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Thus, the courts have held unconstitutional legislative efforts to compel
appointments to faculty positions, 0 7 to control the location of departments, 8° to determine the percentage of out-of-state students,"0 9 to penalize student radicals,3 10 and to require divestiture of securities related to
South Africa. 3 1 Even attempts by the legislature to tie substantive conditions to specific appropriations have been set aside when found to interfere
with general operations of the university. 312 At the same time, the courts
have upheld statutes regulating the financial practices of the university
and its relations with employees, neither regulation significantly affecting
academic values.31 3 Thus, the courts have construed the grant of authority
to the regents as a flexible prohibition against legislative meddling, permitting the courts to determine whether a statute interferes with the university's autonomy over core academic issues. 1 4
The purpose behind provisions such as Michigan's is to improve the
quality of the state university by protecting it from political manipulation.
When Michigan constitutionalized institutional autonomy in 1850, it did
so against a history of frustrating failures to establish respectable state
universities in America. As a Michigan legislative report of 1840 concluded, "[t]hus has State after State, in this American Union, endowed
universities, and then, by repeated contradictory and over legislation, torn
them to pieces with the same facility as they do the statute book, and for
307. See People v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 18 Mich. 468 (1869); People ex. rel. Drake v.
Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 4 Mich. 98 (1856).
308. See Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253 (1896).
309. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 47 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.W.2d 871 (1973),
dismissed as moot, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
310. See id.
311. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 166 Mich. App. 314, 419 N.W.2d 773 (1988).
312. See State Bd. of Agric. v. Auditor Gen., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160 (1924); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975) (construing statute as not
imposing conditions on universities in order to avoid constitutional issues).
313. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204
N.W.2d 218 (1973); Recent Decisions, supra note 303, at 729.
314. California also has a well-developed state constitutional law of institutional autonomy. See
Horowitz, The Autonomy of the University of California Under the State Constitution, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 23 (1977). California has provided the only case where rejection of a claim of state constitutional
autonomy clearly advanced intellectual freedom. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280
(1952) (rejecting regents' power to prescribe loyalty oath for faculty in addition to that required of all
public employees by state constitution). Other states with constitutional status for state universities
have less certain protection for institutional autonomy, see, e.g., Board of Regents v. Exon, 199 Neb.
146, 148, 256 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1977) (construing 1871 constitutional provision to "remove the
University from the plenary control of the Legislature and establish the Board of Regents as an
independent body charged with the power and responsibility to manage and operate the University as
free from political influence and control as possible"). Some state universities, among which Wisconsin is the preeminent example, have achieved excellence through a close and ideologically-charged
relationship between legislature and university. See L. VEYSEY, supra note 56, at 108. Even in states
where the university clearly is a creature of statute, courts sometimes have construed these statutes as
guaranteeing to the universities a certain distance from the political branches of government. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Board of Trustees v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951 (1943) (state university is
entitled to select its own legal counsel and attorney general has no right to represent either university
corporation or trustees).

1989]

Academic Freedom

the same reason, because they have the right." ' How the people could
control a learned and intellectually elite institution without destroying values that they as a group may not comprehend or share proved a difficult
issue of political architecture. The legislature was perceived to manage the
university for practical, political ends, rather than for long-term scholarly
and educational objectives. The solution adopted-the election for eight
year terms of officials responsible only for university governance-was an
ingenious innovation, accommodating conflicting values and fostering a
31
university known and admired throughout the world. 1
This solution employs the traditional American constitutional device of
separation of powers."1 ' The Michigan Constitution gives power for different purposes to both the regents and the legislature. Although their
powers overlap to some extent, the regents have certain core powers over
the internal academic administration of the school that the legislature cannot arrogate to itself. The courts enforce this division in order to protect
the values for which the division was made, even in the absence of an
express judicial role in restraining legislative intrusions.3 18 In this case,
the courts protect those academic values that the legislature can be expected to slight.
The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state universities seems to
have contributed to the development of the federal right of institutional
academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the persistence of the view,
inherent in academic abstention, that civil authorities ought to respect the
special needs and values of universities, even when erected and supported
by the state. More distinctly, institutional autonomy helps to explain why
federal courts seek to protect administrative decisions not related directly
to speech or the exchange of ideas; these state constitutional provisions
recognize that political control over academic administration may prevent
the achievement of educational and scholarly excellence. Perceiving a basis
in separation of powers protection also makes federal protection of these
administrative actions seem less anomalous. Also, this tradition of state
315. Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 377, 68 N.W. 253, 255 (1896)
(quoting legislative report).
316. The failure to accommodate conflicting values is illustrated by the hiring and firing of radical faculty at the Kansas State Agricultural College in the 1890's by shifting Populist and Republican
legislative majorities. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. MEzTGER, supra note 11, at 424-25. The insufficiently-studied process of accommodation between higher education and democratic control has led to
the diverse missions of our public universities.
317. Obviously, the separation of powers is a central mechanism in the United States Constitution. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 359-435
(1986 & Supp. 1989) 29-59.
318. In recent years, the Supreme Court has voided several federal statutes on similar
grounds-that the legislature had invoked powers reserved to the executive. See Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative veto unconstitutional). Considering the university
to be an equal branch of government may seem odd, but an analogous conception was common in the
Middle Ages. See supra note 274.
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constitutional law suggests why federal courts have not doubted that the
federal right of academic freedom protects state as well as private universities: Both have traditionally enjoyed autonomy from political
interference.
Thus, both academic abstention and constitutional autonomy seem to be
precursors of the modern federal constitutional protection of institutional
autonomy. This modern development can be seen as an adaptation of
traditional legal rules and judicial attitudes to the contemporary legal environment. In this legal environment, universities are subject both to numerous civil norms from which they formerly were exempt and to extensive statutory and administrative regulation. Since 1945, universities have
educated a far higher percentage of the American population for participation in an increasingly complex society and economy.31 9 This new, more
central position in national life has been funded in significant part by
federal and state governments, which in turn have sought to ensure university assistance in fulfilling social and economic goals. Statutes and regulations concerning hiring, advancement, admissions, financial aid, student records, and a myriad of other operations have been enacted. Courts
have insisted that some civil rights of individual members be respected by
public universities.32 0 All this has greatly complicated relations between
political officials and universities, drawing the latter out of their prior
social isolation.
It would be fatuous to denigrate this entire development as a derogation
from the ideal; much of permanent value for both the university and society at large has been gained. At the same time, many educators express
understandable concern about distraction from the traditional values of
higher education: the search for truth, the nurturing of intellectual maturity, the insistence on high standards, and the regard for merit.321
Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best be seen as a principle that regulation should not proceed so far as to deprive the university of
control over its academic destiny. This principle has been fashioned by
courts, explaining why they restrain themselves from imposing farreaching constitutional or common law duties on the university. As such,
319. The percentage of college-age Americans attending college has increased from 4% in 1900
and 15% in 1940 to 50% in 1980. B. CLARK, supra note 79, at 50. The change in the role and
internal structure of the contemporary university is discussed provocatively throughout C. KERR,
supra note 114.
320. Judicial recognition of student civil rights is discussed at supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
321. Educators who also are lawyers have taken the lead in discussing whether federal regulation
of universities threatens core values. Compare Oaks, A Private University Looks at Government Regulation, 4 J. COLL. & U.L. 1 (1976) (President Oaks of Brigham Young was formerly a University
of Chicago law professor) with H. EDWARDS, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE UNHOLY CRUSADE
AGAINST GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1980) (Judge Edwards was formerly a professor of law at

University of Michigan). President Derek Bok, himself a former law professor at Harvard, has taken
a thoughtful and balanced position. See D. BOK, supra note 120, at 37-60.
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it represents academic abstention raised to a constitutional level; there, it
generates force comparable to other constitutional norms, such as due process. The principle also can be directed to legislatures and administrative
agencies, prohibiting them from reducing the university to a passive instrument of political or utilitarian calculation. For example, if the United
States Department of Education attempted to compel universities to offer
students a particular liberal arts curriculum, its efforts surely would be
unconstitutional. 22 Thus, courts have embedded institutional autonomy
into the federal constitution through judicial construction, providing to
qualifying universities rights against the federal government long enjoyed
against state government by universities with state constitutional status.
Recognizing this legal parentage helps to clarify the constitutional right
of academic freedom (even if it does not finally justify it). The Supreme
Court's move to protect the institution as a whole should not be viewed as
a perversion of faculty rights, based upon an erroneous development of
Frankfurter's language in his Sweezy concurrence. Nor does it represent
confusion between property and free speech rights. Constitutionalizing academic freedom did not involve absorption of a non-legal norm developed
by faculty activists, so much as adaptation of the traditional legal supports
of the college to preserve intellectual independence for the modern university. Academic abstention and institutional autonomy persist because they
are the legal structures our institutions have developed that most fully
recognize the distinctiveness of higher education. When confronted by
laws that threatened this distinctiveness by insisting that the university
enter completely into the mainstream of democratic culture, courts have
turned to familiar legal structures originally developed in order to prevent
political demands from engulfing academic values. That such a development is justified remains to be defended.
C.

Institutional Academic Freedom and the First Amendment

One who has generally accepted my account of the nature and origin of
constitutional academic freedom might nonetheless conclude that the
whole development has been mistaken and illegitimate. This position is
not untenable. To be sure, there is not even a colorable claim that the
founders specifically intended to provide any constitutional status for
higher education. 23 Even if universities should be afforded constitutional
322. Former Secretary Bennett spoke frequently against the trends in liberal arts education, but
the Department has never suggested that it has the power to regulate this curriculum. In 1974, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare did propose regulations requiring universities to censor course materials "'to ensure that they do not reflect discrimination on the basis of sex.'" D. BOK,
supra note 120, at 52. Imposing such a political constraint on teaching the liberal arts would be a
violation of constitutional academic freedom.
323. Professor Steven Goldberg has argued persuasively that the founders did intend to protect
scientific analysis from religious intolerance and from government interference while authorizing the
federal government to finance scientific research. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American
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status, one must explain why this may be accomplished legitimately
through judicial interpretation. Furthermore, one might deny that universities merit protection from democratic decision-making or that they harbor any values not adequately represented in the political process. Finally,
one might express concern that an autonomous university can systematically suppress the distinctive voices of faculty and students and impose on
them the ideology of trustees or administrators.
I will now defend the constitutional right of academic freedom while
offering some suggestions for restricting its development. First, I will delineate why a university should be held beyond political control to some
degree. Then, I will elaborate the limits of this policy and of constitutional protection.
Universities perform many functions-some competently and some
poorly. In attempting to justify a distinct constitutional status for universities, we should not rely upon those functions performed by the market or
government which universities may duplicate. Thus, college sports provide
outstanding entertainment for millions but in a manner (too often) indistinguishable from the professional; college scientists usefully perform the
tasks of applied research called for by government or business, but only
economies of training and equipment distinguish this work from that routinely performed "in-house"; and colleges train young people to perform
useful tasks required by business or government (and then evaluate their
performance), facilitating a rational labor market. There seems to be no
reason in principle why government cannot regulate colleges in performing these functions as it does any private enterprise.32 4 Thus, courts look
just as closely at the antitrust issues raised by college football television
contracts as they do at those within professional football.32 Similarly, if
Science, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1. One could argue that constitutional protection of science extends to all
inquiry conducted in a scientific method or spirit, but this formulation does not readily resolve the
paradoxes of community scholarship that lie at the heart of academic freedom.
324. In prudence, however, a court would do well to assure itself that the government regulation
will not injure other university work that requires protection. For example, the Reagan Administration's placement of extensive amounts of scientific data under confidentiality restrictions, see J. SHATTUCK & M.

SPENCE, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION CONTROLS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP,

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1988) (criticizing new policies decreasing access to scientific data),
ought to be scrutinized carefully by the courts; although the government constitutionally may (but
ought not) routinely restrict dissemination of information produced specifically for its use-such as the
development of defense technology-it cannot constitutionally restrict the dissemination of a scientific
study merely because it provides funding for the study.
325. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding that NCAA's plan to restrict
total number of live televised college football games violates Sherman Act). Yet courts should not
extend antitrust principles to strike down competitive restrictions actually protecting amateurism because to do so would invade university efforts to hold intercollegiate sports within the educational
mission of the institution. Similarly, but more importantly, courts should not subject agreements relating to educational policy, such as standards for accreditation or principles of financial aid, to antitrust
liability. See generally Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 717 (1984) (arguing that NCAA television plan should be subjected to "rule of
reason" analysis because per se rule lacks flexibility to account for noncommercial educational objectives of NCAA position).
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education were merely vocational training, there would be no reason in
principle for government to refrain from establishing detailed guidelines
for equal opportunity or from dictating warranty liability for universities. 26 Put in terms of the analysis in Part III of this article, government
legitimately can regulate those aspects of a university's work that promote
democratic values. Indeed, how could this valuable work be carried out
without the creation of mutual obligations between government and university? Any argument for constitutional immunity from political control
must rest on those research and humanistic values of a university that are
unique to it. Immunity ought not be extended any further than necessary
to protect those unique attributes of the university.
And what are the indigenous values served by universities? First, the
university is the preeminent institution in our society where knowledge
and understanding are pursued with detachment or disinterestedness. 2 '
The Justice Department's current investigation into whether certain private colleges and universities have agreed on tuition or financial aid policies in violation of the antitrust laws, see Antitrust
Division Probing Top Colleges' Tuition and Aid, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 7, seems on
this ground grossly misconceived and potentially in violation of constitutional academic freedom. It
may result in a governmental attempt to accomplish political ends by forcing the norms of the commercial marketplace on educational institutions.
326. Even vocational training at American universities usually is conducted on a critical and humanistic plane such that requirements of academic freedom and institutional autonomy apply to it.
Law schools provide an important example. Teaching and scholarship are conducted in an atmosphere of academic freedom, and law schools enjoy substantial autonomy. Yet, the requirement of the
bar examination, imposed by civil authorities, places constraints on the curriculum and the manner of
teaching in order to ensure professional competence. Whatever the educational merits of this accommodation, it represents at least a workable resolution of institutional and civic interests.
327. Detachment or objectivity in scholarship is well described by Northrop Frye:
One starts out with a tentative goal in mind, but on the way to it one must consider evidence
impartially and draw only the strictly rational conclusions from that evidence. Cooking or
manipulating the evidence to make it fit a preconceived idea works against detachment ...
The persistence in keeping the mind in a state of disciplined sanity, the courage in facing
results that may deny or contradict everything that one had hoped to achieve-these are obviously moral qualities, if the phrase means anything at all.
Frye, The Knowledge of Good and Evil, in THE MORALITY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1, 3-4 (M. Black ed.
1967). Such a criterion of analysis and exposition neither condones indifference to the social consequences of one's work nor denies that the choice of a subject or problem for examination raises moral
questions not directly addressed by the requirement of detachment. See id. at 10-16. Indeed, the
attempt to impose an imaginative structure on a certain problem may arise from a desire to resolve an
emotional tangle within the scholar's personal or social history, see Hampshire, Commitment and
Imagination, in THE MORALITY OF SCHOLARSHIP, supra, at 29, 41-55. Such imaginative hypotheses, when subsequently subjected to the rigors of critical analysis and experiment, are necessarily part
of the scientific endeavor. See K. POPPER, supra note 92, at 31, 44-48. So understood, detachment
may be an aspect of the scientific method that is followed in the natural and social sciences as well as
in the humanities.
The distinction between detachment and interestedness in argument must be apparent to one who
has practiced and taught law. The brief writer must pursue the interests of her client; those interests
determine the position she will take on every issue of law and fact; indeed, her exposition of applicable fact and law must strain the professional conventions of veracity without exceeding them. In contrast, the writer of a law review article takes personal responsibility for every position she advocates as
well as the quality of her analysis; whatever the reaction of political allies or friends, her professional
advancement depends on evaluations of her work by peers who both share and oppose her views; thus,
presentation, comprehension, creativity and grace must be the criteria she seeks to satisfy. Scholarship
must always be less "committed" than advocacy; the scholar must be open to permitting her materials
to persuade her. See Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarships and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J.
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Outside the university, people generally shape or criticize ideas to make
money or influence public policy; this is preeminently the case with the
mass media, the most powerful forum in which the exchange of ideas
takes place.
Disinterested scholarship and research are both goods in themselves and
benefits to society as a whole. 28 For example, an analysis of Victorian
poetry may lead us to wonder at the continuities and changes in aesthetic
forms and social values, while we also admire or critique the literary
critic's honest struggle to substantiate a general theory from diverse and
recalcitrant texts. Or basic scientific research aimed at enhancing our understanding of the formation of mountain ranges both may lead to a
greater appreciation of the character of natural forces and may exemplify
the potential of careful, systematic human inquiry. These intellectual pursuits are good, both for the researcher and for those who study his work.
The knowledge gained by basic research may improve overall welfare; for
instance, geological research may also help those who search for valuable
minerals or plan for earthquakes. Yet because society as a whole enjoys its
value over a long period of time, no individual can profit comparatively by
investing in its creation.
The second value of a university is related to the first: The disinterested
search for knowledge fosters a manner of discourse that, at its best, is
careful, critical, and ambitious. Again, the method of discourse is both a
good in itself and a benefit to society. It is pleasant to participate in discussion that is intelligent, humane, and to the point. More importantly,
scholarly discourse creates the most favorable environment in which thinkers may formulate ideas that stand apart from popular opinion or fashionable error.329
Disinterested and expert thought is also crucial for society as a whole
because it provides a standard by which to gauge how trivial, debased,
and false is much public discussion of affairs. It is imperative to gain
perspective on the mass of "information" that pours from the print and
electronic media, drivel that so often merely flatters the ignorance and
955 (1981).
A further requirement of disinterested study is that the subject be freely chosen. "Universities are
places where professionals of many disciplines can follow lines of inquiry determined by themselves,
individually and collegially, and not dictated by anyone else, on either ideological or practical
grounds." Bickel, The Aims of Education and the ProperStandardsof the University, in UNIVERSITIES IN THE WESTERN WORLD 3, 3 (P. Seabury ed. 1975).

328. For an account of knowledge as a good in itself, see J. NEWMAN,

THE IDEA OF AUNIVER-

SITY 114 (M. Svaglic ed. 1982) ("there is a Knowledge, which is desirable, though nothing come of it,
as being of itself a treasure, and a sufficient remuneration of years of labour"). On the usefulness of
higher education, see the speech by the first President of Johns Hopkins, D. GILMAN, THE BFNEFITS
WHICH SocIETY DERIVES FROM UNIVERSITmES (1885) (universities advance, conserve, refine, and distribute knowledge).
329. Arthur Leff wrote of the pleasure that comes to legal scholars in "those occasional moments
when they say, in some concise and illuminating way, something that appears to be true." Leff,
Afterword, 90 YALE L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981).
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cupidity of its audience. The role of university discourse in providing an
intelligent perspective has grown dramatically since the independent critics and writers who graced the serious, non-academic periodicals of the
recent past became an endangered species. 3 It is important to keep vital
the possibility of free intellectual excellence lest we become lost to technically-proficient barbarism. 3 '
The third value also follows from the others: The university aspires to
instill in those entering adulthood a capacity for mature and independent
judgment. The elements of this liberal education, which are constantly
revised and challenged, inform the student of the knowledge valued from
the past, convey the methodological rudiments of critical thought, and foster the capacity for independent and measured thinking.332 The term "liberal" does not, of course, refer to any political teaching but to the capacity
of such an education to liberate the student from provincial self-interest.
Again, liberal education is good in itself, both pleasant and virtuous, and a
necessity for providing competent leadership in a complex, technocratic,
and democratic society. 3
One might reasonably complain that this description of values unique
to higher education dwells unrealistically on traditional norms-honored
more in the breach than in the observance-and fails to account for the
main work universities perform today: training young people of widely
divergent intellectual capacities and social backgrounds to be competent
workers and adequate citizens, and simultaneously conducting research
that supports an economically-beneficial rate of technological growth. One
might complain further that the perspective I have offered on the work of
a university stresses the preoccupation of an elite and unfairly deprecates
the concerns of most students for competent instruction in marketable
skills. These objections are powerful and reflect disagreements about priorities in higher education that have raged incessantly at least since the
330. The restriction of intellectual life to universities is described with alarm in R. JACOBY, THE
LAST INTELLECTUALS (1987).

331. Alexander Bickel suggests a slightly different and more direct contribution that disinterested
academic speech can make to the political system:
There is all too little in the way of information and opinion entering the universe of political
discourse with the credit that attaches to disinterestedness. Much of what there is comes from
academic and professional persons, whose credentials are certified by universities or other professional and scholarly organizations, known to be certified in accordance with neutral standards, rather than under the influence of political objectives. Persons so certified then speak
with a certain moral authority, and inject into the political process something that it has difficulty generating itself-dispassionate, informed, disinterested judgment, which looks beyond
the interests and objectives immediately engaged in the debate on any given issue.
Bickel, supra note 327, at 9.
332. This is not the place to enter the debate on what such a liberal education should contain.
Recent arguments about core curricula, about the replacement of standard authors by women and
non-European writers, and about the role of critical methodologies demonstrate both the necessity and
difficulty of offering a vital liberal education to contemporary students.
333. See, e.g., A. GUTMANN, supra note 114, at 173.
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passage of the Morrill Act. 34 The modern university, of course, attempts
to serve the few and the many, the rare and the average, the good and the
useful. Its bureaucratic structure and apparent capacity for infinite expansion keep all aboard and avoid the necessity for final agreement on basic
goals or purposes.
Yet who can doubt that it is the engagement of learning in the arts and
sciences, requiring unfettered debate over detail and structure, that gives
life to higher education both in scholarship and in teaching? The memory
or promise of these things keeps talented men and women-underpaid if
faculty, overcharged if students-at work through hours of drudgery.
These studies animate the intellectual life of the university as purely practical skills cannot; outside of the university's precincts, liberal studies
would suffer in a way that practical training and research would not.
Liberal studies serve the ideals of the academy-knowledge and wisdom;
practical studies serve primarily the ideals of democratic society at
large-prosperity and equality.
Moreover, the nature and value of liberal studies justifies constitutional
limits on legislative control while those of practical studies do not. The
latter reflect the concerns normally addressed by government officials considering issues of public policy. Except for practical concerns about localism and comparative professional competence, there is no reason in principle why government cannot regulate these activities as thoroughly as it
regulates elementary education or the workplace. Legislative policy may
be wise or foolish, it may or may not lead to better-trained scientists or
managers, but it is difficult to see how a constitutional principle limiting
legislative control of the public purposes of the university would lead to
more successful outcomes. Moreover, the political branches have consistently and enthusiastically supported useful research and education (although sometimes ineptly) since agricultural research proved its worth in
the 1880's.
Recognizing the centrality of liberal studies to higher education both
justifies constitutional protection and provides a principle for that protection. Liberal studies are central to the American notion of the free individual. They are necessary for the exchange of ideas contemplated by the
First Amendment, and they exist in constant danger from majorities. Our
democratic society necessarily presumes that individuals can freely govern
themselves and contribute to society by rising above the flood of prejudice
and self-interest." 5 This vision of a democratic people, freely and prudently choosing their institutions, appears indispensable to both liberal
and classical republican explanations of the virtues of our Constitution."'6
334.
335.
336.
omists.

See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
This view is rejected, however, by the contemporary "public choice" school of political econSee, e.g., Buchanan, Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins, in THEORY OF PUBLIC
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Liberal education teaches its students how to take comfort in the clash of
opposing views by developing an individual perspective founded on a just
appreciation of facts. Some aspect of this analysis can be found in Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Keyishian,337 where he pleaded that
"[tihe Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.' "33 Civic and educational aims merge in their common concern to
increase the capacity of citizens to exercise reason and judgment freely.
The critical and informed discourse of a free university might be said to
be strictly a "transcendent value." 33 9 It offers a symbol of reasoned exchange that stands slightly above the contentions of our political life.
Similarly, the free exchange of ideas, the support of which is the central
tenet of the First Amendment, is a more attractive ideal when it results in
insight and elucidation rather than in manipulative persuasion or vituperative ranting. The development of a field of knowledge through reasoned
debate and the progress of a student to a critical perspective are among
the most appealing and fruitful forms of expressive activities. These goals
are often missing in political or commercial speech. This may be the sense
behind Justice Brennan's highly figurative declaration that the "classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' "30
Finally, liberal studies may not be adequately protected by legislative
majorities.""' For the foreseeable future, scholarship and liberal education
will likely remain the pursuit of a minority, appealing to those with the
requisite intellectual capacity, imagination, and willingness to sacrifice
immediate material rewards for the pursuit of knowledge. Those who do
not recognize this allure of scholarship tend to value more concrete gains
over the remote and intangible benefits of higher education. Universities
can do much in the short term to cure contagious disease, alleviate pollution, and integrate minorities into the professional classes-projects close
to the heart of dedicated public servants. Constitutional academic freedom
requires that such wholly appropriate projects be structured so as not unduly to hamper core educational activities. Judges are sufficiently well
CHOICE 169 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds. 1972).
337. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
338. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
339. 385 U.S. at 603.
340. Id.
341. The protection of minority interests from the power of the majority has been a theme of
constitutional analysis at least since The Federalist.Beginning with the CaroleneProducts footnote,
the potentially tyrannical power of the majority has encouraged judges to create constitutional protection for minority interests. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See
generallyJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusr: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW (1980) (developing
theory of judicial review based on premise that judicial role is to protect "discrete and insular minorities" from institutionalized unfairness of political process).
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qualified by background (most have advanced degrees), insulated from political buffeting and economic pressures, and familiar with constitutional
norms to perceive the special values of a university and to protect them
from legislation. Indeed, the judicial elaboration of academic abstention
has demonstrated their traditional regard for higher education. Similarly,
judges have shown themselves able to accommodate civic constitutional
norms, such as due process, with the legitimate needs of academic institutions. After all, it was the judiciary that fashioned constitutional academic
freedom, not the legislature or the academy.
Preserving the fundamental academic values of disinterested inquiry,
reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal education justifies a constitutional right of academic freedom."4 2 These goals give intellectual and educational expression to the vision of human reason implicit in the Constitution. The concern with liberal studies also provides limits on the scope of
constitutional protection. I have already argued that legislatures should be
permitted to regulate those undertakings of a university unrelated to liberal studies, so that universities can continue to serve public needs and
democratic values. Just as importantly, constitutional academic freedom
ought not to protect institutions resembling universities but which do not
pursue genuine liberal studies-that prohibit or consistently discourage
professors from following controversial arguments, that recognize no role
for faculty in governance, or that seek to indoctrinate rather than educate
students. In other words, universities that do not respect the academic
freedom of professors (understood as the core of the doctrine developed by
the AAUP) or the essential intellectual freedom of students (a concept
barely developed) ought not to be afforded institutional autonomy. 3 This
limitation, dictated by the justification for the right, may lessen fears that
institutional freedom will cloak extensive violations of professors' academic freedom by institutions bent on intellectual orthodoxy. Institutions
so perverse in their ends will suffer the loss of constitutional status, a risk
that may deter abuses.
342. Professor Gutmann's non-legal formulation is helpful:
When governmental regulations threaten to destroy the environment for scholarship and teaching, either by substantially lowering the intellectual quality of faculty and students or by
draining essential resources from academic to nonacademic areas, universities dedicated to free
scholarly inquiry can legitimately assert an institutional right to academic freedom, consistent
with (indeed, derived from) the right of their faculty to academic freedom.
A. GUTMANN, supra note 114, at 177. I, of course, believe that the constitutional right derives from
the structure of disinterested thought and that it is consistent with the tradition of academic freedom.
343. Courts now apply a similar test to determine whether the receipt of government funds by a
religiously-affiliated university violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: whether
the institution is "pervasively sectarian," thus designed to foster set precepts and proscribe behavior,
or whether teaching and scholarship occur in an "atmosphere of intellectual freedom." See Roemer v.
Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-56 (1976) (quoting Roemer district court opinion, 387 F.
Supp. 1282, 1295 (D. Md. 1974)); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-82 (1971)
(applying similar standard). In Roemer, the Court specifically noted that the colleges in question
subscribe to, and abide by, the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom. 426
U.S. at 756.
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Such a mechanism can lessen-but not eliminate-the tension between
institutional autonomy and faculty autonomy. Two further points about
faculty autonomy should be made: First, the interests of students, alumni,
parents, employees, and other constituencies in the work of the university
are legitimate; professorial concerns inevitably must co-exist with other
university interests. Second, those incidents of faculty autonomy won by
creative and persistent agitation through non-legal channels have tended
both to be the most significant and the most prized of faculty prerogatives;
internal faculty governance powers worth exercising will rarely be won by
judicial decree. Government abstinence from interference in university affairs will more likely result in workable allocations of authority suitable to
the diverse missions of the university than will judicial restructuring.
Stating these general principles and justifications does not eliminate
problems of application. Which actual university functions are so closely
tied to liberal studies that they cannot be regulated? Some may charge in
frustration that I have traversed much ground to return where many
scholars have started-that constitutional academic freedom protects the
right of the professor to teach and write without ideological interference. 3" While this is obviously a cardinal virtue of liberal studies, it states
both too broad and too narrow a view of the place of liberal studies in the
university. It is too broad in the sense, explained in Part IV, that penalization of faculty-particularly through peer evaluation-on the basis of
their work is an essential part of the process of academic discourse. Thus,
faculty should not be able legally to challenge good faith, internal personnel decisions as violations of academic freedom. On the other hand, nonacademic officials should never be able to trouble professors about the ideological tendencies of their work. It is too narrow in the sense, elaborated
in Part V, that the First Amendment should protect also the social structures and collective judgments that permit cooperative enterprises of scholarship and liberal learning to flourish.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy has come to be
understood as the four freedoms offered by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.'-"""
The four freedoms adequately express the degree of autonomy necessary
for a university to harbor liberal studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they recognize that liberal studies involve more than the simple act of speaking-that they require " 'that atmosphere which is most
344. See sources cited supra note 9.
345. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.' "' This requires security, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the hiring of competent
people, and the reward of excellence. Constitutional protection can preserve the possibility that academics might attain the goals of learning and
scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less.

346. Id.

